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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
1.1 Research Context 
A long time ago, around the fourth millennium BC, in the area of Mesopotamia or in the North 
Caucasus, an individual or maybe a community made an invention that revolutionised human 
civilisation – a wheel. Throughout the centuries, the wheel had seen improvements to its structure, 
durability, and materials. We can only guess how it was invented – most likely, it was an 
embodiment of observations of nature performed by an intelligent mind. Certainly, no 
professionally trained people made it; it is probably the oldest example of making. 
Prior to the era of mass production and fabrication, hand-production, repair of worn parts, re-
making and improving were a necessity and for many – a professional occupation. Nowadays, they 
are a way of self-fulfilment, satisfaction, and self-identification. Irrespective of industrial, economic, 
or psychological implications, tinkering and inventing by individuals constitutes a normal human 
behaviour and partakes in human development. 
Although curbed by the industrial revolution, tinkering and inventing were not completely 
eliminated. A certain portion of industrial invention came from users and workers, who were 
improving the performance of machines and devices they worked on. In The Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith gives the example of an improvement done by a 
boy who wanted to make some time for playing with his fellows. At the time of the first fire engine, 
many boys were employed to open and shut the communication between the boiler and the 
cylinder. The boy noticed that “by tying a string from the handle of the valve that opened the 
communication to another part of the machine, the valve would work without his assistance.” In 
this way, this minor change allowed him to gain valuable free time. As Smith reports, this was the 
first important improvement to the fire engine since its invention – an example of a minor technical 
modification that led to greater efficiency, cost-reduction, and time-saving.1 
Because of technological progress, devices and mechanisms became much more complicated, and 
hence required special preparation and knowledge to be fully comprehended. This development 
opened a path for popular science and technology magazines like Popular Mechanics, which 
presented complicated technical matters without resorting to a perplexing scientific jargon, and 
made them available and comprehensible for laymen. 
1 Adam Smith, The Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London: Penguin, 
1776/1999 fromMarcel Bogers, Allan Afuah, and Bettina Bastian, "Users as Innovators: A Review, Critique, 
and Future Research Directions," Journal of Management 36, no. 4 (2010): 858-59. 
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For a long time, user-generated solutions were regarded as a minor issue. It was not until the 1970s 
when professor Eric von Hippel launched a series of surveys on the role of user engagement in 
technological development. In the book The Source of Innovation (1988), he introduced the term 
user innovation to depict the shift form manufacturer-centred to user-centred innovation. By 
testing more than 100 innovations and showing that around 80% of them were provided by the 
users (firms and individuals) themselves, he proved that users could be a major source of 
innovation. At the same time, another great mind, the American futurist Alvin Toffler, introduced 
the term prosumer to describe a consumer actively involved in the product development and its 
commercialisation. 
How was the change possible? New communication technologies (means of communication) 
broadened the access to new ideas and communication between enthusiasts – resulting in the 
establishment of the open access movement. Greater access to higher education resulted in the 
emergence of a growing number of specialists who implement their knowledge into extra-curricular 
activities. Another important factor was the disillusionment with proprietary endeavours in closing 
software which ran counter to the communitarian and “free” spirit of sharing spread among the 
hackers and programmers of the 1970s. This was the first point of friction between users and 
rightsholders, when users had their natural right to use taken from them. 
An initiative undertaken by Richard Stallman, who launched the GNU Operating System (1983), 
stimulated the growth of similar communities and models (like Linux or Apache); and stimulated a 
counter-proprietary social movement. The organisational forms and philosophy of the movement 
leaked into the hardware scene (e.g. sport equipment), where people collaboratively improved 
products neglected by producers. 
Nowadays, the user innovation scene is dominated by Makers (individual innovators or prosumers), 
who bring great ideas into life. The notion behind the movement is new: it derives from the MAKE 
magazine (created by Dale Dougherty in 2005), the profile of which refers to the tradition of the 
aforementioned Popular Mechanics. In the globally connected world, the popularisation of the do-
it-yourself approach exceeded the bravest expectations of its proponents. Open making 
communities are growing like mushrooms – everyone may join them and everyone may post or 
comment on an idea in order to stimulate its further development. The engine of the movement is 
the makers’ self-motivation and their infectious enthusiasm.2 
2 A comprehensive list of research projects, studies, and articles on the maker movement: "Research on the 
Maker Movement,"  
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The expansion of the movement embraced high-tech fields such as robotics, electronics, and 3D 
printing, where makers become not only hobbyists, but true contributors to technological progress. 
Their technological advancement resulted in their growing awareness and interest in patent-related 
issues. 
The development of do-it-yourself culture was parallel to the increasing recognition of patents and 
other forms of intellectual property protection, which was a manifestation of a shift in the economy 
toward knowledge and human resources. This shift was the cause of friction between two 
discrepant approaches and philosophies: open communal workings and closed proprietary 
operations. The possibility of patenting ideas by individual inventors always existed, but changes in 
IP practice and the dynamic of making provoked concerns about the free use of the ideas of third 
parties. 
To that end, making and patents can be illustrated as two planets sharing the orbit of innovation, 
where they happen to collide… 
 
1.2 Research Development 
The project departed from the concept of individual user innovators, which was supported by the 
vast research done in the field of management (e.g. Eric von Hippel, Joachim Henkel, Cornelius 
Herstatt, Dietmar Harhoff), where users are seen as a non-exploitable source of innovation. The 
observations and studies perfectly characterised the main attributes of the maker movement, i.e. 
collectivity and openness, together with its economic inclinations; however, at the point of pre-
research, the studied literature did not deliver strong indications of the technological advancement 
of the user-innovated solutions. Moreover, the studies indicated a strong collaboration between 
user communities found on the Internet and companies – a feature that did not correspond with 
the assumed model of individuals freely cooperating with each other and working together on 
common projects. 
The work of Sonali Shah and Mary Tripsas on the accidental entrepreneurship of user-generated 
ideas3, land-marking for this project, indicated that users could be very successful in their workings 
and create good marketable products without the external support of companies. Another 
milestone work by Christina Raasch, Cornelius Herstatt, and Kerstin Balka, On the Open Design of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yRyWCpd1IpTuyM7ck6xWOvAzbqNmo9B1vKRbOu_-MeE/edit#, 
accessed 29.09.2015. 
3 Sonali K. Shah and Mary Tripsas, "The Accidental Entrepreneur: The Emergent and Collective Process of 
User Entrepreneurship," Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 1, no. 1-2 (2007). 
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Tangible Goods, described the project of the open 3D printer RepRap and indicated that users not 
only work on tangibles (beside open source software), but also engage in high-tech projects.4 It was 
significant that the RepRap community did not rely on any company and was built by 3D-printing 
enthusiasts. That was the most important pull of the project. 
One investigation path pertained to the ongoing transformation of the phenomenon of user-
generated solutions; the other concerned the formulation of the legal question. Making constitutes 
an important element of the innovation landscape. By contesting the classical paradigm of 
innovation incentivised by IP protection, it questions the established principles of patent law. With 
the exception of the works of Kathrine Strandburg5, the legal science has not devoted much 
attention to patent-related aspects of the user-generated inventions. 
In this context, next to the (rightful) affirmation of the phenomenon and its spectacular growth, a 
great stimulus for this research was the work of Viktor Braun and Cornelius Herstatt, User-
Innovation Barriers to Democratization and IP Licensing, which lays out legal, business, 
technological, and social barriers restraining users from tinkering with their goods. It was an 
inspiration to examine the patent system from the perspective of the balance of interests and the 
rights of users to freely exploit protected ideas. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
The project was commenced in the midst of heated debates on the misuse of the system by so-
called patent trolls, one of the many plagues of the patent system. The expansion of patentable 
subject-matters, the reinforcement of patent rights, patent wars between smartphone giants, were 
(and continue to be) the main themes in discussions on patent reforms. It has become clear that 
the system has stepped off the path of its laudable objectives in incentivising technological 
progress. 
Against this background, making represents a new trajectory of innovation based on free-sharing 
and communal workings. Regarded initially as a movement of low-impact developers, the speed 
and organisational progress of the maker movement speak to the fact that it has become a relevant 
                                                          
4 Christina Raasch, Cornelius Herstatt, and Kerstin Balka, "On the Open Design of Tangible Goods," R&D 
Management 39, no. 4 (2009). 
5 Katherine Strandburg, "What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain," Wisconsin 
Law Review 2004(2004); "User Innovator Comunity Norms at the Boundary Between Academic and 
Industry Research," Fordham Law Review 77(2009); "Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent 
Doctrine," University of Colorado Law Review 79(2008); "What If There Were a Business Method User 
Exemption to Patent Infringement?," Mich. St. L. Rev. 2008(2008); "Patent Fair Use 2.0," New York 
University Law and Economics Working Papers, no. 268 (2011). 
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market player in spite of its limited resources. Studies in the management field point to a growing 
interest of corporate entities in the makers’ solutions (e.g. Mindstorm Lego, the purchase of 
Makerbot by Stratasys), which implies the high monetization potential of such projects. However, 
the preponderance of makers’ solutions is developed without the patronage of bigger market 
players. 
In this context, the research focused on the applicability of existing patent limitations to the effects 
of patents in protecting makers from infringement liability. 
It was hypothesised that the communitarian profile of the movement and the uncontrollable 
dissemination of information, often in a form of instructions on how to introduce an improvement 
and replicate it, do not allow for the movement to fit under the protective umbrella of patent 
exceptions, an assumption which required further verification and become the aim of this project. 
The primary objective of the patent system is allowing for technological development, which is, on 
the one hand, safeguarded by granting patent protection limited timely and territorially; and, on 
the other, by maintaining a balance in regard to patent rights, which should neither harm nor 
become a large burden on the users and subsequent developers. Therefore, the pivotal axis of the 
project are patent limitations – instruments that derogate patent exclusivity from certain acts, 
without which the scope of patent monopoly would be excessive and detrimental to research and 
development. They serve not only as the openers of patent exclusivity, but also as tools of defence 
against infringement claims. 
In that respect, the project sets out to explore to what extent makers benefit from patent 
limitations in terms of the free use of patented solutions. Furthermore, it evaluates the adaptability 
and functionality of the patent system to a modern technological phenomenon such as making. In 
light of the formulated hypothesis, the project intends to advocate for the introduction of a new 
form of patent limitation tailored precisely to the context of making based on public and non-
commercial dissemination of knowledge.  
In terms of the underlying purpose, the project is driven by the strong ethical conviction in regard 
to the need to protect the weaker parties, here understood as individual end users and inventors, 
on the IP playground with its fierce rules of conduct. 
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1.4 Methodology 
To determine the accuracy of the hypothesis, a classic form of legal investigation, namely the 
comparative analysis of patent limitations was adopted in order to illustrate the main trends and 
assumptions in this subject-matter. The comparison covers four patent systems of the following 
countries – Germany, the UK, the USA, and Japan – selected for their significance in the global 
patent market. The four aforementioned patent systems belong to the main target countries for 
patent applications and important IP economies. Moreover, their national regulations or judicial 
decisions affect the international standards of IP protection. 
The analysis focuses on law application and substantive legal aspects which dominate over 
procedural ones. The comparison does not serve to indicate the “better” system, but the one with 
the greater freedom to operate. Considering the global unification of IP protection within the legal 
framework provided by the TRIPS Agreement, it stands to reason that questions of patent 
limitations would underlie similar considerations in the analysed systems. 
With respect to applied terminology, legal instruments limiting the effects of a patent are termed 
patent exceptions, patent limitations, or patent flexibilities. Only these terms are used in the 
aforementioned context by the author. The terms exemptions or exclusions are not regarded as 
suitable in this context, because they pertain to norms regulating subject matters excluded from 
patentability. However, some titles and direct citations used in this work may apply this wording in 
the context of patent exceptions. 
The legal norms and doctrines in the analysis are categorised into two groups: statutory and non-
statutory. The analysis of statutory limitations follows the catalogue of patent limitations provided 
in the UPC Agreement in Articles 27 and 28 (prior use) because of its exhaustiveness and topicality. 
The study also includes compulsory licensing as a countervailing measure, understood as a forceful 
instrument which derogates patent exclusivity. 
The UPC Agreement serves as a point of departure in the search for similar provisions in 
two non-European systems. In terms of non-statutory limitations, i.e. legal doctrines, the German 
system serves as a touchstone in the search for corresponding forms in other jurisdictions. 
Another path of investigation comprised of an empirical study on the makers’ experience with 
patents and patent law, which constitutes a measurable justification for this project. The survey 
was motivated to collect information on the willingness to patent solutions and on infringement 
claims against makers. The core part of the survey investigated the types of obstacles makers face 
in their activities, with the emphasis on patent-related matters. 
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1.5 Composition of the Work 
The work proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 introduces and explores the notion of the maker 
movement (making). It explains the inception of the phenomenon and its development into the 
current form. The chapter presents a complete picture of the movement and provides various 
examples of maker-driven products and collaborative projects. 
Chapter 3 delivers an overview of patent law and the patent system: its historical evolution, 
theories, and controversies. Due to the high complexity of this subject matter, the chapter only 
highlights points from the current discussions on the shape of the system. Despite a quite critical 
tone, it is not the purpose of this work to underestimate the contributions of patent law to 
technological progress. Instead, it is the misappropriate practice of patent law which warrants 
reconsiderations and changes. 
Chapter 4 outlines all found patent limitations, both statutory and non-statutory, and explores their 
application in selected jurisdictions. The chapter closes with an assessment of the compatibility of 
patent limitations with the making model. Likewise, Chapter 5 investigates compulsory licensing 
schemes and ends with an examination of its conditions applied to making. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates a novel patent limitation in regard to addressing the conditions of making 
– the green light license.  
The results of the online survey are included as an appendix due to their supplementary role in the 
project. 
  
14 
 
Chapter 2. WHO ARE MAKERS? 
2.1 Introduction 
We all are Makers. Beyond any doubt, everyone has certain tinkering skills: some people make their 
own clothes; others know how to repair their own car or build a house; those with high-tech skills 
know how create e.g. robots, 3D printers, or solar cells. Owing to breakthroughs in communication 
technology, people left their basements and garages with the aim of sharing their ideas and 
developing them with others. The process took the form of a viral infection, which lead to the 
establishment of diverse groups – communities of like-minded enthusiasts. 
This phenomenon has become the subject of the attention of scholars from diverse fields, such as 
sociology, management, and marketing. With a fine-tooth comb, scholars attempted to classify its 
features and frequencies, and, last but not least, to label it. Various depictions emerged to describe 
the phenomenon of innovative individuals: User Innovation (by Professor Eric von Hippel), 
Prosumption (by Alvin Toffler), Do-It-Yourself (DIY) (by Professor George McKay), and the Maker 
Movement (by Dale Dougerty). 
This study adopts the term maker as the most appropriate and up-to-date term describing 
resourceful people who work on technological projects: initiate and lead them to their completion. 
The observation of communities on Google+ concentrated around MAKE magazine and its 
derivatives, as well as other making groups6, clearly indicates the successful adoption of the term – 
the participants identify themselves as makers. Another term that often emerges is DIYers (also 
diyers), which is a generic term for people constructing things themselves. While the latter covers a 
variety of domains from knitting and crocheting to electronic gadgets and devices, making 
connotes with technology. Terms such as User Innovators or Prosumers are highly academic and 
circulate primarily in management and sociological literature. 
This chapter is designed to present the complete picture of making. Because makers innovate, the 
point of departure is the notion of innovation and its characteristics, which serves to locate the 
contributions of makers on the map of innovations. A historical insight into the evolution of the 
phenomenon allows us to understand the circumstances of its development to the current form. 
This involves investigating political, economic, and social changes in the post-war reality, such as 
the redirection of the economic paradigm to intangible resources and knowledge, the shift of focus 
on the consumer as a value co-creator, and the advent of new technologies. Knowing this, we can 
                                                          
6 E.g. Maker Faire, Maker Hangar; Makers, Hackers, Artists & Engineers; Makers – Electronics, 3D Printing & 
More. 
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focus on the features of making. Why do people get involved? How do they profit from innovating 
without patenting? These questions will be answered. Since making has various forms, a certain 
model had to be adopted in order to continue with subsequent stages of the project. On the 
backdrop of the full picture of making, recent cases of clashes with patent law are displayed as 
evidence justifying the standing of this research. 
 
2.2 The concept of Innovation  
Inn = Inv + Exp 
This simple formula presents innovation as the sum of two variables: invention and exploitation. 
The former denotes the generation of a new technical idea; the latter denotes its application, i.e. 
the transfer to the market and/or the society, with its “broad-base utilisation, dissemination, and 
diffusion.”7 A technological change is the logical consequence of implementing this math in 
practice.8 Despite the simplicity of the equation, the nature of innovation remains disputable. 
It is certain that innovations are inevitable: no civilizational progress would be possible without 
technological input. Joseph Schumpeter argued that all economic stages could be clarified through 
the lens of technological development9, and that every new development derived from a previous 
development. However, in his opinion only spontaneous and discontinuous new-combinations 
could be seen as the source of change: the implementation of a new combination (invention) could 
affect the form and the content of development.10 An invention as such, in Schumpeter’s view, had 
no greater meaning: “an invention was possible without anything; it did not necessarily induce 
innovation, but produced of itself (…) no economically relevant effect at all.”11 Solely the following 
actions constituted “the content of development” that resulted from “new combinations:” 
1) the manufacturing of new consumer products or introducing new product quality, 
2) the introduction of a new production method, 
                                                          
7 Edward Roberts, "What We've Learned. Managing Invention and Innovation," Research-Technology 
Management 31, no. 1 (1988): 13. 
8 Vernon Ruttan, "Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation and Technological Change," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 73, no. 4 (1959): 596. 
9 Ehud Zuscovitch, "The Economic Dynamics of Technologies Development," Research Policy 15, no. 4 
(1986): 175-76. 
10 Joseph Schumpeter, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung  (Berlin: Dunker Humbolt, 1964), 98. 
11 Joseph Schumpeter, Business Cycles, I, 84 from Ruttan, "Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation 
and Technological Change," 597. 
 Ruttan states that Schumpeter did not succeed in clarifying the concept of innovation. Ibid., 598. 
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3) the opening of a new market, i.e. a market of a relevant branch of industry that the country 
in question has not been introduced to, 
4) the conquest of a new supply source of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, 
regardless of whether the source of supply existed before or had to be created, 
5) the establishment of a new organisation, like the establishment or breaking up of a 
monopoly position.12 
The concept of innovation has been investigated in diverse fields. For example, the anthropologist 
H. G. Barnett defined an innovation as “any thought, behaviour, or thing that is new because it is 
qualitatively different from existing forms.”13 Everett Rogers, a sociologist, defined innovation as 
“newness” perceived by an individual: an idea, a practice, or an object is innovative (new), if it is so 
perceived by “an individual or other unit of adoption.”14 An innovation can be adopted only if it 
reaches its receivers (also other inventors), by dissemination through “communication channels.”15 
Coming back to the initial equation, an invention is an innovation minus exploitation:  
Inv = Inn – Exp. However, the simplicity of the formula is misleading because the notion of 
invention also bears a certain level of ambiguity: 
Is the invention the idea; or the first conception of a way of using the idea; or the 
actual working utilisation of the ides; or the compounding together of two existing 
ideas; or the effective fusion of two ideas for a useful purpose?16 
While an invention is an artefact of human inventive activity, an innovation is the invention served 
to the public, in a process which imbues the invention with a practical and economic meaning. 
Without the transfer to the society (market), an invention remains just an idea without a broader 
emanation.17  
Some scholars rejected this inconvenient distinction between invention and innovation, arguing 
that innovating embraces the entire process from the invention to the technological change (this 
being the practical application of innovation in technology and business).18  
                                                          
12 Schumpeter, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 100-01.  
13 Thomas Robertson, "The Process of Innovation and the Diffusion of Innovation," Journal of Marketing 31, 
no. 1 (1967): 14. 
14 Likewise by Robert Dewar and Jane Dutton, "The Adoption of Radical and Incremental Innovations: An 
Empirical Analysis," Management Science 32, no. 11 (1986): 1422. 
15 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 3 ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1983), 11. 
16 John Jewkes, David Sawers, and Richard Stillerman, The Source of Invention, 2 ed. (Edinburgh: Macmillan, 
1969), 25. 
17 Ruttan, "Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation and Technological Change," 599. 
18   ibid., 606. 
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A. P. Usher formulated a cumulative synthesis approach, according to which the emergence of a 
new idea (an invention) is an act of insight that exceeds the standard application of one’s 
knowledge and skills. Concisely, he outlined the following steps: 1) the perception of the problem, 
2) setting the stage (compiling the elements for the solution), 3) the act of insight when the 
solution to a problem emerges, 4) critical revision (testing the solution). Here, the individual act of 
insight becomes the agent of the new thing. Usher’s theory unified the inventive and innovative 
processes and was intended to apply in diverse domains (from science to arts).19 
In practice, such comprehension of a process manifests itself only when an idea moves smoothly to 
the application stage and becomes available on the market – a tested prototype does not end the 
process. Otherwise, an idea ends up as e.g. a costly patent that does not have any greater 
significance for the society. 
The shift from an invention into an innovation is time-demanding and requires certain conditions – 
opportunities. A success in “innovating” can be attributed to knowledge, ingenuity, focus, and 
purposeful work20: 
There are (...) innovations that spring from a flash of genius. Most innovations, 
however, especially the successful ones, result from a conscious purposeful 
search for innovation opportunities, which are found in only a few situations. 
Four such areas of opportunities exist within the company (...): unexpected 
occurrences, incongruities, process needs, industry and market changes. Three 
additional sources of opportunities outside a company (...): demographic 
changes, changes in perception, new knowledge. (...)[T]ogether they account for 
the great majority of all innovation opportunities.21 
The innovation process is determined by multiple factors characterised by a high level of 
inconsistency and speculation. Preconditioned by an invention, the process modifies a technical 
idea into a solution (a piece of technology) that has a real impact on social life and economy.22 
Patents constitute an important factor of the invention-into-innovation transition. On the 
dichotomy map, they are located right after the invention they are granted for and precede the 
workings on innovations, i.e. further developments and commercialisation, that they largely 
stimulate but do not guarantee. 
                                                          
19 ibid.. 
 See also A.P. Usher, A History of Mechanical Inventions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); 
"Historical Implications of the Theory of Economic Development," The Review of Economics and Statistics 
33, no. 2 (1951). 
20 Peter Drucker, "The Discipline of Innovation," Harvard Business Review 76, no. 6 (1998). 
21 ibid., 4.. 
22 "Measuring Innovation. A new Perspective,"  (OECD, 2010), 12. 
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2.2.1 The Degree of Departure 
Various typologies of innovations have evolved over time. Innovations are classified according to: 
a) the type of solution – product vs. processing, or 
b) the nature of the problem they solve – technical vs. organisational, or  
c) the degree of changes they introduce - radical vs. incremental.23 
The last category is of a special attention in academia and among practitioners. Radical innovations, 
Schumpeterian new combinations, signify fundamental and revolutionary changes; involve a high 
degree of expertise and involve complex organisational preparation. They bring new qualities and 
benefits to the market.24 Incremental innovations are improvements on current technologies; the 
complexity and the novelty of their technological content are significantly lower than in the case of 
radical innovations.25  
Discontinuous (disruptive, radical) innovations are accompanied by a high level of technological and 
economic uncertainty (risk) – they are rather risky departure from existing practice and 
technology.26 Major changes require new skills, a profound market understanding, and expanded 
processing abilities. Their feasibility and potential applications can be determined through 
prototyping and a thorough market analysis.27 The distinction depends on the perception of the 
departure-degree from existing technology and knowledge.28  
Somewhere between those two types reside re-inventions, i.e. changes provided during the 
process of implementation and/or adaptation of the invention: “the new idea departed from the 
mainline version of the innovation that was initially promoted.”29 
This is possible because an invention is a bundle of components with differing intensities – during 
the re-invention process all or only some components might undergo alternations. In inventions 
with highly correlated elements, one element cannot be changed without changing the other. In 
                                                          
23 S. Gopalakrishnan and F. Damanpour, "A Review of Innovation Research in Economics, Sociology and 
Technology Management,," International Journal of Management Science 25, no. 1 (1997): 18-19. 
24 Robert Veryzer, "Discontinuous Innovation and the New Product Development Process," Journal of 
Product innovation Management 15, no. 4 (1998): 307-08. 
25 Dewar and Dutton, "The Adoption of Radical and Incremental Innovations: An Empirical Analysis," 1422-
23. 
26 John Ettlie, William  Bridges, and Robert O'Keefe, "Organisation Strategy and Structural Differences for 
Radical Versus Incremental Innovation," Management Science 30, no. 6 (1984): 683. 
27 Veryzer, "Discontinuous Innovation and the New Product Development Process," 317. 
28 Dewar and Dutton, "The Adoption of Radical and Incremental Innovations: An Empirical Analysis," 1423. 
29   Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 17. 
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the case of a loose bundle, inventors can mix and adjust only necessary elements.30 Re-inventing 
can be triggered e.g. by problems with converting the original idea into a practical solution, false 
assumptions on applications, and the unpreparedness of customers to use the invention. A re-
invention constitutes “a response to a threat of political survival of the innovation.”31 
 
2.2.2 The Offer of Makers 
Makers perform all types of innovating: a solution might be a completely new idea, drafted from 
scratch, or an improvement over an existing product. The defining variable of makers is their use of 
a solution in a beneficial manner. Professor Eric von Hippel calls this paradigm “the functional 
source of innovation”32, in which the use itself constitutes the main incentive to innovate. 
The distinction between an invention (a pure technical idea) and an innovation (the idea put into 
practice) does not occur because makers develop solutions with the purpose of using them – the 
transition from an inventive idea into an applied innovation is immediate and fluent.  
Makers are in charge of the complete development process – they are the fundamental agents of 
innovation: they recognise the problem, find the solution, and build a prototype.33 As studies 
documented, fabrication of the innovation and its commercialisation is handed over to 
manufacturers, but not in every case.34 The open source projects best illustrate makers’ self-
sufficiency in product conceptualisation, creation, distribution, and management. Here, 
manufacturing capacity is not even required as the whole process is digitalised. The situation differs 
in the case of physical products, where the manufacturer's involvement can contribute to a wider 
dissemination of the innovation due to lower production costs.35 
The spectrum of Makers’ innovations is enormous: sport equipment, electronics, robotics, 3D 
printing, engineering, and software. Mountain bikes, surfboards and their derivatives, and kayaks 
are classical illustrations of “revolutionary” making. 
                                                          
30 Ronald Rice and Everett Rogers, "Reinvention in the Innovation Process," Science Communication 1, no. 4 
(1980): 503. 
31 ibid., 502-03. 
32 Eric von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation (New York Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3. 
33   Democratizing Innovation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 13-15. 
34 "The Dominant Role of Users in the Scientific Instrument Innovation Process," Research Policy 5, no. 3 
(1976). 
35 Dietmar Harhoff, Joachim Henkel, and Eric von Hippel, "Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: 
How Users Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations," ibid.32, no. 10 (2003). 
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Just a quick look through maker communities leaves the one with the impression of the great 
richness, diversity, and advancement of makers’ capabilities. Depending on their knowledge and 
expertise, they can either provide complex solutions or suggest some minor improvements.36 
Proficiency is not required because making assumes “learning by doing (and by playing)”37 – 
“Makers at their core are enthusiasts.”38 Community posts reflect the eagerness and happiness 
stemming from the simple act of making. As a result, the technological know-how imparted into 
projects has skyrocketed in recent years. 
A great example of a maker project is the 3D printer project RepRap, developed by a community 
under the same name, which was founded in 2005 by Dr. Andrian Bowyer, a senior lecturer of 
mechanical engineering at the University of Bath. RepRap was the first low-cost printer that started 
the revolution of open-source 3D printing. The first RepRap printer 1.0, named “Darwin,” printed its 
first parts in 2008. Its 2.0 version, “Mendel,” was produced in 2009, and the third generation, 
“Huxley” – in 2010.39 
Another example from the basket of low-cost open projects is Arduino – a single-board 
microcontroller designed around the Atmel AVR microcontroller. It was launched in 2005 by 
students of the Interaction Design Institute in Ivrea (Italy) in order to simplify the process of 
electronic prototyping. Nowadays, it enables ”everyday people with little or no technical 
background to create interactive products.” Currently Arduino can be purchased as pre-assembled 
or assembled, at the costs of approx. $30; with even cheaper variations available for $9 (Chinese 
models available for $4). As stated on its Google+ profile, Arduino exists due to three factors: 
1) a small electronic board manufactured in Italy that makes it easy and affordable to learn to 
program a microcontroller, a type of tiny computer found inside millions of everyday 
objects; 
2) a free software application used to program the board; 
                                                          
36 Viktor Braun and Cornelius Herstatt, User-Innovation. Barriers to Democratization and IP Licensing  (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 4; Christoph Hienerth, "The Commercialization of User Innovations: The 
Development of the Rodeo Kayak Industry," R&D Management 36, no. 3 (2006); Christopher Lettl, 
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from Four Cases in the Field of Medical Equipment Technology," ibid.; Sonali Shah, "Sources and Patterns 
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4105 Sloan School of Management (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000); von 
Hippel, Democratizing Innovation 14-15.  
37  John Dewey strongly propagated this learning method. See Alex Howard, "The Maker Movement's 
Potential for Education, Jobs and Innovation is Growing,"  http://radar.oreilly.com/2011/11/dale-
dougherty-make-white-house.html, accessed 09.05.2014; Christopher Voss, "The Role of Users in the 
Development of Applications Software," Journal of Product Innovation Management 2, no. 1 (1985): 117. 
38 Dale Dougherty, "The Maker Movement," Innovations 7, no. 3 (2012): 12. 
39 "RepRap Project,"  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RepRap_Project, accessed 10.05.2014; "RepRap.org,"  
https://plus.google.com/communities/108419464619607320823, accessed 09.05.2014.  
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3) a vibrant community with a true expression of the enthusiasm powering the project.40 
Mr. Beam is an open source, DIY portable laser cutter and engraver kit for wood, metal, or plastic, 
designed by Mr. Beam Lasers located in Munich. As the authors explain, they were inspired by the 
RepRap printer kit and by other self-made laser cutters like ct hacks Laserplotter, 
Laseraur, and Domestic Hacks. (They also implemented the Arduino microcontroller into the kit.)41 
Raspberry Pi is another open source project powered by individuals. It is a low-cost single board 
computer (a mini-computer) developed by the Raspberry Pi Foundation, founded in 200642, which 
gathers teachers, academics, and computer enthusiasts with the aim of promoting computer 
science among youngsters – to “make programming fun again.” Raspberry Pi can be plugged into a 
computer monitor or a TV set; it also requires a mouse and a keyboard. Popular at schools, it 
supports teaching students (and adults) how a computer works and how to program in languages, 
such as Scratch or Python. Its schematics, together with printed circuit board, were publicly 
disclosed. The Raspberry Pi B model costs $35, the Model A – $25. Because of its price and a wide 
functionality, Raspberry Pi is used in various maker projects, e.g. music machines and weather 
stations.43 
A brand new project, Pepino, is a comprehensive drag&drop programming tool. As stated on the 
webpage, “Pepino is a complete open source micro-controllers development environment 
(hardware and software) web based Drag & Drop solution.” It was developed by Tovi Levis as his 
final project at the Afeka College of Enginnering (Israel). Non-programmers are also able to easily 
apply Pepino, since no lines of code are necessary to develop a program due to the availability of 
drag&drop tools. It is installed on a Raspberry Pi B that connects to an Arduino based on Atmel 
                                                          
40 "Arduino,"  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arduino, accessed 09.05.2014; " About Arduino,"  
https://plus.google.com/+Arduino/about, accessed 09.05.2014; "Massimo Banzi: How Arduino is Open-
Sourcing Imagination,"  
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42 Founded by: Eben Upton, Rob Mullins, Jack Lang and Alan Mycroft, based at the University of Cambridge’s 
Computer Laboratory. "The Making of PI,"  http://www.raspberrypi.org/about/, accessed 10.05.2014. 
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atmega328. The source code along with installation instructions has been published online in May 
2014.44 
A “must-mention” is Limor Fried's company Adafruit Industries, which is based in New York. Limor, 
an electrical engineer by profession, founded a company distributing online electronic parts and 
kits for original, open source hardware electronics featured on the website adafruit.com. Apart 
from this, Limor’s other projects are documented on the website ladyada.net. With more than 3 
million followers on google+, Adafruit, and “associated” community platforms, Fried is able to hold 
massive brainstorming sessions on diverse electronic projects.45 
 
2.3 Making a Place for Makers 
The maker movement is a phenomenon of the last decade, but its roots go back to the late 1970s, 
with economic and technological breakthroughs initiated at that time. Concepts such as value of 
use, intangibility, customer co-creation, and, last but not least punk, culture, modified the customer 
relation together with the profile of modern business. Most importantly, they conceived a safe 
niche for creative and inventive individuals. 
 
2.3.1 Historical Insight 
The classical economic view established in the advent of the Industrial Revolution focused 
predominantly on tangible output (a commodity), the value of which was embedded in its exchange 
capacity (value of exchange46). Emphasis was put on the production and its size. Fordism, a business 
model named after Henry Ford, based around standardised mass production (with subordinated 
                                                          
44 "Project Pepino,"  http://pepino.tovilevis.com/, accessed 09.05.2014; "Drag & Drop Programming with 
Pepino,"  http://atmelcorporation.wordpress.com/2014/05/08/drag-drop-programming-with-pepino/, 
accessed 10.05.2014; "tlevis/Pepino,"  https://github.com/tlevis/Pepino, accessed 10.08.2014. 
45 "About Limor Fried,"  https://plus.google.com/+ladyada/about, accessed 09.05.2014; "Limor Fried,"  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adafruit, accessed 09.05.2014; "About Adafruit Industries,"  
https://plus.google.com/+adafruit/about, accessed 09.05.2014. 
46 “The exchange value” is a theoretical concept which describes the value of an object “ when placed in a 
value or exchange with another commodity of a different kind”, e.g. milk and chicken. 
 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England. 1867 (New York: 
Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 2001): 88 from Ashlee   Humphreys and Kent  
Grayson, "The Intersectiong Roles of Consumer and Producer: A Critical Perspective on Co-production, Co-
creation and Prosumption," Sociology Compass 2/3(2008): 965. 
23 
 
mass consumption), remains a good example of that mind-set.47 Activities were ranked by their 
productivity, which was the core wealth accumulation factor; hence, another important factor was 
the (implied) durability of the output. In the view of classicists like Adam Smith, services were 
useful as such, but did not contribute to value creation; utility (value in use48) itself did not have a 
direct impact on the increase of net capital and was categorised as unproductive.49 According to 
Karl Marx, the value in use “becomes a reality only by use or consumption”50, which implies 
subjectivity51, and so cannot be recognised as a measurable and reliable trade asset. Those 
theoretical assumptions negatively affected the position of services and customers in the capitalist 
society of the time. Services did not generate profit52 and customer consumption was considered as 
value destruction.53 By the same token, interaction with the customer as a source of value creation 
was out of the question – the companies equipped with sets of tools were targeting and managing 
“their” customers.  
The post-1945 reality was marked by the shift of economic attention from production to 
consumption.54 The post-war consumerism “replenished desires of the war scarcity on consumer 
goods”, but was also a successful tool of economic recovery. The growing demand for consumer 
goods ensured peacetime prosperity despite the intensive military production for the purposes of 
the Cold War. In the USA, consumption was promoted as a civic responsibility, as it was a crucial 
element of the prosperity-producing cycle: “the good customer devoted to more, newer and better 
was in fact the good citizen, responsible for making the United States a more desirable place for all 
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its people.”55 Even the oil crisis from 1973 did not stop consumption. On the contrary, consumption 
as the public duty proliferated and accelerated (however, due to the decline in domestic 
production, the quantity of imported goods increased). “Cathedrals of consumption” were 
springing up like mushrooms.56  
The late 1960s and 1970s were stigmatised with socio-political disturbances, such as the Vietnam 
War, racial tension, immigration, threats of terrorism, and economic unease. Slower growth and 
higher inflation forced the review and reorganisation of the economic regime, which resulted in the 
erosion of Fordism and its mass production.57 The technological changes have led to economic 
shifts as well. Entrepreneurs propagated the free market, free trade, and the free flow of 
information – ideals strongly promulgated in the era of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Regan. The 
Left promoted the Post-Industrial Society as “a modern version of Jeffersonian democracy.”58 
Additionally, postmodern philosophy destabilised the traditional paradigm of the distinction 
between production and consumption. The postmodernists acknowledged consumption as a 
productive process, in the course of which consumers produce their own identity and actively 
participate in value creation.59  
At the same time, however, massive consumerism triggered its counter movement, the best 
expression of which was the punk culture of the 1970s. Anti-mainstream music, independent 
recording studios, as well as independent distribution venues pronounced a deep desire of 
independence and self-expression. That mixture set in motion the Do-It-Yourself culture (DIY). The 
DIY culture was “a self-proclaimed cultural movement, challenging the symbolic codes of 
mainstream culture.”60 In the music sector, DIY bands were in charge of the complete production 
chain, and because they acted outside big recording studios, they established new ways of 
communicating with their fans. DIY culture spread among artists and artisans who opposed 
consumerism, mass-production, and the prevailing industrialised forms, in favour of bringing back 
the natural and individual sense of aesthetics by encouraging people to participate in hands-on 
activities. The DIY principles were clearly noticeable in the sport sector: skateboarding, surfing, 
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biking, or kayaking enthusiasts tended to repair and improve their equipment on their own. Here, 
the market shortage played a role: since the manufacturers did not furnish the market properly, the 
users took things into own hands. Politically, the DIY situated itself alongside the left movement 
and anarchism, but with time it evolved into a formation of various individuals, often politically 
neutral, dedicated to making things for their own joy.61 As Cosmo, a DIY activist, said: 
(…) DiY culture was born when people got together and realized that the only way 
forward was to do things for themselves.… Ingenuity and imagination are the key 
ingredients.… Free parties, squat culture, the traveller movement and later Acid 
House parties pay testament to the energy and vision of people who decided it was 
now time to take their destinies into their own hands.62 
It is indisputable that developments in electronics and communication technologies assisted that 
transformation and affected a wide spectrum of activities in the post-industrial society.63 The 
Internet and other communication platforms facilitated the exchange and dissemination of ideas 
(viral distribution). Computer innovations and software applications made it possible to produce 
high quality works at home; eventually, home-based start-ups could compete with giant 
companies. Through low-cost hardware and software, individuals have become independent and 
self-sufficient. IT technologies have brought into life the Industrial Revolution 2.0.64 
 
2.3.2 Intangible Resources – Speed instead of Size 
The Industrial Revolution established the conviction that high profits could be generated only by 
mass-production. Capital accumulation became the main paradigm: the more capital was 
accumulated, the more resources for the production could be purchased. The distribution of capital 
in society, however, remained unequal, creating wealth disparities.65 Karl Marx foretold the 
collapse of the flawed system. Society, however, was not liberated by communism, but information 
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technology: Marx’ dream of the “capitalist worker came true in Silicon Valley.”66 Technology 
launched the Knowledge Revolution, in the course of which knowledge rose to the position of the 
fundamental parameter of economic growth. The source of wealth drifted to intellectual capital.67  
The core variable of the modern system is change – those who manage change become leaders. 
According to Gordon Smith and Russell Parr, in the new regime there is no time to accumulate 
expertise in all areas and there is no room for a not-invented-here mind-set.68 
Furthermore, the new paradigm of intangibility has shaken the classical economic doctrine: it 
introduced the notion of the abundance of resources. Knowledge is the asset of the modern 
economy – endlessly consumed and multiplied, unaffected by the number of users, it can be sold 
many times over, which may only increase its value.69 Knowledge can be everything from an 
opinion to an observation, captured in diverse communication means, e.g. emails and reports. 
Likewise, intangible assets are of great value to the company.70 Neither is declared on financial 
statements.71 Human capital has evolved to the status of the most important intangible asset. It 
denotes the know-how extracted from employees and customers. In the knowledge economy, 
everything starts and ends with people who possess knowledge. This understanding results in an 
immense appreciation of customers: “today the customer capital counts”72 – strong and sustainable 
relations with customers contribute to the company's success. The customer from the 1960s was 
accustomed to the one-size-fits-all, or the zero-services approach. Nowadays, customers expect to 
participate fully in the product or service design in order to ensure that the product matches their 
individual needs. Those companies succeed which shape good relations with their customer and 
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possess the most knowledge about the customer.73 The competition rests upon the paradigm of 
being the first, of anticipating trends ahead of others – flexibility is the remedy for entrepreneurial 
anxieties. Under these circumstances, Haeckel formulated “sense and respond” strategy, which 
transformed into a leading post-industrial managerial paradigm and replaced the rigid “make and 
sell” business model.74  
 
2.3.3 Embedding Customer Knowledge into Business Strategies 
Under the new paradigm, marketing practitioners had to answer the following question – “how to 
meet customer needs?” “People don't want to buy a quarter-inch drill. They want a quarter-inch 
hole.”75 The success relied on the proper recognition of practical, emotional, and aspirational 
dimensions of a potential customer, which were later associated with a specific product.76 
Customer-centricity was followed by greater openness and stronger interactions between 
companies and customers. The process of “opening” was aided with new communication 
technologies, which also helped customers communicate with one another. They liberated 
themselves from their dependency on companies: the exchange of ideas allowed them to learn 
new perspectives and share expertise on companies’ services.77  
 
2.3.3.1 The Concepts of Co-creation and Co-production 
The concept of customer-centricity evolved into the concept of co-creation understood as joint 
problem solving. Co-creation assumes a personalised interaction between the customer and the 
company: the customer shares with the company their unique experience; the company gains 
access to new resources (an infinite source of creation) and builds its competitive advantage. 78 
Eric von Hippel coined the term customer-active paradigm (CAP) in contrast to the manufacturer-
active paradigm (MAP), and refuted for good the archetype of the manufacturer as the only 
possible innovator. The CAP assumes that the customer provides an idea for a new industrial 
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75 Clayton Christensen, Scott Cook, and Taddy Hall, "Marketing Malpractice: The Cause and the Cure," 
Harvard business review 83, no. 12 (2005): 4. 
76 ibid., 6-8. 
77 C. K. Prahalad and Venkat Ramaswamy, "Co-Creation Experiences: The Next Practice in Value Creation," 
Journal of Interactive Marketing 18, no. 3 (2004): 6. 
78 ibid. 
28 
 
product or service to a selected manufacturer. A chosen manufacturer responds to the customer's 
request by “screening” emerging ideas for new designs, and selecting the most promising design 
available. In the study, Hippel remarked that the “customer request” may contain a partial or 
complete product solution.79 With this concept and further studies, he opened an interesting 
chapter on non-manufacturer-generated innovations and propelled users (customers) to the 
forefront. 
C.K. Prahald and Venkat Ramaswamy proposed a model of co-creation that consisted of four 
characteristics (blocks): dialogue, access, risk-benefits,, and transparency (DART). The DART 
describes a constant process of encountering the customer. The dialogue can be enhanced only 
through open access and the high transparency of the information. This allows the customer to 
understand the whole context of the ongoing action and to assess the risk-benefits of the offering. 
Each DART block is of equal importance for the proper interaction. The outcome of co-creation is 
the experience. All points of the interaction are opportunities for value creation and extraction. The 
DART model enables companies to co-shape the expectations and experiences with the customer.80 
Another interesting concept by Stephen Vargo and Robert Lusch presents the co-creation within 
the service-dominant logic as a counterpoint to the traditional concept of good-dominant logic, 
which illustrates the shift from tangible toward intangible resources.81 The new dominant logic 
homes in on specialised skills and know-how: services are “the application of specialised 
competences (knowledge and skills) through deeds, processes and performances”82, and are 
integrated with goods. Co-creation as defined by Vargo and Lusch shares similarities with the 
distinction between operand and operant resources introduced by Constantin and Lusch. Operand 
resources, primary for good-dominant logic, were defined as “resources on which an operation or 
act is performed to produce an effect;” operant resources, substantial for service-dominant logic, 
“were employed to act on operand resources.” The latter are invisible, intangible, dynamic, and 
infinite; they easily multiply and create additional operant resources. The embodiment of this 
rather abstract idea is the microprocessor, where an operand resource, silica, was embedded with 
an operant resource, knowledge.83 By applying these concepts to the service dominant logic, we 
come to the conclusion that the customer is an operant resource acting and performing on operand 
resources. The new logic rejects the dichotomy of production and consumption. The market is seen 
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as a platform of continuing social and economic processes: interactivity, integration, and 
cooperation.84  
The concept of co-production, in which the customer rises to the role of the co-producer, goes a 
step further – the customer assumes certain activities, which were previously performed by the 
company. Co-production denotes a shared product design and shared production, e.g. assembling 
IKEA furniture. It occurs when the customer wants to “exercise the control over the process or the 
outcome of service.” The customer engages in the governance of the project and provides 
additional quality control over its performance. The company gains competitive advantage through 
enhanced customer experience.85 
In the co-reality, the impetus comes from the customer to the manufacturer. This approach has 
proven to be more efficient, as nowadays customer needs change rapidly and are much more 
heterogeneous, making traditional “exploration” time and cost consuming. To facilitate this process, 
companies provide their customers with toolkits86 to obtain direct information about their product 
expectations. A great advantage of toolkits is the cost reduction of information transfer. Computer 
designs and production technologies are areas of great applicability of toolkits; in some production 
fields toolkits are the best option, in others they are are less effective, as they cannot substitute 
very refined human skills. Nonetheless, as studies showed, both users and companies take great 
advantage of them.87 
 
2.3.3.2 DIYers and Technological Makers 
Customer engagement goes even further in the concept of prosumption88, which has been coined 
by Alvin Toffler, an American futurist, and is an amalgamation of the terms producer and 
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consumer.89 In Toffler’s view, the producer-consumer hybrid is much more than just a figure: “a 
prosumer is the liberator of humankind,” who generates “the first truly humane civilization in 
recorded history.”90 A prosumer derives great satisfaction from creating, making, producing, and 
obtaining new skills.91 Economic necessity is not the main drive; it is a lifestyle option - a way to 
express own personality, own ethos.92 Toffler’s presumption reflects well in the DIY culture. DIY 
projects involve raw and semi-raw materials and components to produce, transform, or 
reconstruct. Compared with co-concepts, DIY implies higher material costs, and requires higher 
skills, knowledge, as well as more time. Studies show that DIY behaviour results from a mixture of 
factors, varying from economic to personal that is: 
1) the expected economic benefits (saving money93), 
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2) the insufficient quality of the market offering (DIYers can perform simply better than 
professionals do), 
3) the lack of product availability on the market,  
4) the need for customisation (DIYers create products tailored to their own particular 
needs94),  
5) discretionary time to complete DIY project, 
6) identity enhancement (self-satisfaction, feeling of empowerment), 
7) community sharing (the feeling of connectedness with others), 
8) enjoyment and happiness.95 
Whereas DIY can be regarded as a generic term for all self-made activities, e.g. cooking, and manual 
and creative works, the Maker movement represents its technology-centred extension, with MAKE 
magazine and the blog Boing Boing as its social representatives. 96  
MAKE is a 21st century equivalent of Popular Mechanics that inspired individuals to play with 
engineering, learn new skills, and find like-minded makers.97 However, MAKE did something more – 
it catalysed the worldwide growth of the movement. As stated on its homepage, “this is a magazine 
that celebrates your right to tweak, hack, and bend any technology to your own will.”98 The growth 
of makers is correlated with the establishment of (bio)hackerspaces, makerspaces, and FabLabs all 
around the world. These are physical places for people to share tools and ideas, or to fabricate their 
prototypes.99  
“We’ve had this merging of DIY with technology,” says Bre Pettis, co-founder of NYC 
Resistor, one of the first hackerspaces, in Brooklyn. “I’m calling it Industrial 
Revolution 2.”100 
The Maker Movement has enormous momentum: it fuels social well-being and the economy, and 
for that reason could not remain unnoticed, even in the White House. The democratisation of 
technology was appreciated by proclaiming June 18 the National Day of Making in the USA.101 
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2.4 An Escape from Labelling – Characteristics of the Movement 
Two aspects of DIY and making are crucial to the legal questions this study explores and intends to 
answer. Making is a collective activity that is possible only thanks to the free dissemination of 
information. 
 
2.4.1 Communities 
Innovating communities are “nodes consisting of individuals interconnected by information transfer 
links, which may involve face-to-face, electronic, or other communication.”102 They vary in size, 
organizational structures, and subject matters. A community might be a group of friends and family 
members or a well-organised community with a paid membership. Coordinated by leading users103 
and forum moderators, communities can introduce very competitive products to the market. The 
membership is not restricted to one community; maker communities are open to everyone and 
people join different groups, which intensifies the exchange of knowledge.104  
Observations of collective innovation lead to the conclusion that the assistance of community 
members improves the overall quality of innovation and its dissemination.105 The synergy effect 
explains the success of communities in accomplishing their goals: the greater the number of 
entrants, the higher the quality and the frequency of assistance, the stronger the cooperation and 
the greater the number of problems identified and solved.106 A classic example of a com unity is the 
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Apache software community. Its designer, Rob McCool, revealed the source code of NCSA HTTPd 
web server in the 1990s, so that others could download it and modify. The community members 
carefully documented all modifications and bugfixes, and continued developing the code in the 
form of “a consolidated patch.”107 The same occurs the in RepRap or Raspberry Pi communities. 
The Raspberrians are additionally involved in educational activities, as the Raspberry mission is the 
popularisation of computer science among children. Despite the prevalence of online communities, 
the maker scene also has a great offer of offline communities such as Dorkbot, whose members 
meet in person to discuss new electronic gadgets.108 Another example is TechShop, organised via 
membership-based workshops that offer tools, equipment, sophisticated 2D and 3D design 
software, instructions, and the support of community members in “building your dreams.”109 MAKE 
magazine has a great offer of offline community meetings. The most important with a great 
publicity is Make Faire: “Maker Faire is the Greatest Show (and Tell) on Earth—a family-friendly 
festival of invention, creativity, and resourcefulness, and a celebration of the Maker movement.”110 
It started in 2006 (a year after the first issue of MAKE) in the Bay Area and grew rapidly, reaching in 
2013 a record attendance of 195,000 makers during MAKE Faire in NYC and the Bay Area. With 
time, MAKE Faires expanded throughout the world and are now organized in Rome, Tokyo, 
Santiago, Oslo, and Hannover. Such meetings offer the chance of showcasing projects which are 
being developed privately in basements and garages.111 Last but not least, makers spin off their 
spaces into various derivatives: next to makerspaces, there are hackerspace and biohackerspace 
communities, both online and offline, which make feel people connected and happy. The positive 
attitude of participants, who want to share and build, strengthens the movement. That leads to 
another feature of Makers and DIYers – the sharing of information. 
 
2.4.2 Open Sharing 
Open sharing112 (free revealing) contradicts the classical proprietary approach, where the return on 
investment is assured by keeping knowledge locked113 – any involuntary information leakage 
impairs the awaited compensation of the investment. 
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When we say that an innovator “freely reveals proprietary information”, we mean 
that all existing and potential intellectual property rights to that information are 
voluntarily given up by that innovator and all interested parties are given access to 
it.114 
As studies have shown, neither legal protection nor trade secrecy are an effective and appealing 
instrument for Makers115 - sharing is a fundamental part of the Maker conduct.116 
Why do Makers disclose information? Sharing connects like-minded people. It offers a great 
learning opportunity and an opportunity for teaching its members. It is a cycle: you share a bit of 
your wisdom to teach others, and you immediately get a question back when you have to reflect on 
your information. Personal ambition, satisfaction, and enjoyment are among many driving factors. 
In addition, it is easy: it suffices to post a photo or a comment.117  
From a wider perspective, free revealing fosters the dissemination of and development of ideas: all 
entrants permanently update and monitor the process. Collaboration enhances the process 
efficiency; the increase of knowledge positively affects the improvement of practice.118 Being first 
to reveal a given piece of information also facilitates establishing an informal standard.119 Free 
revealing provides significant advantages to the information-holder and, in the larger perspective, 
to the society. Just a brief look through some classical cases like Apache or sport equipment shows 
that driving innovating forces were generated when the information was made open. Sharing 
diminishes the risk of resource overuse for the same innovation. It even occurs between 
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companies: a low rivalry condition, when no direct competition exists, it may appear as the only 
profitable solution.120 
Two sharing websites are worth naming at this point: Instructubles and Kickstarter.121 The first one 
is a place where people post and document their DIY creations (from cooking, crafting, and building 
toys to 3D printing) with (visual) instructions and detailed descriptions. Other participants comment 
on them or suggest improvements. Launched in 2005, it currently features more than 100,000 
projects. 
Kickstarter is a crowdfunding platform where people donate to projects to bring them to life –with 
many makers’ projects among them.122 Creators and DIYers must set a deadline and minimum 
funding goal. The crowdsourcing platform was launched in 2009 and since has collected $1 billion 
from 6.2 million people for 61,000 projects. 44% of the projects have met the criteria and received 
money – Kickstarter operates on an all-or-nothing premise.123 
 There’s just something magical about Kickstarter... You immediately feel like you’re 
part of a larger club of art-supporting fanatics.124 
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2.5 The Adopted Model of Making 
The specific model of how people pursue their making activities forms the background for further 
legal considerations and analysis of patent limitations. The study focuses on innovating initiated 
and carried out by Makers who work individually or within communities, share their ideas with 
other makers (online or offline), present how to achieve a given solution (an improvement or a 
derivative) – and all this on a non-commercial basis.  
As mentioned in the previous section, people make for self-amusement, in-house use, or create 
own solutions when the market does not meet their needs. That market gap creates a new “design 
space”125, where innovation takes place. When working on their projects, makers apply their own 
“local” knowledge available at low-cost – tacit knowledge.126 This, however, does not undermine 
the quality of the embedded know-how. On the contrary, makers are often world-class specialists, 
ranging from aerospace engineers and software programmers to medical doctors.127  
At some point, an idea elaborated privately (in the adverbial basement) sees the light of day via 
free sharing, e.g. by publishing it on the Web (an online forum) or by presenting it in a makerspace. 
From this moment on, further developments of the solution, i.e. experimentation, adaptation, and 
prototyping, form part of a collective process. Here, any scale of community cooperation is more 
beneficial than working in isolation; efficiency increases even more when diverse communities fuse 
into the project.128  
In terms of project financing, the majority of makers and DIYers invest in their projects rather than 
obtain any return from them. High-tech creations can be expensive, requiring even a few hundred 
dollars of investment.129 Therefore, an additional advantage of community exposure is feedback on 
commercialisation opportunities (and the recoup of investment). Makers, by principle, do not 
anticipate financial profits and do not evaluate marektisation opportunities for their solutions (with 
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the exception of leading creators130). Within a community, members or observers express their 
“purchasing” interest in the solution and provide a helpful feedback on the market value of a given 
solution. As studies show, Makers are often “accidental entrepreneurs”, i.e. the complete product 
development occurs much before the idea on the formation of a company sparks in one’s mind.131  
Makers, however, are not people without any business awareness – various makers’ start-ups were 
initiated on crowdfunding platforms (like Kickstarter or Indiegogo). A good example is PiMaker (a 
3D printer) by William Steel, who even applied for patent protection to license his idea to 
commercial companies, but keeps design files opensourced (published on Thingiverse under a non-
commercial license).132 Another is Formlab, grounded by researchers at MIT Media Lab, who aimed 
to launch the production of an affordable 3D printer for professionals – Form 1.133 Their successful 
project initially collected $100,000 in pledges, to eventually reach almost $3 million.134 
In terms of the use of patented solutions, makers either work on products embedding patents, by 
improving on them and by creating them; or work with such products by applying them into their 
own projects. The maker community is much concerned with patent-related issues, such as 
whether to seek patent protection, and how to liberate making from patents – a crucial issue. With 
regard to the latter, makers face certain obstacles: it is unfeasible to identify all existing patented 
solutions in a certain field due to the high saturation of patents (1) and to control and limit the 
proliferation of an idea once it is shared (2). Last but not least, certain misconceptions on the 
permissible use of patented solutions misguide makers on the ambit and types of lawful uses. Many 
believe that working on patents as individuals, i.e. privately, with no business affiliations, secures 
them from infringement allegations. They underestimate the fact of public sharing, even in a form 
of one “innocent” Internet post, e.g. suggesting (instructing) certain patent improvements, for 
which they can be sued for indirect patent infringement or for inducement to infringe. 
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Of course, as long as makers remain unnoticeable with their projects, they stay in a low-risk zone. 
However, crowdfunded projects of the scale of Formlab can hardly be ignored on the market: a 
successful maker project denotes a new player (a competitor) who mobilises a broad group of 
“customers.” When we combine the following features – the successful marketization of a maker 
project and performance in a patent-active field (e.g., 3D printing, robotics, electronics, and solar 
cells) – the peril of a patent lawsuit becomes very realistic. 
 
2.6 The Maker Movement Meets Patent Law 
Patents safeguard market exclusivity upon the recoup of the investment by the patent holder. Thus, 
when the solution of a maker competes with a patented counterpart and attracts many purchasers, 
a company loses their clients and can claim financial demages – a no-go situation for any 
enterprise. Below are two recent cases that made the maker scene tremble. 
 
2.6.1 3D Systems Inc. v Formlabs and Kickstarter 
In 2012, 3D Systems Inc. sued Formlabs and Kickstarter for the infringement of a patent titled 
Simultaneous multiple layer curing in stereolithography (claims No. 1 and 23). The Form 1 printer 
works with DPL technology and inserts an object in slices onto a bath of UV light curing resin.135 
This technology creates 3D prints of much higher resolution than plastic extrusion technology (like 
the RepRap 3D printer). Additionally, the quality of the Form 1 is comparable with 3D Systems 
printers and is much cheaper. The 3D Systems patent expired on January 28 2014 and due to this 
fact the case was voluntarily dismissed on November 8 2013; but 3D Systems did not give up and 
filed another suit for the infringement of eight other patents.136 
Apart from the fact that the field of 3D printing itself becomes one of the most prominent 
battlegrounds of the patent wars137, more worrying is the fact that Kickstarter itself was claimed 
liable for the infringement as well. 3D Systems alleged that both companies were willingly blind to 
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the existence of their patents.138 Another Kickstarter project is applying stereolithography 
technology and it seems unclear whether it will be targeted by 3D Systems as well.139 
 
2.6.2 Stratasys v Afinia 
In November 2013, Stratasys, one of the world-leading producers of 3D printers, sued Afinia, a 
division of Microboards Technology LLC, for the infringement of four of its patents.140 Afinia 
produces a popular H series of 3D printers for the consumer market and is regarded as a mid-size 
company. It implements FDM technology141 adopted in a great number of 3D printers. 
Commentators indicate that due to a broad reading of the patents, Stratasys’ claim refers to any 3D 
printer producer who implements a similar method, and does not address Afinia products 
specifically. For example, Stratasys claims the infringement of the infill concept, but does not 
provide specifics on how this process is infringed by Afinia. Hence, any other manufacturer or open 
source project that applies a similar infill infringes the Stratasys patent; as indicated, Afinia does so 
as well (!).142  
The company took a big shot back and filed a declaratory judgement of non-infringement, as well 
as petitioned the court for jury trial. First, it intends to narrow down the broadly read Stratasys 
patents by confronting them with prior art and proving their invalidity. Afinia also claims that 
Stratasys did not disclose a patent that would undermine the novelty of the allegedly infringed 
patent – if that were the case, it would be an inequitable conduct in result of which Stratasys would 
not be able to enforce the patent. Unexpectedly, Afinia has become the defender of all players in 
the field of 3D printing.143 
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Apart from challenging infringement claims, Afinia alleges that the lawsuit was motivated by the 
desire to monopolize the market – an anticompetitive conduct and a patent misuse. In December 
2012, Stratasys merged with Objet, a manufacturer of 3D printers, and gained 50% of the market 
and control over the input materials, e.g. ABS plastic (commonly used in 3D printers due to its 
differential melting points). In June 2013, Stratasys purchased MakerBot Industries, a producer of 
desktop-sized 3D printers. Apart from the corporate growth, Stratasys’ licensing practice (Terms of 
Service) gives it the right to all developments and improvements over devices by their customers. 
Considering the 50% of the market share, it is a tempting offer.144 
Many ask why Stratasys launched the infringement campaign at this precise point in time. They 
indicate the acquisition of MakerBot as the departure point. Before, Stratasys focused on the 
industrial market, but through the named purchase it opened its operations on the consumer 
market, where Afinia has been active and recorded a growth curve. Moreover, a desktop market is 
exploding now. It is worth mentioning that MakerBot grew out of the RepRap Project and its 
purchase reverberated throughout the community. Thus, the fear is that building a RepRap is as 
risky as building a proprietary printer that might infringe on Stratasys’ patents.145 
Another issue is the threat of low-cost Chinese printers that are flooding the US market through 
China's partnership with US companies. This motif also emerges in the case of Afinia, which 
licensed hardware for the printer from Delta Micro Factory Corporation, which is owned by 
Tiertime, a Chinese low-cost 3D printer manufacturer. Chinese companies implement technologies 
of established players on various market segments. The partnership with US companies facilitates 
the accommodation of the printers on the US market without the risk of a lawsuit. Despite Afinia’s 
determination in the court proceedings, a settlement remains an option. The whole industry and 
communities await with bated breath for the outcome of the lawsuit.146 
By September 2014, court dismissed the infringement claims for the patent on controlling infill 
(US5653925). Afinia counterclaimed not only to have found prior art that challenged the novelty of 
the said patent, but also to have found evidence that Stratasys knew about that prior art to begin 
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with, and, what's more, had a patent that included the invention in question. Under such 
circumstances, Stratasys was obliged to inform the patent office about this example of (own) prior 
art; otherwise, it would have committed a patent misuse. In the aftermath of Afinia’s 
counterclaims, Stratasys offered to voluntarily dismiss the claim for a reciprocal withdrawal of 
Afinia arguments. This did not happen. In fact, the court upheld the counterclaims and enjoined 
Stratsys to voluntarily dismiss its claims. It appears that Afinia furnished strong legal evidence 
against the validity of the said patent; however, the court has the final word – the ruling on the 
counterclaims is just about to come. As reported, the full trial is set for December 1 2015, and 
separate rulings will come before that date. We know a bit more, but all of the old questions 
remain.147 
Many indicate that patents constrain the DIY 3D printer market because companies hold patents 
for obvious printing methods or hardware parts: they are enforceable and thus must be obeyed 
unless worked around. The Electronic Frontier Foundation launched the project “Joint efforts to 
keep 3D printing open” in order to identify patents that might be detrimental to the industry. The 
so-called “creative” patent drafting might hinder the advancement of new technologies after the 
expiration of the current core patents.148 
 
2.7 Concluding Thoughts 
The maker movement has evolved into a powerful mass phenomenon that largely challenged the 
classic innovation paradigms. As a disruptive business model, it introduces a new value and quality: 
self-sufficiency and, based on crowdfunding, independence from big companies.  
The movement dominates in various fields, e.g. 3D printing, robotics, software engineering, and 
biotechnology. Its credo is sharing and allowing others to improve (play with) the makers’ ideas. As 
makers have reached an advanced technological level, they are confronted with patent-related 
questions. The rebellious and blatant character of the maker movement challenges the underlying 
principles of the patent system and questions its implementation. 
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It is not about juxtaposing two different forms for the mere explanation of differences; it is about 
the actual friction between them. The 3D printing field illustrates this clash very well. A community 
of technology enthusiasts, who admittedly have great ideas, but nonetheless have a limited 
infrastructure, unintentionally infringes on multiple patents on a daily basis. 
One aspect of this issue is the sheer number of infringement indications, and another – the validity 
of the patented solutions itself. In patent litigations, the latter determines the former: if a patent is 
claimed invalid, there is not ground for asserting infringement. This is what Afinia is attempting to 
do – it intends to prove that Stratasys lack legal grounds for claiming infringement of rights. An 
invalidity counter-claim is a common litigation practice and an effective instrument in cleaning the 
patent space from “usurped” patent rights that hinder third parties in their R&D operations, 
including makers. However, such a practice induces many questions and doubts on the overall 
patent environment.  
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Chapter 3. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PATENT SYSTEM 
3.1 Introduction 
The patent system can either be a partner or an obstacle to making – with the prevalence, 
unfortunately, of the latter. Nonetheless, some makers decide to search for patent protection with 
the aim of expanding their business activities in cooperation with commercial companies. Here, 
worth mentioning is William Steele, the creator of the aforementioned PiMaker (a desktop 3D 
printer which was funded on Kickstarter), who filed a patent application for PiMaker, explaining his 
decision as follows: 
The patent is to protect our IP and to prevent other commercial companies from 
utilizing our designs in their own printers. There is a clear separation between 
commercial interests and hobbyists here. Hobbyists will be able to hack, modify, 
understand, improve... whatever they want too with their printer or derivative, 
including making their own from our published design files. Commercial companies 
that produce 3D printers will need to license our technology in order to utilize our 
designs.149 
Steele’s words pronounce the main purpose underlying each patent application, i.e. investment 
recoup and profit generation. Nowadays, patents comprise a crucial part of companies’ assets, 
which are not necessarily involved in R&D activities; IP portfolios become more opulent and 
profoundly affect corporate strategies. Is there still a place for romantic ideas underlying the 
constitution of patent law? Has there ever been such a place? 
From its inception, the idea of rewarding inventors with patents stirred debates (and 
disagreements) upon their objective and rationale. Despite the overall merit of the discussions, 
patents (or rather patent industry) provoke very emotional discourses that divide the field into 
strong supporters and fierce opponents of the system. In the author’s view, there is ample space 
for neutral pragmatists, who understand both the drawbacks and the advantages of the system for 
the society and the economy.  
Patent wars, pro-patent marketing, and patent trolls negatively influence the common perception 
of the system – even its most faithful proponents cannot neglect such facts. Perhaps the following 
words of Fritz Machlup best illustrate the situation at hand: 
 If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our 
present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. 
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But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, 
on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.150 
Proposals of complete patent abolition151 are rare and, if they occur, receive moderate applause152 
– the patent system is too deeply anchored in economic structures. We have reached the point 
when not the cancellation, but the reform of the patent system can improve its effectiveness and 
fairness – to quote Fritz Machlup again, we have to “muddle through it.”153 
This chapter provides an outline of the fundamental theories which justify the patent system and 
highlights various points upheld in discussions on the current form of the system. It endeavours to 
paint a general picture of the system and thus it only indicates certain concerns. The analysis of 
economic models remains beyond the scope of this chapter and work.  
 
3.2 The Brief History of Patents 
The first recorded reference to patent-related considerations appeared in Aristotle's Politics in the 
4th century BC. Aristotle described a proposal of Hippodamus of Miletos, who advocated a reward 
system for those “who contribute usefully by discovering useful things for the state.” Hippodamus 
assumed that thanks to rewards, inventors would make more contributions to society. However, 
Aristotle himself criticised this idea, arguing that rewards could adversely affect the obedience of 
the law and social structures. He believed that citizens should contribute to society simply because 
it is good to do so, and not in anticipation of any compensation. In this manner, Aristotle foretold 
the intrinsic friction between the patent system and society. The proposal of Hippodamus of 
Miletos remains the only record of the proposal for inventor protection from the ancient times.154  
The Middle Ages, with their rigid hierarchism and theocentricism, did not show much appreciation 
to inventive minds. However, the period was familiar with patent-like documents (dating back to 
the 14th century), then better known as open letters (litterae patentes155), which conferred 
exclusive rights to the inventor. However, open letters were not reserved exclusively for inventions; 
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they conferred various privileges and rights within trade and craft guilds, like the conferral of officer 
nominations or nobility.156 
By contrast, the Renaissance revitalised ancient philosophy and returned to the anthropocentrism 
that allowed individual genius to flourish.157 The first acknowledged patent was granted in 1421 to 
the Florentine architect Filippo Brunelleschi for the invention of a ship construction for lifting heavy 
goods.158 In 1474, Venice was the first to pass written rules on issuing patent privileges, which 
conceived the requirement of novelty, disclosure, and the use of invention, as well as set the time 
of limitation over the granted monopoly to 10 years. (However, the privileges were 
misappropriated and conferred against their purpose and objectives.)159 Owing to the 
intensification of trade exchange between 15th and 17th centuries, Western countries began to 
adopt statutory regulations on “patents” in order to lure foreign inventors to bring their know-how 
and skills into the mainland. The privileges included the right to exclude third parties from the use 
of the protected idea without the permission of the inventor. Subsequent absolutism and 
mercantilism deformed the idea of invention privilege into a source of royal income of low 
incentive impact and quality. The issuance of privileges did not obey the proper patent standards: 
the principles of novelty and priority were abandoned for the sake of utility construed according to 
the current economic interests.160  
The situation was strongly opposed by inventors and lawyers. In England, the outcry against 
misused privileges led to enacting the Statute of Monopolies in 1623, the Magna Carta of the 
inventor rights and the oldest recognised patent statue, which shifted the power of granting 
privileges from the Crown to the Parliament. The Statue declared invalid all types of granted 
monopolies and exclusive rights. The only exception was for privileges for the use and production 
of “any manner of new manufacture,” which were conferred to “the first and true inventor” for the 
period of 14 years.161 The jurisprudence established further principles of patent practice, such as 
the industrial use of the invention, disclosure, and the dissemination of the technical teaching in 
the society.162 
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The end of 18th century was marked by the adoption of modern statutory patent laws in the USA 
(1787)163 and France (1791). They granted the right to exclude others from the exploitation of an 
invention, which remained the core function of patents to date.164 
Already at the onset of patent law formation, certain troublesome issues emerged. The main 
objections against patent law referred to the procedural matters: the application procedure was 
“clumsy, expensive, and uncertain.”165 In England, special parliamentarian committees on patents 
suggested the reduction of the exclusivity time span to 7 years, as well as much stricter 
examination. Trade associations and chambers of commerce went even further and demanded 
abolishing patent law entirely.166 The second half of the 19th century was hallmarked by 
governmental disapprobation of the patent system. In Switzerland, the government refused to 
adopt a patent system following a statement issued by members of the Zurich Institute of 
Technology.167 Even chancellor Bismarck himself announced his objection to the principle of patent 
protection.168 In the Netherlands, free-trade supporters were concerned with the low feasibility of 
patent law and difficulties with its re-formability to a level which was satisfactory to all of the 
involved parties.169 The anti-patent movement ended rather abruptly due to the strong campaign 
of patent proponents, who were strengthened by external conditions such as the economic crisis 
and the rise of protectionism.170 Machlup and Penrose point out that patent law proponents were 
extremely well organised and hence capable of enforcing their interests more effectively: “the 
technique propaganda was remarkable: new societies, press, pamphlets, leaflets, public 
competition for the best paper for the patent protection” bore expected fruits.171 Under such 
circumstances, the modern concept of patents settled down in the legal structures of Western 
countries.172 
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3.3 Chosen Patent Theories 
Patent theories fuse legal and economic sciences with ethical insights. They differ among each 
other by setting “different weights on different places of the patent system.”173 With diverse points 
of departure and a number of overlaps, they all arrive at the conclusion that the patent system 
guarantees the fairest rewarding system for inventors, and stimulates R&D activities. Notably, the 
words of the Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson should remain a balance point in all theoretical 
discourses: 
[A] patent system must be related to the world of commercial rather than to the 
realm of philosophy (…).174 
 
3.3.1 Patent as a Natural Property Right 
The concept sees intellectual property as “more sacred” than property over material things – a 
natural property that cannot be waived. John Locke voiced that everyone obtains the right to the 
fruits of their own efforts – “labour provides a foundation for property” (introduced to the 
preamble of French and US constitutions).175 The society must recognise this fact and provide an 
adequate protection of the property.176 Categorisation of patents under the concept of natural 
property was too absolute for many as it resulted in a broad privatisation of subjects of intellectual 
property.  
Nowadays, some scholars point to the existence of a phenomenon known as the tragedy of the 
commons177 as the rationale behind the concept of private intellectual property: to counteract the 
depletion of common resources, they must be assigned the status of private property in the form of 
                                                          
173 Pauline Newman, "Luncheon Speech to ABA-IPL Section," in Cases and Materials on Patent Law, ed. 
William H. Francis, et al. (St.Paul, Minn: Thomson/West, 2007), 77. 
174 Brenner, Commissioner of Patents v. Manson, 383 U.S 519, *536 (1966). 
175 Wendy J. Gordon, "A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property," The Yale Law Journal 102, no. 7 (1993): 1540; Sigrid Stercks, "The Ethics of 
Patenting - Uneasy Justification," in Death of Patents, ed. Peter Drahos (London: Lawtext Publishing 
Limited, 2005). 
176 Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, 21; Machlup and Penrose, "The Patent Controversy 
in the Nineteenth Century," 11; Wolfgang Bernhardt, Die Bedeutung des Patentschutzes in der 
Industriegesellschaft  (Köln: Heymann, 1974), 8. 
177 Garrett Herdin, "The Tragedy of Commons," Science 162, no. 13 (1968): 1243-48. 
48 
 
patents or copyrights to the persons they originate from.178 Above that, the ownership over 
intellectual creation forms part of the modern credo and remains consistent with the essence of 
the modern democratic order.179  
 
3.3.2 Patent as an Incentive to Invest 
In this understanding, patents attract indispensable investment into the research sector. In light of 
the utilitarian doctrine after John Bentham: patents are instruments, owing to which inventors are 
willing to pursue research activities.180 
The theory rests on the conviction that inventors could not compensate for the outlay without 
patent protection. The exclusivity conferred by a patent allows for the extraction of better prices. 
By the exclusion of competition – an automatic delay – patents provide time for further 
developments and market conquest.181 
Patents in the hands of small or new companies are treated as trump cards to attract investors: 
they decrease the risks involved in commercialization by constraining the competition.182 In 
practice, this conviction underlay the Bayh-Dole Act, enacted in 1980, which was designed to 
stimulate technological entrepreneurship at universities, investment in their R&D departments, and 
encourage the stronger integration of universities with the industry.183 
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3.3.3 Patent as an Incentive to Disclose 
The point of departure for this theory is the firm belief that trade secrecy deprives society of the 
opportunity to grow. Industrial progress could not happen if inventions were to be kept secret. For 
this reason, technologies must be made public and available – the aforementioned goals are 
satisfied through disclosure, which enables a person skilled in the art to make and use the 
embodiments as described in a patent specification.184 In the time of patent privileges, the 
beneficiaries were obliged to present their solutions and disseminate the novel teaching 
throughout the society. 
The disclosure theory corresponds with the theory of the social contract: a patentee and the 
society sign a contract in which disclosure is exchanged for protection.185 Unlike the concept of 
trade secrecy, patents ensure that exclusivity “survives the disclosure.”186 Notably, trade secrecy 
accompanies many patents, as it covers the know-how necessary to implement the disclosed 
patent information; it is licensed either together with a given patent or in a separate agreement.187 
In spite of multiple claims against patents, their informative function can be hardly challenged: 
thanks to the disclosure, new technical teaching becomes available to everyone and enriches the 
state of the art. 
 
3.3.4 Reward (Compensation) Theory 
This theory derives from the economic conception of a reward for the work performed (for the risk 
and expenses involved). In the context of patents, the inventor receives a reward (compensation) 
for his or her efforts in delivering a useful invention to society. That reward takes the form of 
market exclusivity, which enables the patent holder to benefit from the exploitation of the 
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invention. Further rewards, i.e. income from patent commercialisation, depend on the merits and 
social contributions of the invention (its utility).188 The concept of a reward constitutes the core 
motivator behind various patent theories: the reward is both an incentive and an award. 
A reward might also be seen as a rent. Grady and Alexander proposed the concept of invention 
renting where the reward is the rent paid by society to the inventor. The focus of this concept rests 
on the social benefit being dissipated by redundant technological development due to secrecy or 
improvements.189 
 
3.3.5 The Prospect Theory 
The prospect theory is an interesting and complex theoretical conceptualization that goes beyond 
the scope of the reward theory. It demonstrates an ex post perspective on the effective 
management of IP ownership.  
In 1977, Edmund Kitch introduced the term prospect190 – the opportunity to introduce 
technological improvements following the disclosure of an invention: a patent displays a prospect 
that the patentee, a coordinator, utilises to increase its value. The opportunity (the prospect) is 
feasible because:  
a) patent claims have an abstract and general character and as such do not embrace all 
possible products; 
b) a patent is granted in the very early stage of development, which implies further 
research.191  
Kitch argued that each invention “generates a shift in the matrix of technological possibilities” that 
overwhelms the original inventive idea alone.192 He also assumed that the prospect improves the 
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management of innovations. Patent monopoly can be more efficient than competition itself, and 
the patent system effectively contributes to the exchange of information and the management of 
resources. A patent disclosure signalises (and warns) not to duplicate the invention and hence, not 
to waste resources; it also alarms other market entrants who deliver substitute technologies. This 
scenario may involve a patentee-producer tandem to minimise resource dissipation and maximise 
technological achievements. Kitch indicated that the implementation of an invention could succeed 
when its social costs were lower than those of existing technologies. Like the reward theory, the 
prospect theory assumed the existence of a return based on the economic value of the 
technology.193 
 
3.3.6 Theory versus Practice. Concluding Thoughts 
Patent theories underscore the social and public functions of patents: honouring inventors for their 
research efforts and their enrichment of the society with useful and valuable inventions. 
Recognised as an important R&D stimulus, together with an inherent link to commerce, one can 
make the argument that patents perform the function of the proverbial carrot: they encourage 
innovating, offering in the end a limited exclusivity with the aim of extracting value out of the 
technology and recouping the investment from the market. The system tends to create an inventor-
friendly environment in order to stimulate technological progress, with its ultimate goal being 
welfare growth via the creation of new industries and workplaces, increasing trade, and making life 
better and easier.194  
The justification of patents leaves place for scepticism and questions: if the existence of patent law 
was so evident and unequivocal, why would there exist so many different theories speaking in 
favour of patents? In terms of scientific evidence, no clear proof of the virtual contribution of 
patents to technological progress has been delivered so far apart from sectorial studies195, and 
available statistics can be interpreted in different fashions according to intended statements and 
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interest.196 Solely the informative function of patents in regard to novel technical teaching remains 
unchallenged even on the side of patent contesters. 
The modern IP reality proves that the initial philosophical (and somehow romantic) premises of 
patent law are, in the least, outdated – nowadays, not only are patents legal protection 
instruments, but also (and foremost) business assets. The IP market has grown immensely and 
developed various models with the intention of monetizing the “protected investments.”197 
Regardless of their size, innovating companies that possess IP portfolios, with patents being the 
most prestigious component, resort to various methods of recouping their R&D investments: via 
classical licenses, enforcement of rights, or sale of patents. The latter accentuates the tradability of 
patents and opens the secondary IP market, where profits from IP rights are captured either via the 
direct reassignment of patents to competitors, or via their reassignment to intermediary firms that 
assist in IP transfer between companies. But while this practice expands the utilisation potential of 
patents, it does is not equal to consumption of patents as “legal embodiments of commoditised 
assets.”198 If patents are not eventually licensed to a producing company, they function as liquid 
assets booked on a balance sheet and await further resale on the stock market or to an investment 
vehicle. The patent utilisation practice has reached a point where even “Wall Street has discovered 
patents,” where patent transactions require rigorous quasi-litigation preparations.199 The presented 
facts provoke the question of how such practices remain in touch with the overall objectives of the 
patent system. 
 
3.4 Makers in the field of patents 
3.4.1 Natural Property 
The notion of natural property met with much criticism. Machlup and Penrose pointed out that the 
introduction of the term property in the 19th century was a deliberate manipulation to disassociate 
patents with the detested privileges200: “the spirit of that time was so much for liberty and equality, 
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and against privileges and monopolies of any sort.” Thus, patents read as property had better 
chances of being respected and obeyed.201 
The opponents of the concept argue that an idea once communicated to the public stops being the 
property of its creator – it becomes a publicly circulated good. Moreover, a single invention cannot 
be disentangled from the environment: every new solution originates from previous ones – an 
invention is “a new combination of already existing data”202 and part of continuous 
development.203 The prior art present in every patent application demonstrates the origins of the 
solution: how a new solution improves on the drawbacks of former ideas. From this perspective, 
the view that each invention is common deprives the inventor of the right to claim property and 
monopoly. Polanyi formulated the concept as follows:  
I believe that paten law is essentially deficient, because it aims at a purpose, which 
cannot be rationally achieved. It tries to parcel up a stream of creative thought into 
a series of distinct claims, each of which is to constitute the basis of a separately 
owned monopoly. (…) Ideas usually develop gradually by shades of emphasis, and 
even when, from time to time, sparks of discovery flare up and suddenly reveal a 
new understanding; it usually appears on closer scrutiny that the new idea had 
been at least partly foreshadowed in previous speculations.204 
The interpretation of patents as natural rights is all the more complicated by the fact that an 
inventor must first apply for a patent, which is granted only when the idea (and the application) 
complies with the requirements for patentability. Furthermore, the granted right is hedged 
territorially and limited in time – it can be withdrawn either due to invalidation or unsuccessful 
utilisation. To accentuate the incoherence of the arguments supporting the natural-property view 
on patents, the practice demonstrates that (1) in the majority of cases patents are assigned to 
corporate entities (i.e. employers), (2) in the first-to-file regime filing a patent application 
resembles a chase in which possibly a person other than the inventor manages to be the first to 
patent the solution.205 
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3.4.2 Monopoly & Prospect 
Market monopoly (the winner takes all) is criticised as an adverse consequence of patents and as 
their false justification. It is a strictly economic question and represents a complex issue that is only 
sketched in the following paragraph. 
Opponents of patent exclusivity affirm that monopoly works to the detriment of the competition, 
which is regarded as the best inducement to innovate – competitive rivalry is far more profitable 
than coordinated planning.206 They also argue that a low-rivalry context harms product 
advancement. For example, the prospect theory magnifies the advantages of monopoly and 
underestimates the benefits which stem from competitiveness. Due to the patent monopoly, 
competitors choose to innovate on the secondary market of compatible products, and abandon the 
primary market with an unrivalled product. An early patent application, like in the prospect theory, 
often leads to a sub-optimal product development (underdevelopment), which in the condition of 
restricted competition negatively affects consumer welfare: the first-mover advantage lures 
inventors to accelerate commercialisation before product completion. In effect, premature and 
broad patents may decrease the incentive for incremental developments (improvements) and lead 
to a waste of resources in order to work around a patent to develop substitutable solutions.207 
 
3.4.3 Disclosure 
Although even patent sceptics underscore the informative function of patents in a positive manner, 
the practice of patent disclosure opens another discussion field: the revealed patent information 
may not present complete technical data. In the idealistic scenario, patent information should be 
sufficient to enable the reader (a person skilled in the art) to comprehend the technical solution, 
and to make it.208 Patent information consists of two elements: the written description and patent 
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claims, where the former is intended to support the latter.209 Apart from the presentation and 
explanation of the new idea, the disclosure serves various purposes, e.g. the avoidance of 
duplicating the research efforts, the estimation of the value of the invention, and the 
determination of the protection scope. However, a patent may not reveal sufficient information. 
The patentee can protect (and thus disclose) certain elements of the solution, while keeping other 
elements secret. Such a practice enhances the bargain power of the patentee who, apart from 
licensing a patent, delivers the know-how.210 
On the other hand, disclosure appears to be a good strategy to create prior art with the aim of 
blocking competitors’ operations – companies extensively disclose patent information in 
applications without the intention of pursuing the patents (the application is published 18 months 
from the date of filing and then abandoned).211 Apart from its questionable effect on the quality 
and quantity of the patent information, such a practice also puts into question the 
instrumentalisation of patents, as well as overall business standards.  
The language of patents is another issue. The formulations (particularly in patent claims) are very 
convoluted and include special phrases, such as comprising, consisting of, and nuances, such as 
more preferably and most preferably that cannot be ignored. What seems normal in conventional 
language, in the context of patent language has a concrete and specified meaning. Moreover, 
patent language allows for the uncommon use of words, i.e. an unusual combination of words or 
their use as a different part of speech (e.g. verbs as adjectives).212 This peculiarity of patent 
language complicates the comprehension of solutions presented in patent documents – even for 
the technicians who possess the required knowledge to embrace the technical teaching. In that 
regard, a certain level of competence in reading patents as legal documents is a precondition to 
correctly understand the scope of sought protection. 
Reading a patent is challenging, but writing one is even harder – patents are regarded as the most 
complex legal instruments in existence213. In terms of patent drafting, the application cannot be too 
broad, too narrow, or too ambiguous, and must leave a certain space for stretching the scope on 
possible equivalents. It is even more challenging to provide an accurate translation of complex 
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technical material to secure the same scope of protection as specified in the original version of the 
patent application. Proper translation has a tremendous impact on the overall management of an 
IP portfolio: the scope of protection, enforceability, licensing negotiations, and litigations (e.g. in 
discovery procedure). Translation mistakes are expensive, hence experienced patent translators are 
at a premium (and rare).214 
 
3.4.5 Patent Scope 
The matter of patent scope does not seem to ever disappear from the agenda of uneasy and 
unanswered patent questions. The breath of a given patent bears two implications: one in the post-
invention phase (commercialisation), and another – in regard to follow-up inventions. 
The success of marketization cannot be guaranteed – it depends on various factors, including good 
timing and luck in finding interested partners. In this context, a broader patent (a prospect patent) 
covers a broader scope of sectors and offers greater chances of monetizing the investment.215 On 
the other hand, broad patents take away a greater portion of the technology market and block 
competitors in their R&D undertakings. When the competitors use a patented solution as a 
research tool or need to perform certain tests216, they have to either obtain a license or establish a 
R&D project to continue their operations. For that reason, narrow (well-tailored) patents would be 
more welcomed: 
(…) some people jump from that to the conclusion that the broader the patents 
rights are, the better it is for innovation, and that isn't always correct, because we 
have an innovation system in which one innovation builds on another. If you get 
monopoly rights down at the bottom, you may stifle competition that uses those 
patents later on, and so the breadth of utilization, maybe I should say, in a broader 
sense, the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle 
competition, but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation. We have 
to strike a balance.217 
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Questions arise as to how to achieve such balance and where the virtual boundaries of patent 
protection reside. The latter are determined through the construction of patent claims, which 
should neither rely on a literal meaning of the wording, nor treat it as a guideline.218 This position, 
though fair and reasonable at first glance, is fraught with uncertainty and obstacles, as there is no 
single yardstick to ascertain the distance between the literal and non-literal meaning of patent 
claims. The notion of equivalency or the consideration of the intentions of the inventor (like in 
Catnic principle219) introduces even more legal insecurity. Certain doctrines and principles may 
guide the course of interpretation but they themselves do not contain any measurable features. 
Ultimately, the virtual scope of protection for a given patent is specified by a court in the course of 
patent litigation, but even then, the boundaries are set in reference to an allegedly infringing 
subject-matter (i.e. whether it falls within the ambit of protection). Nonetheless, a court decision is 
the most firm signpost; until then, attempts to recognise the correct scope of protection are 
assumptive and resemble floundering the in the dark.220 
 
3.4.6 Patent Term 
The patent term amounts to 20 years, with the option for an extension in certain sectors, such as 
the pharmaceutical sector. Considering that patent prosecution time spans from 4 to 5 years, 
patent holders theoretically have 15-16 years to monetise their solutions, which is a fair period, if 
not too fair. Unarguably, pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors are affected adversely with the 
fixed patent term due to long development process and arduous approval procedures. However, to 
compensate the loss due to regulatory delays, legislators introduced supplementary protection 
certificates for medicinal products extending the protection term up to five years.221  
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In that regard, it is questionable whether the one-size model of patent protection is beneficial to all 
industry sectors. Industries, such as information technology and life sciences, have different needs 
and innovation cycles. Accordingly, patents from the different fields are written in a different way 
and with different business purposes in mind. Therefore, it would be reasonable to form doctrines 
and models which are applicable separately depending on the sector.222 Such proposals appear all 
the more reasonable when we take into account that out of all the granted patents, only a low 
percentage of patents reaches the threshold of 20 years – mainly blockbusters and the 
aforementioned pharmaceuticals.223 Patent holders close their patents for various reasons, e.g. 
misfortune in commercialisation, or a shift in technologies. The current patent term manifests 
generosity for business sectors affected with quickly changing market trends, like electronics or IT, 
where companies themselves may not even last 20 years, whereas their patents might do so by 
landing in the hands of either bigger market players or patent assertion entities. The patent term is 
questionable with regard to the patent quality. As estimated, up to 50% of litigated patents are 
claimed invalid (!).224 However, until the invalidity of a given patent is proved, a patentee enjoys all 
benefits of doubt and may extract benefits from the granted right, and successfully enforce it. 
 
3.4.7 Patent Quality 
The name of the game is the patent quality – the issue has never been as significant as nowadays, 
when low patent quality has been blamed for the major sins of the system. 
The notion of patent quality is liquid and can be defined in at least three complementary manners, 
i.e. with regard to drafting quality, validity standards, and economic value.225  
In order to differentiate between a good and a bad patent, it is more reasonable to first describe a 
good patent. A high-quality patent contains technical details pronounced in a well-formed, i.e., 
clear and definite, patent claims, and includes alternative embodiments which support the general 
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claim, but are also grounded in the patent description and the main claim.226 A bad patent is 
everything opposite. 
From another perspective, patent quality pertains to the validity of a patent in legal terms, its 
technical contribution, and its inventiveness. A good patent stands firmly on three criteria of 
patentability, i.e. novelty, non-obviousness (an inventive step), and industrial application. In a 
nutshell, the criterion of novelty indicates that a claimed invention has not been available prior to 
the date of the application. The patent authority approves documented evidence on the claimed 
form and described uses. The requirement of industrial application pertains to the finished form of 
an invention that can be industrially implemented, and does not require further research and 
development. In the author's opinion, the most crucial criterion that addresses true inventive 
efforts, which are embedded and socially awaited in every patent-rewarded solution, is 
inventiveness (non-obviousness). Inventiveness is a factor which describes the level of inventive 
contribution (rewarded with a patent) that exceeds the threshold of obviousness, i.e. the 
availability of a solution for a person skilled in that art without inventive efforts. Non-obviousness is 
connected with prior art and existing knowledge, against which it is scrutinised. However, a claimed 
idea not only cannot be mentioned in the prior art, nor can it be inferred directly therefrom. 
Instead, it must deviate from what is known and obvious – it must be beyond and above it. 
Nowadays, when dissemination of information is advanced and knowledge has become available to 
many, the threshold of patentability (non-obviousness) should be permanently elevated in order to 
maintain the said distance between easily deductive and truly inventive ideas. Critical voices assert 
that patent practice stray from this presumption: patents are granted for solutions that “have not 
been produced yet” and are hence regarded as “non-obvious.”227 This alarming practice 
undermines the constituting objectives of the system. 
The responsibility for patent quality rests mainly in the hands of patent authorities, which are 
expected to secure the issuing of qualitative patents. They should detect elusive and broad claims 
for solutions of no contribution to the state of the art. 
As estimated, the examination of a single patent takes approximately 30 hours228, during which a 
patent examiner assesses the prior art and manages formalities. In other words, the patent office 
                                                          
226 Jack Ellis, "Change in Practice," IAM Magazine 65(May/June 2014): 11. 
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evaluates and grants a patent in less than one labour week. Such speedy patent assessment might 
result in awarding patents for premature, trivial, and obvious solutions.229 A patent expert 
commenting on the Amazon “Studio Arrangement” patent (photos taken on the white background) 
holds the following opinion: 
As a patent attorney, I saw plenty of applications rejected, saw examiners 
finding remarkable prior art, and still saw plenty of patents issued on the most 
obvious ideas.  
The problem is not with the examiners, but with the law that governs that 
examination. That law makes it possible to get patents on ideas that any 
ordinary person would find old, well-known, and obvious. (…) 
Examiners are far from the rubber stamps they are sometimes caricatured to be. 
Even the examiner of the Studio Arrangement patent found precisely the right 
reference to cite. But examiners work within a regime of law that constrains 
them to allow patents that we would not expect or desire. That systemic 
constraint needs to be corrected if we are to stop the tide of obvious patents 
being issued.230 
Some experts, however, point to the insufficient training of patent examiners, who oversee certain 
flaws and oversights of patent applications, such as overly broad claims (insufficient disclosure), or 
fail to find the proper prior art.231 Such mistakes may cause costly troubles for patent owners who 
first invest, and then lose as much as millions of dollars before the patent is eventually invalidated. 
A good illustration of the malpractice in prior art detection is the case of NTP patents: Research in 
Motion paid $612 million to NTP to settle a patent infringement case in 2006, only to find their 
NTP’s patents invalidated three years later after a research paper was discovered in a university 
library in Norway (!).232 
Another critical point upheld in discussions on patent quality is the questionable significance of 
patented solutions, i.e. patents are granted for unimportant (unworthy) solutions, or, to put it in 
other words, mere gadgets, such as a “contactlessly-chargeable light-up shoe” (a recharging 
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process for colourful lights in children shoes).233 Trivial industrial application of patents, which 
alone defines other qualities of such a solution, makes a lot of shake their heads in disbelief. In the 
common perception, patents should be granted for inventions that can truly change and facilitate 
life, like Edison’s light bulb. However, patent practice goes against this common belief and 
demonstrates that the patent system can award socially meaningless inventions. 
From the economic perspective, good quality patents ensure licensing prospects, sales, and the 
acquisition of R&D projects. They ensure greater economic recoup of investment and they are more 
reliable in the pursuit of various business models. However, to a certain extent, the economic 
system (the market economy) supports the imbalance between the recoup of investment and the 
actual contribution to welfare and technological progress. Excessive rewards for trivial solutions 
lead to disadvantages in short and long terms: the increased pricing of goods and services, and 
economic inefficiency by discouraging investment.234 However, the rules are set by the market 
itself. If a certain market sector is not mature enough to welcome and appreciate an invention, e.g. 
the manufacturing capacities are insufficient or customers cannot comprehend and apply the 
solution, no commercial success can be expected. It should be stressed that victorious patent 
prosecution does not necessarily translate into successful commercialisation. 
Low patent quality works against the system by increasing mistrust and disbelief in the system as a 
whole. Bad patents block others in their research undertakings and may land in the hands of so-
called patent trolls, i.e. companies that extort nuisance settlements and deepen the negative 
perception of the system.235 Opponents of the patent system assert that the system does not serve 
its purpose: once an inventor obtains a patent, he or she enters a patent-litigation-driven industry. 
The costs of patent lawsuits, particularly in the US, “escalate very fast and challenge the business 
reason behind it.”236 Eventually only big market players can afford enforcing their rights in a court 
proceeding; however, like smaller market entrants, they also tend to lean toward settlements that 
represent more reasonable business solutions. The economic report of the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association shows that legal costs (including expensive discovery proceedings) can 
amount to as much as 60% of the total sum at risk, e.g. $600 000 in the case of $1 million at risk 
                                                          
233 US 7,510,293 B2. 
234 Shapiro, "Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution," 112-13; Machlup and Penrose, "The Patent 
Controversy in the Nineteenth Century," 23-24. 
235 Milone, "The Real Problem is Patent Quality, not NPEs," 13; Marshall Phelps and David Kline, "Building a 
White-Hat Brand in the Patent Industry," ibid., no. 67 (September/October 2014): 42; Jack Ellis, "Change in 
Practice," ibid.65(May/June 2014): 11. 
236  John DuPre and John Hamann, "Controlling Costs in Patent Litigation," IAM Magazine - 2013 IP Value. 
Building and enforcing intellectual property value (2013): 54. 
62 
 
(only $5 million in a litigation for more than $25 million).237 The likelihood of a settlement increases 
when the exorbitant legal costs make at least one party amenable to such offer. Settlements are a 
common practice as the US system conceived a general rule that each party covers own legal 
expenses (the American rule238). This, however, has been changed with the fee-shifting that the 
losing party covers a certain amount of attorney fees of the winner, which had an impact on 
decrease litigations number, with the focus on the “frivolous” ones.239 Cory Doctorow, a science 
fiction author and co-editor of Boing Boing, sums up the pitfalls of the patent system as follows: 
(…) I'm very suspicious of them [patents] because of a bunch of systemic issues 
with patent law, the USPTO, and the way that most patent lawyers game the 
first two. In particular, the fact that the USPTO routinely grants "overlapping" 
patents that cover the same inventions; and that patent attorneys routinely set 
out a very broad set of claims ("a method for doing anything with stuff") that 
narrow down to a specific claim, in the hopes that an overworked patent 
examiner will grant them a patent over very broad things that their clients did 
not in any way invent; and that the patent courts don't allow people who've 
been sued for patent infringement to claim their expenses if they're victorious, 
combine into a vicious, especially pointy triangle that means that big, well-
heeled companies can patent everything under the sun and can sue everyone 
else into oblivion using those patents, whether or not anything was actually 
invented and whether or not that invention is ever infringed upon.240 
 
3.4.8 Patentable Subject Matters 
Rightly said, almost anything can be patented. The ambit of patentable subject-matters expands in 
a natural manner. As technology develops and new forms emerge, we observe a shift from physical 
structures towards “conceptual” patentable solutions. Initially, patents were granted for tangible 
and visible objects that could be intuitively understood: mechanical devices, their components, or 
physical processes. Due to its abstract character, the intangible remained outside the realm of 
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protection.241 Even certain types of products, such as pharmaceuticals, chemical substances, and 
food products, were excluded from patentability due to moral and economic reservations on their 
monopolization, which could block progress and access to solutions in sectors satisfying important 
social needs.242 Nowadays, however, patent authorities award patents for computer-implemented 
inventions243, business methods244, and biotechnological inventions245. 
Notwithstanding the expanding scope of eligible solutions, no legal definition of an invention has 
been formulated thus far. Legal provisions stipulate the requirements that a patentable solution (an 
invention) should meet in order to be conferred with protection. The TRIPS Agreement states in 
Article 27 (1) that patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in 
all fields of technology given they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial 
application (which echoes the Article 52(1) EPC). This provision means that (1) patents are granted 
in all fields of technology and (2) patentable solutions must have a technical character. To that end, 
before an application falls under the scrutiny on the legal requirements of patentability, it should 
be first recognised as an invention in terms of its technicality, which, again, has not been unitarily 
specified within the TRIPS, EPC, and national regimes.246 It is therefore safe to assume that an 
invention is a technical mean of altering a substance, “a mean of controlling natural forces to 
achieve predictable results in the physical world”247; human intervention is an inevitable 
construction element. Products of nature, i.e. discoveries of minerals or plants, mathematical 
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formulas, or laws of physics are not patentable, because they exist independently of a human 
factor.248 
As mentioned before, no legal definition of an invention exists, but law determines subject-matters 
eligible for patent protection. The EPC specifies this issue in a negative manner, i.e. it states what is 
not patentable (is not regarded as an invention) or cannot be patented. Articles 52(2) enlists 
exclusions from patentability, such as a discovery, a scientific theory, a mathematical method, an 
artistic work, an aesthetic creation, doing business, a program for a computer, or the presentation 
of information. Article 52(3) clarifies further that the application of the former provision refers only 
to the named forms “as such,” as they have no technical implications in their pure form. However, 
no legal definition has followed the determinative “as such,” neither on the European nor the 
national level.249 Article 53 demarcates those subject matters which are not patentable, such as 
inventions contrary to ordre public or morality, inventions on plant or animal varieties (other than 
microbiological processes or products), on methods of human and animal treatment (but not 
products for the use thereof). Notably, there is no practical difference between the two types of 
exclusions – in both cases, patent protection is not conferred.250 
In turn, US law (35 U.S.C. §101) provides positive guidelines and enlists four eligible categories, such 
as processes, machines, manufacture, composition of matters, and any improvements thereof that 
must comply with the requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility. The catalogue, 
however, remains open , since the invention may be “anything under the sun that’s made by 
man.”251 The US system does not provide any provisions on exclusions from patentability similar to 
those included in the EPC. Nonetheless, judicial decisions and the USPTO practice established a 
framework for non-patentable solutions that per se does not drift much from the European 
catalogue. The framework concerns the aspects of morality and ordre public; forms that remain 
outside the scope of patent protection are scientific discoveries, mathematical methods, aesthetic 
creations, mental acts, and the presentation of information.252 
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Legal exclusions from patentability do not slow down the expansion of the patentisation of new 
forms. The general way of formulating the rules enable their flexible construction and demand 
further specification and clear definitions that undergo certain alternations with time. 
Commentators point out that the emphasis rests not on the exclusion, but on the inclusion of 
subject-matters: materials are excluded only in extreme circumstances. Illustratively, the inclusion 
of biotechnological inventions stirs broad debates, because in this field in particular, a discovery 
and an invention may occur within one research operation. The answer to the puzzle on how to set 
the demarcation line has purely commercial implications as basic-research patents opens up broad 
(inappropriate in the opinion of some) market opportunities.253 Similar objections arise in 
discussions on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions (previously defined as 
software-related inventions254). Objections concern the questionable technical character of the 
mentioned types of solutions, such as whether human factor contributes to the claimed solution, 
whether it exists (causes specified reactions) without human intervention altogether, and whether 
the achieved solution goes beyond the normal interaction between software and hardware, i.e. has 
further technical effect. The demarcation lines are blurred, as both biotechnology and software 
involve technical considerations; however, the mere fact of using technical infrastructure is 
insufficient to assert technical character in the patent definition.255 As commentators point out, 
observations of EPO practice in terms of granting patents on computer-implemented inventions 
allow for the conclusion that the interpretation of Articles 52 and 53 has undergone an excessive 
curtailment, as if the exclusion rule for computer programs has literally been removed from the 
list.256 The inclusion practice adds fuel to the fire: it supports the “over-patentisation” of technology 
and science and negates the validity of exclusion rules that (should) secure “the balance of 
interests” of all participants. Given the current patent practice, it appears that the patent system 
serves the private interest of patent holders and not the public welfare.257 
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3.4.9 The Patent Landscape 
In spite of various objectives, the system is constantly fuelled with thousands of patent applications 
a year. It is estimated that only in the USA (the most important patent market) there were 
2,239,231 million patents in-force in 2012 (549,521 in Germany).258 The EPO granted 64,613 
patents in 2014259; Samsung Electronics field 21,659 applications (on utility, design, and plant 
patents) to the USPTO in the same year.260 IP portfolios are bursting at the seams – they have to 
achieve critical mass in order to defend themselves from attacks. During the famous (or notorious) 
Apple v Samsung litigation, Samsung’s lawyers estimated that 250,000 patents apply to a single 
smartphone (!).261 Media report on big IP transactions without ever mentioning the idea of 
technical progress, e.g. IBM transferring 750 patents to Twitter as part of licensing deal and 
litigation settlement262, Google buying 17,000 patents from the Motorola handset business for 
$12.5 billion (in the form of a company acquisition).263 
How is the system capable of processing this amount of IPs? The market developed various 
instruments and business models with the aim of supporting companies dealing (more) with the 
quantity of patents embedded in their IP portfolios and overlooking valuable solutions.264 
As statistics present, companies are doing more than well with patent monetisation. Microsoft and 
Ericsson report royalty revenues of over $2 billion a year, Qualcomm – $6.1 billion.265 How do they 
do it? They collaborate with patent brokers266, patent assertion entities267 (PAEs, also labelled as 
patent trolls), and more.268 PAEs gain particular attention as they generate bad publicity for the 
patent system, destroying the faith held in it. The term PAEs refers to market players who 
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aggregate IP portfolios with the aim of only asserting them for financial gain – with no 
manufacturing intentions whatsoever. They approach (often small and medium-sized) producing 
companies via demand letters, alleging patent infringement without merit with the aim of extorting 
nuisance settlements.269 Since patent litigations can be extremely expensive, most addressees 
choose to pay rather than to start a court battle. Such practice, common in the USA (but not 
exclusively270) is regarded as an evident system abuse. The lawmakers attempt to constrict such a 
business model; commentators remain sceptic about their efforts. The America Invents Act271 
conceived a new procedure of inter partes review and covered the business method patent review, 
both post-grant examination procedures at the Patent and Trial Appeal Board of the USPTO. As 
faster and cheaper alternatives to patent revocation lawsuits, they were intended to affect PAEs 
practise. However, as recent studies present, they are predominantly used by operating companies 
in cases where there is no litigation.272 The US Congress has prepared a number of legislative 
proposals to combat the plague of non-serious lawsuits273, but they also face criticism for the 
possible adverse impact of their proposals on other non-practising entities, such as universities.274 
The USPTO and Conversant opened platforms furnishing Q&A to identify demand letters and 
educating entities how to further proceed in case of such notifications.275 Additionally, Conversant 
has launched a campaign to increase ethical standards in licensing and to dissociate serious patent 
licensing businesses from patent trolls, e.g. “never threaten litigation against a start-up company, a 
local retailer, or an end-user customer, unless it is your direct competitor.”276 
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Besides patent trolls, the IP field is plagued with patent battles, e.g. Apple v Samsung277, Yahoo! v 
Facebook, Qualcomm v Broadcom, Stratasys v Afinia. They are neither beneficial for the patent 
system (by deteriorating its image), nor for the participants themselves, who could instead invest in 
R&D operations. However, the party that loses the most are the end-users who have to “pay back” 
enormous litigation costs that are recouped in the ultimate product price.  
An example of fierce patent practice is the cease of operations by IPXI, a Chicago-based company, 
which offered a new model of IP licensing aimed at safeguarding transparency and fairness of 
patent transactions. IPXI proposed a complex, albeit well-thought business solution in a form of an 
exchange platform for patent licenses covering consumable products (e.g. five square meters of 
OLED), named the Unity License Right (ULR). Transparency concerned the determination of the 
price, which was based on profound market analysis and a standard license on publicly disclosed 
terms. Another distinguishing element of this business model was an obligation to deliver 
consumption data reports by purchasers of URLs, who were given the right to re-sell unconsumed 
ULRs that were offered in the second (and subsequent) offering tranches.278 On March 25 2015, 
IPXI announced: 
IPXI’s business model offered fairness and transparency and relied upon patented 
technology users to be good corporate citizens. In the end, potential licensees 
made it clear that the only way IPXI would really get their attention was through 
litigation, and that’s exactly what our business model tried to overcome.279 
The IPXI case revealed probably the main reason behind the disillusionment with the patent 
system, namely widespread low and fierce business ethics. As announced, if IPXI attempted to 
pursue its model and objectives, it would be involved in multiple legal proceedings against its 
potential customers, who would be using the product without a license. IPXI would then almost 
automatically face suits challenging the validity of the infringed patents, despite a careful 
examination of patents before launching an offering. Not only would this development generate 
exorbitant costs, but also completely block the operations of the platform. In light of the above, 
business termination was the sole reasonable decision.280 
Against this background, initiatives like that of Elon Musk (Tesla Motors) are very surprising and 
encouraging, though seen by many as anecdotal rather than as a form of setting a new patent 
practice.  
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On 12 June 2014, Tesla Motors announced that it would not initiate lawsuits against anyone who 
applies its technology in good faith (the term stayed undefined). It was an unusual step – a public 
declaration on allowing “patent infringements,” or a promise not to sue for using Tesla’s patents.281 
Why? Elon Musk indicated opening Tesla’s technologies for their further development as the main 
reason for his move. As Tesla's business does not deal with a lot of competition, it would benefit 
more by establishing a partnership with companies willing to work on its patents within a single 
innovation platform. Commentators indicate that this situation is similar to to cross licensing: Tesla 
blocks those who use Tesla’s patents (in good faith) in filling lawsuits against Tesla itself for using its 
patents. In this way, Tesla secured access to external R&D. The competitors and users must 
remember that Tesla did not abandon its patents so any use deemed as a bad-faith would still be 
prosecuted.282 An overall positive impact on Tesla’s image is an added value to this move. 
Regardless of the business motivation, the decision was much welcomed in the open maker 
community. Some commentators recognised it as marking a new spirit of cooperation and 
openness. After all, working in good faith is one of the main characteristics of making. Were other 
patent holders to adapt a similar attitude as Tesla, the change would be a huge step forward in the 
pursuit of free making. Mark Lamley interpreted this as “a Silicon Valley mindset of creating a 
network effect to further boost the adoption of disruptive products and grow the ecosystem of 
company in the space.”283 Likewise, Android became the prevalent operating system on 
smartphones after Google made it open.284 
Time will tell whether this development will remain a single episode, or whether it will become a 
common practice. Nonetheless, this example shows that closing down access to inventive solutions 
is not the sole option for technology and business making. 
As studies of R&D labs demonstrate, patent protection situates itself in the third place after lead-
time and trade secrecy in various industries as an effective appropriation mechanism, with patents 
prevailing in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors.285  
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Trade secrecy is an appealing instrument for many companies, large companies included. For 
example, reports claim that in the EU, DuPont spends two billion US dollars on R&D, a great portion 
of which is not patented. Trade secrets may pertain to very valuable technologies that are difficult 
to re-engineer (e.g. production of Kevlar by DuPont), but also to small and incremental 
improvements that, when assembled together, can be used to run a whole factory and are crucial 
in maintaining a competitive edge. A short technological lifespan (2-3 years), the failure to meet the 
threshold of patentability, or tight budgets may determine the fact that the information is kept 
confidential. However, not only does trade secrecy represent an alternative to patenting, it also 
complements it by situating patents within an implementable and marketable framework. Due to 
its importance, national legal regimes protect trade secrecy (obligation under Article 39 of the 
TRIPS Agreement) through regulations, such as the Uniform Trade Secret Act in the USA and 
respective national regulations in the EU.286 Moreover, trade secrecy theft is a legal crime (in the 
USA – a federal crime). For example, Kolon Industries had to pay $920 million in restitution and 
cease manufacturing and selling products for stealing DuPont’s trade secrets on the production of 
Kevlar.287 
Another alternative to patents is the system of utility models, designed to protect small (petty) 
inventions, i.e. inventions of lesser importance, with a shorter term of protection (e.g. 10 years in 
Germany) and lower protection requirements (only novelty and industrial applications). Although 
utility models belong to the catalogue of intellectual property stipulated in the Paris Convention, 
not every system makes use of this form of protection. Owing to lower protection threshold in 
countries such as Germany, prior art pertains to written descriptions of the solution published 
within the country, utility models are granted in the course of faster and cheaper procedures. In 
Germany, applications are evaluated in light of compliance with formal requirements. The material 
aspects of the claimed solution are excluded from the examination and hence minor validity level of 
protected solution. In various places, the utility model law refers to patent law; however, it does 
not cover all types of inventions the patent protection applies to (e.g. methods), and envisages a 
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grace period of 6 months for own disclosures and use. Utility models are considered useful for 
incremental innovation or for solutions (products) with a short commercial lifespan. Due to their 
lower costs, they represent a good option for SMEs or in the case of unsuccessful patent application 
– some countries allow the conversion of a patent application to a utility model.288 (However, 
patents in a company portfolio render more prestige than utility models.) 
Finally, yet importantly, why do inventors seek patent protection? As studies suggest, pure business 
motives dominate, such as preventing copying, blocking competitors (compelled to cross licensing), 
preventing infringement suits, building patent fences (e.g. patenting substitutes around own core 
invention), enhancing reputation, or using patents in negotiations.289 
 
3.5 Concluding Thoughts 
In the knowledge economy, patenting constitutes a lucrative business strategy that puts under fire 
the romantic concept of technological progress supported by (and possible only because of) patent 
protection. 
Perhaps, if patents were openly portrayed as legal and financial instruments, the current criticism 
of and disappointment in the system would not be that strong. 
The fact that the system requires modifications is clear to everyone. However it cannot be 
reformed ad hoc. Long-term changes first demand the restructuring of underlying mindsets and a 
new vision, which should be mirrored on the legislative level by inducing higher patent quality, 
stricter examination, and greater transparency in patent litigation. Higher ethical standards among 
practising companies should certainly lead such reforms. 
Reforms that have already been initiated, such as the inter partes review within the AIA, bore their 
fruits and assisted in sorting out invalid patents. Notably, the majority of patents (64.3% in the 
USPTO fiscal year 2015) concerned electrical and computer sectors, with another 7.5% coming from 
the biotech and pharma fields. This does not require further comment. The rulings of the US 
Supreme Court also steer the changes: in Alice Corporation v CLS Bank International, the Court 
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invalidated business-method patents at suits. However, the court's decision caused mixed feelings: 
the revocation of patents in itself did not surprise as much as the explanation on the abstract 
character of eligible subject matters, which provoked discussions; but most importantly, the case 
called for the clear, definite, and tighter drafting of patent claims.290 
The proliferation of low-quality patents remains a substantial problem to solve, which would 
subsequently solve other related issues. Certainly, this would support making by removing invalid 
and weak patents that only block and deter the makers’ performance. The concerns upon the 
friction between makers and patent law might be expressed in another way: maybe it is the maker 
movement that has become too technological and too advanced, having reached the level of 
sophistication where patents are involved. The pendulum swings in both directions. 
Setting aside the genuine cause of friction, we need to face the facts as they are. Before taking any 
further steps, it should be established whether the instruments provided by patent law allow 
makers and other users to legitimize unauthorised uses of patented solutions. Perhaps the critical 
opinions on the fake balance of interests that the patent regime provides are erroneous with 
regard to limitations on patent effects. The following comparative analysis of patent flexibilities 
attempts to solve this puzzle and presents just how much free space has been carved out in the 
system for end users. 
Only with this knowledge in mind can we determine if there is a need for a toll designed for makers, 
or whether the existing patent exceptions sufficiently support makers in their routine operations. 
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Chapter 4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PATENT EXCEPTIONS  
4.1 Introduction 
From a legal standpoint, a patent is a complex document that bestows exclusivity upon the use of a 
patented solution that translates into market monopoly. All permissible uses can be conducted only 
with the permission of the patent holder, who steers the utilisation and commercialisation 
processes in regard to the said patented solutions. Each jurisdiction regulates this matter in details 
but the core of protected rights remains the same: law protects the economic exploitation of rights, 
pursuant to Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement: 
A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
(a)    where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third 
parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing (6) for these purposes that product; 
(…). 
 A patent does not entitle the patentee to use the invention – such a possibility exists without a 
patent – but constitutes a legal condition of an exclusive use of a patent in a commercial manner 
(ius positivum; a subjective exclusive right). In the practical dimension, this translates into the right 
to exclude others from the use (ius negativum, ius prohibendi), which remains the core functionality 
of patents – the exclusion of unauthorised use and a legitimate enforcement of the infringed rights 
from a patent. 
The right to exclude finds it expression in patent licensing, where the patentee chooses a party to 
which he or she secedes the exploitation rights to a patent. In a license agreement, a patentee not 
only allows others to use the invention in the negotiated manner, but also voluntarily refrains from 
enforcing their rights against such uses (in a specified territory and for a specified time), i.e. a 
license is a contractual promise not to sue. 
An unauthorised use of an invention constitutes a legal ground to enforce the rights from a patent. 
Infringement occurs when an unentitled party conducts one or more of activities stipulated in the 
norm, such as manufacturing, using, putting into circulation, offering to sell or selling. A patented 
subject matter might be either imitated (reproduced or applied into working) or worked around 
(which diminishes the value of such a patent). Infringement means that the infringing party has 
encroached on the area protected with a patent – the substance of an infringement demands a 
detailed examination in light of the conferred patent protection.  
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However, certain unauthorised uses are sanctioned by law and therefore they do not establish any 
legal ground for claiming an infringement of patent rights. Patent exclusivity is limited by norms 
and doctrines that set boundaries on the exploitation and the enforcement of patent rights, and 
that limit the effects of a patent. 
Patent law seeks to achieve balance between the commercial interest of the inventor and access to 
the invention to support important public interests and ordre public. The latter is safeguarded with 
patent limitations (patent exceptions) that derive from legal and ethical considerations upon the 
permissible uses of a patented subject-matter. They either do not violate the exploitation rights of 
the patent holder or support crucial public interests. It is therefore legitimate, to e.g. use a 
patented solution in a private sphere and for a non-commercial purpose, or to conduct experiments 
on patented subject matters with the aim of discovering new applications and new information. In 
principle, patent limitations deal with very specific situations. Without them patent law could not 
achieve its objectives and would represent a burden to trade relations (e.g. without the exhaustion 
principle) and established social practices (e.g. farmer’s privilege). 
The proper application of a patent limitation can secure the use of a patented solution without the 
peril of a patent lawsuit. From this perspective, patent flexibilities constitute limitations ex ante – 
they create a space free from the effects of a patent. However, the rightfulness of such application 
is often determined in the course of legal proceedings on an infringement allegation, when 
limitations are applied ex post as defence tools.  
This chapter presents the profiles of a number of patent limitations adopted and exercised in the 
analysed jurisdictions. It begins with a sketch of the international background specified in the TRIPS 
Agreement, which stipulates the allowed “unauthorised freedom to operate.” The analysis ends 
with a summary of general trends transposed directly onto the making model. The objective of the 
study is to determine which limitations and to what extent facilitate the activities of makers. 
The comparison follows the catalogue of patent limitations provided in the UPC Agreement, 
categorised as statutory limitations. It investigates further judicial doctrines, i.e. non-statutory 
limitations, which complete the palette of patent flexibilities. 
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4.2 The TRIPS Agreement as the International Foundation for Patent 
Exceptions 
Once patent protection ingrained itself in national legal orders, its development entered the stage 
of internationalisation291. In the second half of the 19th century, the issue which raised much 
concern was the protection of foreign inventions. International trade contacts expanded and stirred 
debates over the protection of foreign (imported) goods. At that time, to benefit from patent 
protection in third countries, an inventor had to file applications simultaneously in various patent 
offices. Countries regulated protection-related matters in bilateral agreements; however, those 
efforts were insufficient292. At the same time, international exhibitions organised in European 
capital cities demonstrated an urgent need for the unification of patent norms. Although a 
complete unification of patent laws was unfeasible due to discrepant national interests of 
contracting countries, a compromise on certain common principles of patent protection was 
attainable. In 1883, the first international convention, the Paris Convention on the Protection of 
Industrial Property (the Paris Convention, PC), was signed.293 It conceived of two core principles of 
international patent law: the recognition of foreign patents at a national level (equal treatment) 
and a patent priority (union priority) of twelve months. However, the convention did not impose 
any obligation on the contracting countries to harmonize their substantive laws among each other, 
unless the national provisions went to an extreme (national protectionism) and e.g. nullified patent 
protection for imported goods. Other provisions of the PC that affected further law developments 
concerned the failure to function or the insufficient working of patents (and established the 
standard of compulsory licensing) in Article 5A, the principles of unimpeded transport (transport 
privilege) in Article 5 ter.294 
The internationalisation of IP protection has progressed since the Paris Convention295. However, 
the next milestone in standardisation was enacted only 100 years later, launching the era of “IP 
globalisation.”296 
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The Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) was enacted at the end of 
the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and converged on establishing the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which assumed the administration of the Agreement. (The fact of enforcing IP outside of 
the WIPO forum – proposed and exercised by developed countries, mainly the US – was strongly 
criticised297; however, as commentators indicate otherwise the legislation would never have 
happened.298) 
The TRIPS revolutionized the IP field in two ways: 
1) it recognized IP protection as an economic tool in international trade, and 
2) comprehensively regulated the IP field , determining a framework for national IP 
regulations.299 
It attempted to eliminate impediments to and differences in the protection of intellectual property 
between countries to a much greater extent than any other treaty.300 In that regard, the TRIPS 
Agreement went much further than its predecessors: the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, 
the Rome Convention, the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, and the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (Article 2); the regulations of which remain in force.301  
In terms of patent-related issues, the TRIPS Agreement broadly covers: 
1) patentable subject matter (Article 27) – requirements and exclusions from patentability, 
2) effects of conferred rights (Article 28) – the scope of patent exclusivity, 
3) conditions on patent applications (Article 29) – sufficient patent disclosure, 
4) patent exceptions (Articles 30 and 31), 
5) judicial review by patent revocation or forfeiture (Article 32), 
6) term of patent protection (Article 33) – 20 years, 
7) the burden of proof in patent infringement cases (Article 34). 
As stipulated in Article 1, the Agreement conceives “the minimal standards of protection”; hence, it 
justifies the authority of the Member States to introduce more restrictive regulations. 
Paradoxically, already in the first provision it implies a limited power of a country when defining the 
framework of IP protection according to domestic interests and conditions because the minimum 
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standards must be met. The initial concept behind the TRIPS Agreement, which was forced by 
developed countries, was to harmonize the threshold of patent protection as established there, 
eventually leading to the elevation of standards in the global scale. In that regard, it is rightly 
claimed that for many countries (mainly, developing and less-developed countries302), the minimal 
standards were (and still are) too high to be implemented without harm for their domestic 
economies.303 In addition, next to the proclamation on the minimal standards, the Agreement 
introduces instruments which support the uplifting of standards. For example, it appended the 
principle of national treatment from the Paris Convention with the principle of the most favoured 
nation (Article 4), i.e. privileges and favour granted to one Member States shall apply to all others. 
To that end, non-formalised reciprocity and pressure, predominantly economic, oblige countries to 
mirror the standards adapted in the country of higher norms, which apply to both national and 
foreign inventors.304 
The Agreement introduces certain exceptions to IP protection, which traditionally constitute a part 
of all IP regimes, in Articles 13 (copyright), 17 (trademarks), 26 (industrial designs), and 30 
(patents), with the aim of securing a fair trade-off between the interests of the rightsholders and 
users. Another “safety valve” was inserted in Article 8, which gives the Members the discretion to 
adapt measures necessary in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that they are consistent with the Agreement.305 It pertains to the wording 
of Article 7, which states that IP protection should contribute to the promotion, transfer, and 
dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of producers and users, social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
Critics nonetheless point to the strong pro-IP mechanisms incorporated in the Agreement, which 
impede the sensitive balance between producers and users.306 Commentators reproach the 
industrialized countries for shaping the Agreement according to their interests, bent on enhancing 
and stimulating greater IP protection, although they themselves enjoyed much greater freedom at 
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earlier stages of development.307 As commented by an Indian representative: “This piece of 
document is going to do maximum good to maximum countries (…)”308 The practice shows that 
compliance with the TRIPS is extorted via economic means: industrialised countries impose 
pressure on developing countries by blocking technology transfer or applying other sanctions 
affecting the local economy (e.g. higher customs, import embargoes). The United States, for 
instance, lists the suspect countries on a “watch list” based on Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act. It also pursues higher IP norms via bilateral free trade agreements 
introducing TRIPS Plus IP regimes, much tighter than in the US itself.309 Considering the objective of 
the Agreement, i.e. the dissemination of technology and the promotion of innovations within the 
framework of an international trade system, and with the public and global welfare in mind, the 
execution of the Agreement remains controversial. In this context, the assessment of the 
implications of TRIPS, reinforced by negotiation history that was shaped mainly by industrialised 
countries, leads to the conclusion that IP protection is instrumentalized for the benefit of “the 
maximum countries” that steer international trade according to own interests.310 
 
4.2.1 Limited Exceptions to the Effect of a Patent – Article 30 TRIPS 
During the TRIPS negotiations, diverse proposals emerged on how to regulate the matter of 
exceptions included in Article 30. The European Commission proposed the exclusion of private and 
non-commercial use, along with experimental uses; later appended with the preparation of 
medicines, governmental uses, and prior use. The proposal concerned an exhaustive and closed 
catalogue of exceptions. The contracting states eventually rejected this concept in favour of an 
abstract formulation that was intended to serve greater flexibility in shaping patent limitations, and 
which should offer the Member States the widest possible discretion in determining the types and 
scopes of limitations according to their policies.311 
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Article 30 adopts the three-step test from the Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention312 (intended for 
copyright law) and accommodates it to the prerequisites of patents. Its abstract character does not 
denote unrestricted flexibility in defining possible exceptions; a number of limitations (steps) are 
hidden in the provision that every exception introduced into a national system has to comply 
with.313 The three criteria that qualify a given exception as lawful and acceptable, stipulate that an 
exception must be limited (1) and must not “unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of the 
patent” (2), as well as must not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties” (3). Each condition constitutes a 
separate and independent requirement; however, all three conditions must apply cumulatively – 
failure to comply with one of them prohibits the application of the exception at question.314 Article 
30 was indispensable, as TRIPS vastly regulated the substantive law on patents. Like other 
provisions, the purpose and objective of the Article stay in accordance with Article 7 and 8.1 of the 
Agreement. However, like no other provision on patents in TRIPS, Article 30 serves the balance of 
rights and obligations and the mutual advantage of producers and users, as pronounced in Article 7. 
Considering the fact that it functions as “a yardstick” that all limitations adapted in domestic laws of 
countries, signatories of the Agreement, must comply with, it serves the named objectives 
globally.315 
Notably, Article 30 broadens the scope of the three-step test from the Berne Convention by 
acknowledging the interests of third parties, but only in the third step, and simultaneously, already 
in the first step, it specifies the term of exception as a limited one. In other words, it sets an ab 
initio limitation to a limitation; this manoeuvre is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that 
exceptions per se are construed in a narrow manner.316 Thereby, the initial formulation of the 
provision suggests that negotiating countries addressed the matter of exceptions with a great 
precaution, as if intentionally framing the minimum ambit possible for norms circumscribing the 
effects of a patent. 
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The practice, however, has revealed an imbalance and a double-standard policy in regard to 
forming legal tools: support for the expansion of IP protection (i.e. a stronger protection) and 
contempt for any attempt at reducing the scope of protection by introducing new derogations.317 
Despite the abstract formulation of the Article, the scope of TRIPS-conforming limitations appears 
to be exhausted. Limitations that comply with the Agreement existed in national systems long 
before the TRIPS and were determined by a legal tradition and practice318, e.g. private and non-
commercial use, prior use, experimental use, traditional exceptions for pharmacists, acts done on 
vessels (as in the Paris Convention in Article 5ter), and permissible agricultural uses. The cautious 
academic analyses of the three-step test for patents as construed by WTO319 prove a narrow 
comprehension of the permissible and lawful ambit of exceptions, and emphasise the political 
considerations that significantly determine law construction under the auspices of an international 
organisation. 
 
4.2.2 The Three-step Test for Patents 
The interpretation of the patent three-step test was the subject of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Panel report320 in the case Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (2000). 
In this widely commented case, the European Communities (EC) challenged the provisions of the 
Canadian Patents Act: Section 55.2 (1) on regulatory review exception (allowing making samples for 
market permission) and 55.2(2), a stockpiling exception (allowing making and storing larger 
quantities of protected pharmaceuticals until the lapse of a patent). The EC argued that the named 
provisions of Canadian law contravened Articles 27.1, 28, 30, and 33 of the TRIPS Agreement.321 
                                                          
317 Dreyfuss, "TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?," 21. 
318 WTO, "Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products. Complaint by the European Communities 
and Their Member States": 7.70. 
319 Likewise for copyrights and trademarks, see Kur, "Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water."; Senftleben, 
"Towards a Horizontal Standard." 
320 The dispute settlement system of the WTO secures and clarifies the provision of the WTO agreements. 
Members direct their question mainly to the Dispute Settlement Body, the Appellate Body, panels and 
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 See DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes or Dispute 
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321 WTO, "Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products. Complaint by the European Communities 
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Pharmacutical Products," in Research Handbook on the Interpretation and Enforcement of Intellectual 
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The reasoning of the panel is extremely lengthy and repetitive. As commentators indicate, the 
issues addressed in the report were of high political concern, which was manifested in excessive 
character of the wording and “little substance” to extract.322 They also point out that the Panel 
literally “measured” the exceptions and did not examine the motivation and policies underlying the 
limitations in light of the TRIPS objectives. Some shadows of policy re-thinking emerged in respect 
to the second and third criteria. However, that only concerned the limitations that passed through 
the sieve of the first requirement, as a result excluding provisions that could otherwise also bear 
significant social implications. In the end, quantitative features prevailed over their qualitative 
aspects, as if the Panel applied mathematical formulas. 323 
The following summary of the Panel’s interpretation of the three steps highlights the core 
statements on each step and serves as a reference point in the further analysis of a proposal for a 
maker-related exception. 
 
4.2.2.1 The First Step – Limited Exception 
The phrase limited exception was split and each term was rendered a separate meaning. 
In regard to the word limited, the Panel consented to the argumentation of the EC that the word 
connotes with words like “narrow, small, minor, insignificant, or restricted.”324 Canada opted for “a 
broader” understanding325, which was unacceptable in light of its juxtaposition with the word 
exception. The Panel also agreed that limited must be measured by “the scope of curtailment of the 
patent rights.” However, it does not suffice to enumerate the curtailed rights. As the first factor 
does not evaluate the economic impact, the extent of rights a given exception curtails must be 
determined, i.e. “to which extent the patent owner’s rights to exclude ‘making’ and ‘using’ the 
patented product have been curtailed.”326 
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324 Canada asserted that the word limited should be interpreted according to its conventional meaning, such 
as “confined within definite limits.” In regard to the stockpiling exception, Canada argued that the 
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 WTO, "Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products. Complaint by the European Communities 
and Their Member States": 7.27 -7.28. 
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326 ibid., 7.31. 
82 
 
Canada proposed the concept of a hierarchy of the exclusive patent rights; it suggested that the 
right to sell is the one that matters, indicating that manufacturing and using were of secondary 
significance.327 The Panel rejected these arguments. It found the stockpiling exception to be a 
substantial curtailment to the exclusive rights of the patentee, as it did not impose any limits upon 
the quantity of production during the last six months of the patent term.328 
The regulatory review exception was recognised as limited for its narrow curtailment of Article 
28.1.329 The Panel acknowledged the exception as narrow and limited because it confined the 
patent rights solely within the borders of the regulatory approval process. The production of the 
patented product for approval purposes did not prevent the patent holder from reaping 
commercial profits, because the production did not result in the merchandise of the products 
outside the claimed approval process.330 
Although the first condition is considered as not bearing economic implications, the Panel already 
at this point admitted that the regulatory review exception could have a considerable economic 
impact. Without the regulatory review exception, the patent owner could extend the patent term 
by an additional period (even up to 6 years required to develop and obtain regulatory approval for 
a generic company), gaining an additional market exclusivity term. In that respect, the exception 
had a limited impact on patent rights.331 
To summarize, the Panel delivered a double qualification of the term limited exception: the word 
exception indicates a narrow derogation of the granted right; the phrase limited additionally 
reduces its scope, resulting in a small diminution of patent rights. The extent to which an exception 
in question narrows the rights is a determinative factor. It cannot hinder the patent holder in 
pursuing business activities.332 
 
                                                          
327 ibid., 7.33. 
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4.2.2.2 The Second Step – Normal Exploitation 
Since the stockpiling exception did not comply with the first exception, the panel examined the 
second criterion only with regard to the regulatory review exception.333  
Again, the Panel first focused on the definitions of the terms. It stated that the term normal 
describes something that is “regular, usual, typical, ordinary, and conventional”. It added that it 
could be depicted as: “empirical conclusion about what is common within a relevant community, 
and the normative standard of entitlement.” The term exploitation was understood as a 
“commercial activity by which patent owners employ their exclusive rights to extract economic 
value from their patent.”334 
The Panel introduced even more ambiguity in regard to the interpretation of the term normal by 
accepting as a normal practice certain (extreme) acts that exclude “all forms of competition that 
could detract the economic returns anticipated from the patent exclusivity” – which warrants 
further explanations. The Panel admitted that no specific form of patent exploitation exists – 
exploitation results from technological developments and marketing practices that constantly 
change and evolve.335 
The Panel returned to the argument of the prolonged exclusivity obtained by forbidding 
competitors to prepare for regulatory approvals. It admitted that post-patent exclusivity might be 
the natural consequence of a patent. However, it should not apply in fields where regulatory 
approvals are required to enter the market, like in the pharmaceutical sector. The time required 
would extend patent exclusivity far beyond the normal patent term (3-6 years). Meanwhile, fields 
in which products enter the market without specific certifications are not affected by the extension 
of patent exclusivity. 
Here, the Panel found no conflict with normal patent exploitation, and justified the regulatory 
review exception in light of the patent policy.336 Nonetheless, legal uncertainty remains, because no 
                                                          
333 Canada argued that review exception did not conflict with the normal exploitation. It also took the view 
that exploitation concerns “extracting the commercial value from the patent” by selling the product, 
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clear boundaries of the term of normal exploitation were given, as a result of which it is explained 
and justified in various manners due to differences in legal traditions, practice, and national 
interest. However, the proposed interpretation of the term does not provide clarity, but instead 
raises further questions. 
The term reasonable was not scrutinised, as the Panel found the compliance of the regulatory 
review provision with the second step. It underlaid only a theoretical discussion that, by reversing 
the term “reasonable limitation of a normal exploitation,” should stay in accordance with important 
domestic policies, such as healthcare.337 By the same token, the Panel left a lot of place for legal 
puzzles. 
 
4.2.2.3 The Third Step – Legitimate Interest 
The third condition is the most challenging, since it requires negative evidence, i.e. “an act must not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of patent owner.” There are two elements to be 
determined in this regard: 1) the legitimate interests of the patent owner and 2) unreasonable 
prejudice of these interests in light of the legitimate interest of third parties (in other words, a 
reasonable limitation considering the interests of third parties).338 
This step involves similar considerations as the second criterion. The question was whether the 
production and use of a patented product for regulatory approval and the rejection of “prolonged” 
exclusivity from the patent owner that he or she could have enjoyed if making and using were not 
constricted, rest within the legitimate interest of the patent holder.339 
The Panel defined the term legitimate interest as used in legal discourse: “a normative claim calling 
for justifiable protection of interest, which supports relevant social and public policies.” An example 
of an exception that complies with this (convoluted) requirement is an experimental exception that 
supports key public policies: technical development and knowledge transfer.340  
Canada claimed that the patentee had no right to extend the period of protection beyond the 
prescribed period: “the interest of a patentee of pharmaceutical invention can be no different from 
those of patentees in other fields of technology.” It argued that societal interest and health policy 
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were within the ambit of third parties’ legitimate interest.341 The Panel accepted Canada’s 
argumentation. 
The Panel also highlighted the practice of granting a prolonged (additional) protection period with 
the aim of compensating the pharmaceutical companies for the delay and shortening of patent 
exclusivity that was adopted only in some countries. However, the Panel did not elaborate further 
on this politically sensitive subject matter and remained by the point that the reduced patent term 
was not to the detriment of the legitimate interest of the patent holder.342 
 
4.2.2.4 Concluding Thoughts 
The Panel pronounced a restrictive interpretation of the three-step test, accepting exceptions that 
provide a small diminution of the patent rights and concern specific uses. If the curtailment is 
substantial, i.e. embraces various forms of patent exploitation, it falls out of the lawful scope 
already in the first step. A normal exploitation of a patent pertains to activities that concern 
commercial uses with the aim of extracting economic value from the patent.343 Therefore, one 
could think that uses of patented solutions that do not affect the commercial uses are lawful – it is 
so, for instance, in the exception for private and non-commercial uses. However, such uses are only 
permissible if they represent a small diminution of the rights (as stipulated in the first step, and as 
in the named limitation). The interests of third parties which concern motivation and public policies 
underlying a given exception are unfortunately considered at the very end of the process, if they 
are considered at all. 
 
4.3 The European Catalogue of Exceptions 
The catalogue of exceptions proposed during the TRIPS negotiations, was based on the catalogue of 
limitations stipulated in the Community Patent Convention (CPC) in Article 31 (the 1975 version), 
which had been adapted in the national systems of the Member States within the harmonisation 
measures to establish a single patent regime in Europe.  
 
The patent unification efforts constitute a significant chapter of the EU history, as the desire to 
establish a unitary patent system for the entire European Union has been as old as the Union 
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itself.344 Exertions to give this wish a genuine form have taken more than half of the century (and 
will still take a fair bit of time until completion). The legislative activities succeeded in a sinusoidal 
manner, with frequent tides of intense political disputes, followed by silent works on further 
proposals, amendments, and regulations.345 The necessity of a single patent and court system was 
clear: the European market is not as competitive and alluring as the US or Japanese markets, with 
one reason behind this fact being a fragmented patent system.346 The creation of a single patent for 
the entire territory of the European Community (i.e. an equal protection scope, single enforcement, 
licensing schemes for all participants, and an autonomous legal system) was intended to assist the 
principle of the free movement of goods (protected by patents) – one the four basic freedoms of 
the European Community. 
 
The process evolved in two directions: 1) the creation of a Community patent available only for the 
Member States of the European Communities, and 2) establishing a European Patent that non-
Community Members could also apply for. To implement these goals, in the 1970s interested 
countries singed special conventions: the Convention for the European Patent for the common 
market signed in Luxembourg on December 15 1975 (the CPC), and the European Patent 
Convention singed in Munich on October 5 1973 (the EPC) that established the European Patent 
Organization.347 (The CPC was to remain within the EPC system that governed patent prosecution). 
The ratification process ended successfully only for the EPC (1977), with the establishment of a 
system of unified patent registration and examination, which nonetheless preserved the regime of 
separate national patents (a bundle of national patents). The ratification of the CPC did not go that 
swimmingly as one would wish: the Convention had to be ratified by all nine Community Members, 
but Denmark and Ireland objected to it, leaving the CPC out of force.348 Despite that misfortune, 
further attempts to calibrate the framework for the Community patent were undertaken: in 1985 
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and 1989349. However, again with a little ratification success – language requirements and the 
(controversial) patent litigation system remained outstanding issues.350 
Yet although the CPC has never entered into force, it had an immense impact on substantive patent 
laws in the Member States of the European Communities. With a view to ratifying the CPC, the 
countries-signatories adopted provisions implementing the CPC (rights, limitations, and obligations) 
within their domestic systems.351 The CPC comprehensively regulated patent matters pertaining to 
exclusivity (Articles 29-32), property aspects (Articles 39-43), and compulsory licensing (Articles 46-
48) (CPC 1975). The catalogue of limitations in Article 31 included private and non-commercial use, 
experimental use, the preparation of medicines, and permissible uses of patented subject matters 
on vessels, aircrafts, and vehicles to safely continue their operations (after the Paris Convention 
Article 5ter and Article 27 of the Convention on international civil aviation of 7 December 1944).  
The process of unifying the patent system in Europe did not stop. After many pitfalls, the Council 
decided to apply the instrument of enhanced cooperation in order to give the process a desired 
momentum.352 The new cooperation framework resulted in the adoption of two regulations: 
                                                          
349 The Agreement relating to Community Patents and to Jurisdiction. See Brandi-Dohrn, "Some Critical 
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 Thomas Terrell and Editors, Terrell on the Law of Patents, 17 ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), 19-20; 
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 Spain and Italy contested this move on the ground of the misapplication of the procedure requirements in 
light of Article 118 TFFU. The matter was much more nuanced and delicate. Apart from strictly legal 
reservations, the two countries did not accept the language regime, since they recognized their languages 
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Unitary Patent Regulation353 and Translation Regulation354.355 Another landmark step was signing 
on February 19 2013 the Unitary Patent Court Agreement (the UPC Agreement), which established 
a unitary court system for participating EU-Members (a third pillar of the EU-patent system, next to 
the two regulations).356  
The long-awaited unitary patent resembles a hybrid – it is comprised of four documents: the two 
regulations, the UPC Agreement and the EPC.357 Article 24 of the Agreement defines the hierarchy 
of the sources, bestowing superiority to the EU regulations, followed by the Agreement, the EPC, 
and other international agreements and national laws358 that cover diverse matters. For example, 
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of its compatibility with the EU law. The interested parties were on hold for almost two years. Eventually, 
the Court confirmed the incompatibility and presented certain improvements, which were amended in 
accordance with the later (singed) version of the Agreement. 
 Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 8 March 2011, Opinion 1/09.The application from 6 July, 2009; Callens 
and Granata, Introduction to the Unitary Patent and the Unified Patent Court. The (Draft) Rules of 
Procedure of the Unified Patent Court, 51; Winfried Tilmann, "Das Europäische Patentgericht nach dem 
Gutachten 1/09 des EuGH," GRUR Int. (2011); Jaeger, "Shielding the Unitary Patent from the ECJ: A Rash 
and Futile Exercise." 
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patentability requirements follow the provisions of the EPC (accordingly, the EPO will examine and 
grant the EU-Patent as stipulated in the EPC). 359 The UPC Agreement addresses the substantial law 
in terms of the direct and indirect use of an invention, as well as limitations to the effect of a 
patent. The latter were initially provided in Regulation 1257/2012; however, after multi-party 
discussions, they found their place in the UPC Agreement to assure greater uniformity of the new 
law.360 
Legal questions surrounding the creation of the UPC and the transfer of a vast part of substantive 
law to its competences stirred broad debates. As commentators indicate, the EU legislator chose a 
rather complicated and unusual technique to establish the Unitary Patent. In that regard, it was 
questioned whether European law could be subjected to the construction under the auspices of an 
international court – the Unified Patent Court – with the aim of harmonizing EU law processes via 
international law.361 
Furthermore, the proposal of enclosing substantive law in the Regulation has been met with the 
fire of critics concerned with the quality of judgements delivered by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (the CJEU) in matters of intellectual property (like trademark law). It was claimed 
that patent law, a complex legal field, should be subjected to the competences of a specialised 
court (a standard practice in most countries). Ultimately, the interested parties did their best to 
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avoid the jurisdiction of the already much-mistrusted CJEU.362 Professor Rudolf Krasser expressed 
the opinion that the CJEU as a “constitutional court of the EU” should not be obliged to address 
questions (prejudicial questions) in a specialised field.363 The exact role of the CJEU in the unitary 
system remains unclear. The courts of first instance, i.e. central364, local, and regional divisions, as 
well as the Court of Appeal in Luxembourg, may direct questions on the interpretation of EU law to 
the CJEU. Hence, the CJEU may decide upon elements of EU law incorporated in the unitary regime 
like the EU-Biotech directive or supplementary protection certificates.365 
The catalogue of patent limitations provided in Article 27 is based on the CPC catalogue that was 
appended with the later-enacted corresponding exceptions. The extensions of the catalogue derive 
from the EU Law: 1) Directive 2001/82/EC366 and Directive 2001/83/EC367 in Article 27d – the Bolar 
exception; 2) Regulation 2100/94368 in Article 27I – the multiplication of harvest for agricultural 
uses, 3) Directive 2009/24/EC369 in Article 27k – interoperability. Notably, the principle of 
exhaustion of rights, well-founded within the EU-regime, enjoys double security: it appears in 
Article 29 of the Agreement, and in Article 6 of the Unitary Patent Regulation. To the surprise of 
many, important instruments like compulsory licensing and the prior use right remained within the 
jurisdiction of the national law of Member States.370 The countries ought to decide now whether to 
adjust their national law to the unitary patent system or establish two parallel norms for two 
regimes on the same subject matter.371 The question of norm interpretation remains open. Since 
the CPC has never entered into force, the CJEU has never opined on the scope of exceptions (and 
will not do so in the future).372 The UPC Agreement constitutes a foundation for the Unified Patent 
Court (the UPC) that will be in charge of constructing norms. It is certain that the UPC will decide in 
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all patent cases concerning both unitary patents and European patents. The Court will have 
competences in respect to patent infringement, patent revocation, and prior use of the invention 
(pursuant to Article 32). When the unitary patent comes into force (probably in 2016), it is only a 
matter of time before respective case law is carved out under the Unified Patent Court. The 
question is how much time has to pass before the Court makes significant decisions in this regard. 
Forming a unified construction line for each exception will definitely be hard work, since it should 
be compatible with the current practice of the national courts, whether liberal or conservative, and 
unify all discrepancies. In that regard, the experimental use exception serves as a good example: 
German courts are considered to be “liberal” (i.e. exempt more uses under the national provision 
for experimental use, recognising commercial purposes), whereas Dutch courts are seen to render 
“conservative” judgements.373 The input goes both downwards, i.e. from the EU level to national 
laws, and upwards. Certain terms of the EU-Patent must be determined per analogiam to national 
laws. Again, experimental use illustrates this matter well: the wording of Article 27(b) is the same as 
in the corresponding German provision (Section 11 (2) of the German Patent Act). Most probably, 
German court decisions will serve as significant guideposts in determining the scope and meaning 
of the provision. However, it remains an open question whether the German understanding will 
gain Europe-wide recognition.374 So far, only the exhaustion principle, which is a well-established 
principle at the European level, stays firm within the given framework. In questions on the 
exhaustion for a unitary patent, the decisions of the ECJ shall be taken into account375; likewise, 
with regard to terms adopted form the EU law, e.g. the term biological materials corresponds to 
the term Biopatent from Directive 98/44/EC376, or to the term medicine from Regulation 
2001/83/EC.377 The UPC as an international court is expected to make autonomous decisions, 
though it is impossible for the court to detach itself from established patent practice entirely. 
The unification of the patent system did not cover certain instruments, such as compulsory 
licensing and prior use. Scholars claim that this exclusion appears to be inconsistent with the whole 
concept of a unitary patent: not only does it introduce a great portion of imbalance into the system, 
but also denotes a certain dose of misconception. If the creators of the unitary patent aimed at 
establishing a tool for promoting innovation and an effective market, they deprived it (and the 
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public) of a unified protective measure for dependent inventions.378 However, one should not 
forget that an instrument of compulsory license does not bear any practical implications – 
compulsory licenses are rarely granted, if ever. The same goes for the prior use right. European 
patent practice does not reveal an urgent need for the aforementioned tools to be harmonised 
within a unitary framework. Non-EU countries may address this issue with different EU-
mechanisms. It seems the legislators have chosen a pragmatic approach and excluded this delicate 
matter from the unitary agenda. 
There are still more questions than answers in regard to the unitary patent, because the system 
and its mechanisms must first be set in motion in order to observe and asses its pros and cons in 
practice. Certainly, the unitary system needs time to achieve its full operational shape. For the time 
being, patent practitioners and users must become acquainted with its features to make the 
correct (business) decisions: consider prosecution costs and all possible litigation scenarios. Legally 
and logistically, the unitary system is still a puzzle. Anxieties over the new form are all the more 
understandable in light of the fact that it introduces a further complexity layer to the existing 
models of European and national patents in Europe. 
 
4.4 General Profiles of the Compared Patent Systems 
The two European countries selected for the comparison, Germany and the UK, demonstrate many 
commonalities in their models of patent protection. As EU Members and active lawmakers on the 
international level, the two countries have legal systems with the same legal foundations, i.e., the 
EPC, the PCT, the TRIPS, the Strasbourg Convention, and the CPC, as well as provide similarly broad 
catalogues of exceptions. The CPC with its catalogue of patent limitations, though never enforced, 
affected the scope of protection in both systems, which have transposed its regulations into 
national orders for the purpose of further harmonisation with the EU law (and among the EU 
Members).379 
In Germany, the patent system is governed by the Patent Act of 1981. The protection of intellectual 
propriety is further guaranteed in Article 14(1) of the Basic Law380 that safeguards private property, 
and patents are recognised as such. The scope of the patent is curtailed in Article 14(3) when the 
public interest is at stake: “expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good.” Since 
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patent law serves society by fostering innovation and providing access to its fruits, the diminution 
(not the expropriation) of the patent right secures the trade-off between the patent holder and the 
third parties (accepted in light of Article 5(3)).381 This finds its expression in Sections 9 and 10 of the 
Patent Act, defining the scope of patent protection, directly followed by Section 11, which 
stipulates limitations to the effect of a patent, and Section 12, which provides the prior use right.382 
The UK patent system is regulated in the Patents Act of 1977, which is regarded as “the most 
complex piece of patent legislation ever enacted in the United Kingdom.”383 The enacted law was 
the answer of the British legislator to international legislative initiatives: the CPC, the EPC, and the 
PCT, and was followed by the adoption of subsequent international measures.384 That 
harmonisation was triggered by ongoing changes in the industry, in the course of which IP 
protection was uplifted to an important aspect of business. Like in the German system, the scope of 
protection was balanced with the catalogue of limitations.  
As an outcome, the Patents Act vastly regulates patent exceptions in Section 60(5) (following 
Articles 29-31 of CPC); and envisages the doctrine of exhaustion in Section 60(4) (pursuant to 
Article 81 of CPC).385 
US patent law has a long legal tradition, with the first Patent Act being enacted in 1790 (the first in 
the world). Further legislation processes were eventful and dynamic. They were governed by the 
jurisprudence, which construed terms and established doctrines. The US patent system is anchored 
in the constitutional declaration on the protection of intellectual property (Article 1 Section 8), 
which proclaims the promotion of “the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 
Modern patent law is codified in Title 35 of the United States Code (35 U.S.C.) and grounded in the 
Act of 1952, which has been amended several times. A recent major modification took place in 
2011 by enacting the America Invest Act (AIA)386 that converted the US system from first-to-invent 
(existing until then only in the US) into first-to-file, what affected the whole system in numerous 
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ways. 
Patent exceptions are seen as an inevitable necessity which safeguards important public policies: 
However, the real life imposed on the patent system the necessity to establish 
any kind of exemption for unlawful but socially beneficiary uses.387 
However, 35 U.S.C stipulates patent limitations to a limited degree. Apart from the experimental use 
exception (“safe harbour”) under Section 271(e)(1) and prior use provided in Section 273, the Act 
does not account for other tools similar to those seen in the presented European systems. The 
judicial doctrines supplement the picture with measures such as a repair doctrine or reverse 
doctrine of equivalents. 
Learning from the best – that seems to be the Japanese patent388: 
We have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that we can be like 
them. We said, ‘What is it that makes the United States such a great nations? And we 
investigated and found that it was patents, and we will have patents.389 
Throughout the last two centuries, French, German390, English, and American legal institutions have 
shaped the current Japanese legal system. Japan offers a European-Anglo-American mix flavoured 
with Japanese practise derived from local culture, tradition, and comprehension.391 The same spirit 
is reflected in the patent system which, while harmonised with international patent regulations, 
nonetheless managed to preserve the Japanese mindset.392 
In Japan, patent-related matters are governed by the Japanese Patent Act (JPA) of 1959. The civil 
procedure law and the civil code are relevant sources in patent litigations, with jurisprudence 
contributing significant input to patent-law-making.393 The patent exceptions have accordingly two 
sources: Article 69 of the Patent Act and the legal doctrine of permissible repair. 
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4.5 Statutory Limitations 
4.5.1 Private and Non-commercial Use 
Limitation of private and non-commercial use constitutes one of the fundamental patent 
exceptions; it was conceived as far back as in the Paris Convention and is traditionally recognised in 
every patent regime. When we consider that patents are instruments which regulate the use of 
patented subject matter in the public and commercial domains, the exclusion of the private and 
non-commercial sphere appears a logical consequence of the application of law. Theoretical 
justifications for patents, such as the reward theory, accentuate that the economic implications of 
the private use of patents (investment recoup, remuneration) that do not have any commercial 
implications must stay free from the effects of patent monopoly. Furthermore, it would be 
unfeasible for patent owners to control the use of patented solutions by end-users and to force 
them to conduct research on the permissible scope of use for the given patented solution.  
The German Patent Act stipulates the exception in Section 11(1). It covers two inseparable 
premises, i.e. private use and non-commercial exploitation – the exclusion of one makes the 
provision inapplicable. The underlying concept bespeaks that patents as instruments of public 
commerce cannot intrude on and regulate the private sphere, as this was not the purpose they 
were made for. Furthermore, an individual is released from the obligation to conduct patent due 
diligence before applying a product privately at home.394  
The provision has a precise application scope and a defined target-group, i.e.” individuals 
conducting acts upon the patented article privately.” The first condition, private use, concerns acts 
performed within the private sphere (alone or with family), within individual sport activities, or for 
private or personal purposes.395 The second criterion concerns the lack of economic profits from 
the utilisation of the patented solution – individuals exploiting patented articles in private, but 
generating income from the use, cannot shelter under the provision.396 For example, a student who 
builds a patented device as part of their academic assignment, or downloads software for the same 
purpose, can refer to this section. The assistance of a neighbour, however, is questionable even 
when unpaid, since such assistance leaves the narrow ambit of permissible personal use and serves 
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satisfying the needs of others.397 Likewise, non-profit organizations, institutions, schools, and 
hospitals do not fall within the scope of the provision due to activities coram populo. The same 
concerns freelancers, e.g. attorneys and architects, who fall outside the exception due to the fact 
that in the pursuance of their profession, they exploit patented devices on a commercial basis.398 
Another illustration would be software made for private purposes, which supports other programs, 
e.g. open source software. Here, the private relation is automatically denied, because the use 
leaves the personal use sphere and is delivered outside to the open public. Invoking the Section in 
such cases is considered an abuse of the privilege.399 However, no infringement occurs when the 
object purchased or produced for private and non-commercial purposes is re-sold.400 
In the UK, this matter is regulated in Subsection 60(5)a, which is a verbatim implementation of the 
corresponding provision of the CPC.401 The case law delivers interesting examples, including 
enterprises that invoke the aforementioned exception to protect and defend their business 
interests (unacceptable in the German system). 
In Smith Kline v. Evans, Evans Medical, a long-standing pharmaceutical company, argued for the 
right to use the protected substance, i.e. to conduct in-house experiments that resulted in 
producing another patented substance, for private and non-commercial purposes.402 The Court 
construed the provision as follows: 
1) The term privately shall be understood conversely to the term publicly. Private use denotes 
an act done for a personal use. This includes both secret and confidential acts. The most 
crucial feature is the non-public character of an act.  
2) The purpose of such acts requires a non-commercial motivation and outcome: “the word 
‘commercial’ does not need the explanation and clearly includes any commercial 
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purpose.”403 (The border between commercial and non-commercial purpose blurs when 
acts change their character in the course of operation.) 
In the case in question, Evans Medical claimed that the purpose of experiments was private, but 
confirmed that the information could have been of commercial use. The Court asserted that the 
subsection applies even if the information obtained via experiments might eventually lead to 
commercial application. However, if the act has a hidden commercial purpose, the subsection does 
not exclude liability for patent infringement. Evans Medical argued that the sole purpose of the 
experiments was the preparation of the evidence for the amendment proceeding, and hence they 
were of private character (!). Smith Kline opposed this argumentation and asserted that the 
experiments had a dual purpose: 1) the collection of evidence for the proceeding, 2) the collection 
of commercial experience. The Court found that the scale and nature of the experiments suggested 
that they indeed had commercial motivation, because they intended to provide the company with a 
head start in applying for a license of right.404 
In another case, McDonald v Graham405, the Court confirmed the presented course. In the case, the 
defendant kept and used the promotional Z-Cards (patented as foldable sheet material) for the 
purposes of his business. In reference to an earlier case, Smith Kline v Harbottle, the Court 
acknowledged keeping as stocking goods for sale: “a keeping in some capacity and for a purpose 
other than that of a mere custodian or warehouseman.”406 The defendant attempted to persuade 
the Court that their keeping of the Z-card is private and non-commercial407, but its attempts proved 
unsuccessful.408 
When juxtaposed against the German construction of the exception, its application scope in the UK 
regime appears generous and liberal – its ambit stretches, surprisingly, over business entities. The 
provision admittedly applies to acts done in private, understood as acts conducted at home or in a 
laboratory, as long as they are kept secret and closed to the public view. The non-commercial 
character is a requirement of utmost importance, which must be met: an operation must be non-
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commercial in the initial stage. However, if its profile changes with time into a commercial 
undertaking, which was not anticipated or intended, the provision may still find application. 
US law does not provide any similar provision on this matter. It accepts, as presented in a further 
part of this work, private and non-commercial use within the framework of repair and maintenance 
activities. The research unveiled solely one case where the infringing use concerned a personal use. 
In Beedle v. Bennett409, the defendant made and installed a patented driven well to draw water 
from the earth on his farm, an act which the patentee claimed to be infringing. The Supreme Court 
asserted that view and held that a use solely for personal convenience was an act of patent 
infringement.410 The case highlights a restrictive approach in defining the scope of the free use of 
an invention. In the cited case, the defendant neither sold nor offered to sell the patented 
invention, but merely used it on his own farm – his actions did no economic harm to the patentee 
(apart from the fact that the defendant did not buy the invention, but made it himself). The 
decisive argument against the defendant was “personal convenience” from the use of the 
invention, which is the more surprising in light of the fact that undoubtedly any kind of infringing 
act conducted by individuals bears the signs of personal convenience. From this perspective, US law 
does not make place for private and non-commercial uses, as they are known in the European 
systems. 
The JPA does not provide any provision on private and non-commercial acts. The reading of Articles 
68411 and 101412 provides some indications in favour of this kind of use. They stipulate that unlawful 
workings on the patented invention must have a commercial character, “as a business,” to 
constitute an infringement.413 However, no judicial decision has been rendered to clarify this term, 
hence the academic doctrine serves as the only source of interpretation. The term as a business 
refers to industrial activities that are neither individual nor domestic.414 Industrial activities 
generate profits and “relate to business.” Therefore, enterprises, public work projects, medical 
services, legal practice are seen as industrial activities. 415 Based on this understanding of the term, 
an exception for private and non-commercial acts must be construed narrowly and solely concern 
conducts performed individually, i.e. domestically, which are not affected by any commercial use. 
The scope of application of the exception resembles its construction in the German order.  
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4.5.2 Experimental Use 
Experimental use is the most important and the most debated patent exception which is 
implemented in every patent regime. Its importance manifests itself in blocking the effect of a 
patent over scientific experimentation on the patented subject matters, i.e. testing for the purpose 
of finding new applications and their new adaptations – a safety valve for enhancements and 
betterments. In that regard, the experimental use exception plays a central role in retaining a 
delicate balance in the patent system; without this instrument, a single patent would be too 
powerful. Intense public and academic debates on the scope of the exception result from the fact 
that it curtails the effect of a patent over activities that might bear commercial potential, e.g. by 
developing new products.  
The exception is of particular importance to the pharmaceutical and biotechnological sectors, in 
which substances are constantly scrutinised with the purpose of finding new applications. In this 
context, the experimental use exception emerges in discussions on research with an invention and 
the extension of the exception to cover such uses – in the literature, the problem appears in the 
context of questions on research tools. The matter is relevant with patentisation stretching over 
the results of the basic research, which may hinder scientific workings.416  
The exception goes a step further than private and no-commercial use, because it permits uses 
conducted in the public domain, i.e. by public institutions, business entities, universities, 
communities (1), and accepts commercial intentions behind experiments (2), albeit only in some 
jurisdictions. 
The latter underscores the variability in norm interpretation between jurisdictions, despite 
consensus over the inevitability of the exception to ensure the balance of interests. 
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4.5.2.1. Germany 
German law situates this exception in Section 11(2), stipulating that “acts done for experimental 
purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention are exempted from the scope of 
patent protection.”417 The provision is anchored in the constitutional protection of research and 
teaching (Article 5(3) of the Basic Law) and constitutes a limitation of the patent right justified in 
light of Section 14(3) of the Basic Law.418 
The norm recognises tests, trials, and experiments that measure the patented object with the aim 
of gaining new data and information, as lawful experimental uses. New information gained in the 
course of such experiments pertains to new indications, substance characteristics, or dosing 
proportions. Conducts carried out to clarify uncertainties in the applications of patented substances 
fall within the ambit of the provision as well. In principle, experimental undertakings with the main 
objective of securing new findings and gaining knowledge are exempted; tests that examine the 
technical application and the innovativeness of a given patent are also situated within the 
exception. Experimental use allows for reverse engineering, which is an inevitable part of every 
analysis of patented matter. Besides testing, experimental use includes manufacturing and using 
the patented device; however, these cannot be exceeded the scope and amount recognisable as 
experimental. The provision does not indicate any quantitative limitations but the Court might 
challenge extensive and “oversized” experiments.419 Experimental conducts might be carried out by 
the user or delegated to a specialised agency (if it does use the patented technology for its own 
benefits).420  
Two decisions of the Federal Supreme Court landmarked a liberalisation trend in applying the 
experimental use exception, which was of high importance in basic-research, where “blocking” 
patents curtail research operations, as it takes place in the biotechnological sector.421 
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The patents in question concerned inventions in the field of biotechnology: 1) preparation of 
human immune interferon422 and 2) production of erythropoietin423. The Court delivered two 
important statements: it did not object to the testing of patented substances for governmental 
approvals424, nor to the patenting of the results thereof, because the intention to patent an 
improvement cannot disqualify from the exception.425 It was stressed that that the objective of the 
provision is further development and the expansion of knowledge and understanding, which can be 
safeguarded only when experiments are carried out on the patented article. Hence, tests with the 
objective of discovering new indications, features of the substances, or a form or a dosage the 
substance must be provided in to treat certain disorders would fall within the ambit of the 
regulation. For the same reason, the experiments carried out to clarify uncertainties in the 
application of patented pharmaceutical substances are deemed permissible. 
What does not comply with the scope of provisions are conducts that measure the market potential 
of new derivatives: demand, price, and production conditions.426 Likewise, trials that serve dusting 
around with the aim of hiding the genuine purpose of experiments, e.g. the incorporation of 
patented technology into one's own strategy, cannot be exempted. Not only do they deprive the 
patentee of economic benefits, but they also contradict the purpose of the regulation.427 The use of 
patented matter as a research tool is also not considered to fall within experimental use, because 
such use relies on the technical teaching embedded in the patented subject matter, and hence 
negatively affects the economic interest of the patentee.428  
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424 "Experimental Use," 29-30. Some commentators do not recognise the two cases as “a gross about-turn,” 
since the Supreme Court did not dissociate from the general trend observed in Europe. See J.K. Jochen 
Pagenberg, "Clinical Trials I - Comment," International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law (1997). 
425 Klinische Versuche II, 3094. 
426 Klinische Versuche, 784; Ethofumesat, BGH 21.02.1989 X ZR 53/87, GRUR 1990, 997.  
427 Klinische Versuche II, 3094-95; Sedlmaier, Die Patentierbarkeit, 228-29; Pietzcker, "Patentrechtliche 
Fragen " 320. 
428 Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, §11 at 7; Joseph Straus, "Zur Zulässigkeit klinischer Untersuchungen 
am Gegenstand abhängiger Verbesserungserfindungen," GRUR (1993); Rudolf Teschemacher, "Die 
Benutzung patentierter Erfindungen zu Veruschs- und Forschungszwecken," GRUR Int. (1987); Thomas 
Hieber, "Die Zulässigkeit von Versuchen an patentierten Erfindungen nach § 11 Nr. 2 PatG 1981," GRUR 
(1996); Peter Chrocziel, "Zulassungshandlungen mit patentierten Arzneimttelerfindungen durch 
Zweitanmelder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den USA," GRUR Int. (1984). 
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German jurisprudence and commentators stress that the exception constitutes a tool for examining 
the feasibility and the practicability of inventions, as well as generating new information or 
clarifying uncertainties, with the objective of introducing betterments or new inventions on the 
market.429 As long as trials provide new knowledge and deepen the understanding of the patented 
teaching, the stimulus behind scientific curiosity, patent application, and patent commercialisation 
is irrelevant; experiments remain within the scope of the section.430 
 
4.5.2.2 The United Kingdom 
The UK system adapts a similar construction of the experimental use exception. It is included in 
Subsection 60(5)(b), which covers acts of both commercial and non-commercial character.431 The 
first condition of the exception is that experiments must be conducted “on” a patented subject 
matter to see how it can be made, improved, or how it works – research tools do not fall within the 
ambit of the provision. 
In Smith Kline v Evans, the Court perceptively examined the meaning of the wording “relating to the 
subject-matter of the invention.” It pointed out that use of “the” and not “an” invention indicates 
that the subject matter of the invention refers to the claims of the patent in question.432 The 
relationship with the invention must be “real and direct.” That means trials should pertain to the 
properties of the claimed invention itself. Experiments with the objective of evaluating other 
substances or products, challenging or improving upon their validity, fail to comply with the 
premise of a direct relation with the invention; they also deprive the patentee of the just 
commercial compensation for using the claimed patent.433 An excessive interpretation of the 
exception to cover trials with patented matter would rid the subsection of its original intention by 
applying it to all possible experimental cases: 
It cannot have been the intention of the legislature to include in the exemptions 
form infringements of paragraph (b) of section 60(5) tests or trials intended, as 
their purpose, to promote the commercial prospects and acceptability of a product, 
ex hypothesi an infringing product, with a view to its wider or better marketing by 
the infringer when he should be free to market it, as, for instance, when the patent 
expires.434 
                                                          
429 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 787. 
430 Klinischer Test, LG Berlin 25.09.1984 16 O 644/84, GRUR 1985, 375; Feldversuche [Field Experiments], LG 
Düsseldorf 5.3.1985 4 O 419/83, GRUR Int. 1986, 807; Atenolol, Hoge Raad, 18.12.1992, GRUR Int., 1993, 
887. 
431 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Limited v. Evans Medical Limited, 522. 
432 ibid., 524. 
433 ibid., 523; Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 522. 
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This approach confirmed the interpretation baseline adopted in earlier judicial decisions.435 
In Inhale v. Quadrant, the Court indicated that experiments must be carried out for an individual 
purpose, and dismissed the experimental use defence due to the fact that: 
(…) the defendant did not exploit its products or technology for its own 
experimental purposes. In all cases, the defendant was trying to exploit and sell its 
technology to third parties. This is not experimental use.436 
Conducts with the purpose of generating “statistics for further commercial exploitation” are 
another excluded category: 
But trials carried out in order to demonstrate to a third party that a product works or, 
in order to amass information to satisfy a third party, whether a customer or a body 
such as PSPS or ACAS437, that the product works as its maker claims are not, in my 
judgement, to be regarded as acts done for experimental purposes.438 
In the aforementioned case, obtaining named non-statutory approvals was aimed at expanding the 
market of an herbicide, TOUCHDOWN, which had already been manufactured by the defendant. 
The Court of Appeal held that the party went beyond the permissible scope of experimental use. 
The two analysed European jurisdictions adopt analogous constructions of the experimental use 
exception: the conducts must provide new information on and allow for improvements of the 
patented subject matter; they may have commercial motivation, but they should preponderantly 
have an experimental purpose. Due to the general nature of the exceptions, it is safe to assume 
that this liberal construction applies equally in all sectors of technology. 
 
4.5.2.3 The United States 
The strict comprehension of the experimental use in the US doctrine sharply differs from the 
presented European approaches. The exception439 in the US has a well-established legal tradition, 
                                                          
435 ibid.Also Frearson v Loe [1878] 9 CH. D. 48, 66; Hoe & Co. V Foster & Sons [1899] 16 R.P.C.33, 38; Hudson, 
Scott & Sons Ltd. V Barringer Ltd. [1906] 23 R.P.C. 79, 87; J.Lucas (Batteries) Ltd. V. Gaedor Ltd. [1978] 
R.P.C. 297, 384. 
436 Inhale Therapeutic Systems Inc. v. Qudrant Healthcare PLC, [2002] R.P.C. 21, 463. 
437 The two institutions are regulatory bodies: Pesticides Safety Precaution Scheme (PSPS) proves the safety 
of agricultural materials, Agricultural Chemical Approval Scheme (ACAS) tests their efficacy. Both are non-
statutory regulatory bodies, but it is a common practice to apply for clearance and /or approval from 
them to commence marketization. See Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 520. 
438 ibid., 542; Auchincloss v. Agricultural & Veterinary Supplies Ltd [1999] R.P.C. 397, 405. 
439 The experimental use defence shall not be confused with the experimental use exemption provided in 
Section 102, which serves the protection of an inventor prior to filing a patent application. 
 Robert L. Harmon, Harmon on Patents. Black-letter Law and Commentary  (Arlington: BNA Books, 2007), 
409-14; Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126(1877); Deutrim Co. v. The United States 19 Cl. Ct. 624, *631 
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with the first judgement made as far back as 1813. However, thus far the exception has not been 
worded in a codified form. 
In Whitmore v. Cutter440, the Court formulated the experimental use exception for the first time. Its 
scope was very narrow and strictly limited to actions exercised “solely for amusement or to satisfy 
idle curiosity or for a strictly philosophical inquiry.”441 In this precedent-setting case, the Court 
gently unsealed patent exclusivity and sanctioned actions undertaken with the aim of deepening 
knowledge: 
(…) it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, 
who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for 
the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its 
described effects.442 
The philosophical and idle character443 of the inquiries was (and is) understood literally, which 
means that the exception should be understood narrowly. This was affirmed in Sawin v. Guild444, in 
which the Court asserted that unlawful making must be performed with the intention of depriving 
the patentee of their just reward for the invention; acts for “mere purpose of philosophical 
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the specification” were not deemed to be 
making: 
The making of a patented machine to be an offence within the purview of the 
statute, must be the making with an intent to use for profit.445 
The Court unequivocally excluded any option of the commercial application of the obtained results. 
It divided experimental uses into two categories: 1) philosophical (i.e. scientific) experimentation 
and 2) verification of the verity and exactness of the specification.446 The Court accentuated that 
the activity could not deprive the patentee of his or her legitimate economic reward. In “The Law of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
(1990); Pfaff v. Wells Elec. Inc., 525 U.S. 55(1998); Eli Lily & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm Inc., 471 F.3d 
1369(2006). 
440 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120(1813). 
441 Harmon on Patents, 151-52; John M.J. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, *1360-61 (2002); Embrex, 
Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., , 216 F.3d 1343, *1349 (2000); Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, *863 (1984). 
442  Whittemore v. Cutter, *1121. 
443 As clarified by Mueller, the term philosophical experiments might be rather bewildering in the context of 
the contemporary understanding of a technical solution, but then the meaning of philosophical started to 
lean toward natural philosophy, which today is simply referred to as science. 
 Janice M. Mueller, "The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Imfringement 
Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development," Baylor Law Review 
56(2004): 929; Integra Lifescience I, Ltd v. Merck KgaA, The Scripps Research Institute, *874. 
444 Sawin at al. v. Gulid, 21 F. Cas. 554, No. 12,391(1813). 
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Patents for Useful Inventions” (1890), Robinson explains that unlawful use must be hostile and 
harmful to the patentee’s interests, which could be converted into financial gain in other 
proprietary manners.447 
The analysis of case law proves that US Courts did not shift away from the direction of philosophical 
curiosity, relentlessly safeguarding “the truly narrow” margin of flexibility. The modern doctrine has 
tightened its scope to an even further degree. One of the most persuasive and significant cases was 
Pitcairn v. the United States448, where the Court introduced the term legitimate business as an 
important indicator of the lawfulness of experiments and trials. 
In the said case, the US government purchased 2,200 helicopters manufactured to order. The order 
extended from 1946 to 1964 and involved the amount of $639 million (which was used in 
determining the compensation claims). The claim concerned the similarity (and non-similarity) of 
some 40 models of ordered aircraft in regard to which the Court asserted infringement. The 
defendant, US government, urged the Court to exclude aircrafts used for “testing, evaluation, 
demonstrational or experimental purposes.” The Court did not consent to the argument: 
Obviously, every new helicopter must be tested for lifting ability, for the effect of 
vibration on installed equipment, flight speed and range, engine efficiency, and 
numerous other factors. Tests, demonstrations, and experiments of such nature 
are intended uses of the infringing aircraft manufactured for the defendant and 
are in keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency. Experimental use 
is not a defense in the present litigation.449 
The legitimate business of the defendant was the military defence for which the aircrafts were 
designed and tested. The Court clearly stated that the experimental use exception was not 
conceived to serve the business interests of the infringer. Moreover, the use of a minimal sample 
does not release from liability (as it was suggested in Douglas v. United States450): 
(…) an infringement is not a question of degree. Even the use of a small amount of 
substance or to a small extends may bear substantial lost on the side of the 
patentee.451 
However, the strict and narrow scope of the doctrine's application did not guarantee the level of 
reliability that one would wish for.452 The US practice does not allow for a use if it can be construed 
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as using the patented invention in light of 35 U.S.C. §271 453 When examined through the 
parameters of contemporary scientific research, it is demonstrable that the exception has met with 
little success.454 
Universities and research institutions used to enjoy the benefits of the (almost limitless) 
experimental use exception; many found this fact to be self-evident, and this conviction was further 
supported by the jurisprudence. For example, in Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co.,455 the Colorado 
School of Mines, one of the recipients of allegedly infringed mining machines and their parts, was 
released from patent liability, since the use of the patented machinery was experimental – the parts 
were used in laboratory machines and were changed from day to day.456 Hence, academic scientists 
were strongly convinced to be immune from patent infringements, as they utilised patented tools in 
university labs for “strictly philosophical inquiry.” That has changed with Madey v. Duke, in which 
“legitimate business” won over the criterion of “idle curiosity.” 
In Madey v. Duke University,457 the court dismissed the experimental use exception, since the 
activities performed on the patented devices remained in accordance with the objective of Duke’s 
legitimate business, i.e. providing higher educational services:  
(…) these projects unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business 
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty participating 
in these projects. These projects also serve, for example, to increase the status of 
the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty. 
The determining factor was Duke’s patent licensing policy, from which it derived substantial 
revenues. The court emphasised that even the “slightest commercial implication”458 disqualifies the 
application of the experimental use exception. The scope of applying the exception was constrained 
by the notion of legitimate business, which remained the main axis of all concerns. The legitimate 
business objective in the case was the educational benefit for which the patented device was 
operated: students were consumers who paid for that educational opportunity. Therefore, Duke’s 
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457 Dr. John M.J. Madey was director of the free electron laser research laboratory at Duke University. He was 
also an inventor and the owner of two U.S. patents on laser devices – inventions patented during Madey’s 
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 John M.J. Madey v. Duke University, *1352-54. 
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utilisation of the patented device did not qualify for the experimental use exception. Moreover, the 
patented device was used for the purpose it was made for, and not in order to improve its design 
and functioning.459  
In light of the presented cases, it appears that hardly any conduct carried out in the university lab or 
in any other place might be deemed to be of experimental nature. The criterion of legitimate 
business has shrunk the ambit of the exception to some minute activities done for “idle 
satisfaction” – trifling, “dilettante affairs.”460 
Therefore, one would not be mistaken to consider the experimental use doctrine as almost non-
existent in the US system. From the perspective of R&D practice, the majority of trials are 
conducted with the idea (intention) of bringing an ultimate solution to the market (to recoup the 
out-laid investment) – which constitutes normal business behaviour, as acknowledged in the 
German and UK jurisdictions. The acceptance of the commercial nature of experimental activities in 
the European systems results from the basic assumption that a trial must uncover an unknown 
aspect of a patented solution, i.e. it provides new information and moves forward the state of the 
art. That a certain conduct might lead to a marketable product, and an entity or an individual 
desires to carry out trails which lead to such an outcome, does not deprive the conduct of its 
experimental character. However, the US doctrine puts the stress not on the outcome of such 
experiments, but on their purpose, i.e. scientific curiosity, which could have been a reasonable 
approach in the 19th century, but not in the context of science and research in the 21st century. 
Under the conditions of intense competition between companies and universities (for research 
grants), all entrants must deliver “faster, newer and better products” – how to achieve this goal if 
not by testing and measuring existing products? A further question arises on how to disentangle 
one invention from another. Technological progress is grounded in improvements on earlier 
solutions.461 Hantman's case-law analysis exposed another aspect of this issue. Cases in which the 
experimental use was allowed concerned uses where no monetary damages occurred on the side of 
the patentee, only because the defendant neither sold nor manufactured the patented solutions in 
question, although such attempts and intentions vividly existed.462 Further remarks concern the 
concepts of curiosity and idle satisfaction, which should literally serve the gratification of one's own 
philosophical and scientific interests – is it not equal with an act of personal convenience? If the use 
of a driven well for one's own domestic supply is considered to be an act of personal convenience 
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(like in Beedle v. Bennett) and is thus regarded to be infringing, why is this not the same for 
philosophical inquiries?463 This can be interpreted as an inconsistency in the application of the law. 
 
4.5.2.4 Japan  
In Japan, the experimental use exception found its statutory expression in Article 69(1):  
A patent right shall not be effective against the working of the patented invention 
for experimental or research purposes.464 
The provision was introduced as far back as 1909 – a considerable head-start over other 
countries465 – at the time of an intensive technological development based on reverse 
engineering.466 In spite of a long legal tradition, the notion of “experimental and research 
purposes” has not been clarified in the Patent Act, and hence must be supported by academic 
doctrine and judicial decisions. To classify a given conduct as experimental use, it must comply with 
certain requirements:  
1) the subject-matter must be patentable, 
2) the working must contribute to scientific development by verifying the properties of an 
invention, improving it, or ascertaining its economic advantages.467 
The exception also covers tests carried to obtain data for the governmental registration (known as 
the Bolar exception). 
Japanese courts reluctantly accepted the extension of research exception on regulatory approvals. 
In Monsanto v. Stoffer Japan K.K.468, the Court dismissed the explanation of the defendant (Stoffer 
Japan) that experiments were performed with the intention of securing agrochemical registration, 
which was required for the sale of the herbicide.469 The court stated: 
Agrochemical experiments carried out for the purpose of securing government 
registration of the herbicide are not intended to advance technology and 
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therefore do not fall within the scope of the experiment or research exception to 
an otherwise infringing use.470 
The Court followed the prerequisite that research and trials “are inherently intended to advance 
technology to the next stage and not for purposes associated with the manufacture or marketing of 
a patented product.”471 Accordingly, experiments providing data for governmental registration do 
not contribute to technological progress. 
Primary producers welcomed the Monsanto decision and consequently flooded Japanese Courts 
with infringement claims against Japanese generic companies.472 The Monsanto approach was 
equally applied and rejected. In a number of cases473, Courts judged in favour of pharmaceutical 
companies, highlighting the requirement of technological advancement. Some judgements474, 
however, deviated from this construction and approached the exception more liberally to include 
clinical trials (the biological equivalence test475) within the experimental use exception under Sec. 
69(1).476 
The liberal reasoning was threefold: 
1) generic tests contributed to scientific development;  
2) market exclusivity resulted from a patent terminates with the lapse of a patent and as such 
cannot be extended above that time, otherwise it would be with the detriment to the fair 
market competition; 
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3) anyone can freely utilize the invention after the patent is not in force anymore.477 
The extension of the experimental use exception over generic tests caused a great deal of 
confusion and, as has been claimed by commentators, might in fact turn out to be to the detriment 
of the provision by deforming its initial concept. In Japan, the acceptance of generic tests occurred 
without the implementation of a separate provision to the Patent Act. Many practitioners could not 
understand whether the criterion of scientific advancement in regard to the experimental use 
exception lowered its significance or was completely abandoned, and whether it applied in other 
fields of technology, outside the pharmaceutical sector.478 
 
4.5.3 Permissible Conducts on Patented Medicinal Products 
The limitation, widely known as the Bolar exemption479, was named after a US case that signalised 
the necessity of such an exception, and has been adapted in numerous jurisdictions480 Because of 
its specific and clear context, its construction is almost similar in all of the analysed systems. Roche 
v. Bolar is a case with probably the greatest international resonance on patent legislation. It 
initiated worldwide legislative changes, which approved experiments for the purpose of regulatory 
approval, either as a separate provision or, like in Japan, within the scope of the general research 
exception.481 
In short: Bolar tested the properties of a patented pharmaceutical of Roche, Valium, shortly before 
its expiration, in order to compare them with the properties of the generic product and, 
consequently, apply for FDA approval. Roche wanted to enjoin Bolar and argued that the use of a 
patented drug for federally mandated premarketing tests is a use and violates patent law. Bolar 
opposed the accusation by interpreting the experimental use exception very liberally and claiming 
that ”public policy favours generic drugs and thus mandates the creation of a new exception in 
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order to allow FDA required drug testing.”482 The Court denied the exception due to Bolar’s 
business motivation behind generating data for FDA approval: 
It is no trifle in its economic effect on the parties even if the quantity used is 
small. It is no dilettante affair (…) We cannot construe the experimental use rule 
so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of "scientific 
inquiry," when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial 
commercial purposes.483 
The case exposed the inadequacy of the legal construction. It was not correct to block generic 
companies in testing original drugs, because that delayed the entrance of generics on the market 
and extended patent protection beyond the standard patent term. That loophole was promptly 
improved by the Congress, which introduced an explicit exception for experiments on patented 
pharmaceuticals for statutory approvals, informally named the Hatch-Waxmann Act (Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act), which was incorporated into the US patent law 
under Section 271(e)(1).484 
In German law, the exception is included in Section 11(2b) and is applied primarily to generics485 
and biosimilars486. This provision has a wider scope than 11(2) since it exempts practically all 
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conducts on the patented subject-matters as long as they are performed with the purpose of 
obtaining the regulatory approval, e.g. the production of generic, market analysis.487 Likewise, the 
UK Patent Act was appended with a corresponding provision in Section 60(5)i. However, the UK 
construction of the provision is narrower and exempts acts performed solely for the purpose of 
governmental authorisation.488 
In the US, the introduction of the provision spurred numerous court decisions, in which various 
legal schemes have been examined. In some sense, the Bolar exception satisfies a narrow 
interpretation of the experimental use exception by recognising as permissible uses of a commercial 
character, which otherwise would not have been regarded as experimental. 
Merck v Integra489 focused on the application of Section 271(e)(1) for pre-clinical experiments.490 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
two types of patent-equivalents bring us back to legal issues that require regulation, with the main 
question being how much testing is required. 
 The first legislative attempts to regulate this complex subject-matter were undertaken almost a decade 
ago in Directive 2004/27/EC (Art. 10 No. 4), with Annex I, and in Directive 2003/63/EC. Subsequently, the 
European Medicine Agency (London) and its scientific Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use 
(CHMP) developed guidelines précising the requirements with respect to clinical and non-clinical trials.  
 The first biosimilar were marketed in 2006. Biosimilars that have been approved by the European 
Commission include 1) a version of recombinant somatropin – Omnitrope and Valtropin, 2) recombinant 
of human EPO (erythropoietin n) – Abseamed, Binocrit and Epoetin alfa Hexal 3) recombinant filgrastim – 
Biograstim, Filgrastim, Ratiopharm, Ratiograstim, and Tevagrastim: Filgrastim Hexal and Zarzio. 
 Huub Schellekens and Ellen Moors, "Clinical Comparability and European Biosimilar Regulations," Nature 
Biotechnology 28, no. 1 (2010); Daan Crommelin et al., "Pharmaceutical Evaluation of Biosimilars: 
Important Differences from Generic Low-Molecular-Weight Pharmaceuticals," Eur J Hosp Pharm Sci 11, 
no. 1 (2005); H. Mellstedt, D. Niederwieser, and H. Ludwig, "The Challenge of Biosimilars," Annals of 
Oncology 19, no. 3 (2008); GaBI Generics and Biosilimars Initivative, "Biosimilars Approved in Europe,"  
http://gabionline.net/Biosimilars/General/Biosimilars-approved-in-Europe, accessed 11.07.2015; 
"Biosimilars-Info.de,"  www.biosimilars-info.de, accessed 28.02.2013; "DIRECTIVE 2004/27/EC OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 31 March 2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use," Official Journal of the European Union, L 
136/34, 30.4.2004; "COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2003/63/EC of 25 June 2003 amending Directive 
2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Community code relating to medicinal 
products for human use," Official Journal of the European Union, L 159/46, 27.6.2003. 
487 Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, §11 at 10. 
488 Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 327; Nicole Dinaut and Stephanie White, "Experimental Use or 
Infringement? Location Matters," Intellectual Asset Management, no. 59 (July/August 2013): 115-16. 
489 Integra owned five patents on a tri-peptide segment of fibronectin/amino acids (Arg-Gly-Asp, referred to 
as RGD peptides). When bound to avB3 receptors, the peptides should enhance wound healing and 
increase the biocompatibility of prosthetic devices. Dr. Cheresh, a highly renowned professor at the 
Scripps Research Institute, discovered that blocking integrin avB3 inhibits the growth of tumour cells. 
Merck KgaA, a German company, offered to support Dr. Cheresh’s research and entered into an agreement 
with him and other Scripps scientists. The project was aimed at developing a drug candidate and launching 
clinical trials within three years. The research succeeded in the discovery of cyclic peptide EMD 66203 and 
its derivatives. The extensive tests also covered the RGD peptide and its therapeutic effects. When Integra 
learned about the project, convinced of its commercial character, it proposed Merck licences, which 
rejected calling on safe harbour within 35 U.S.C. Sec. 271 (e)(1). 
 Integra Lifescience I, Ltd v. Merck KgaA, The Scripps Research Institute, *862-64. 
490 Merck intended to apply for an Investigatory New Drug application (IND), which is a regulatory 
requirement by the FDA at the preclinical stage of developing new drugs. The IND is a prerequisite for 
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The Court of Appeal upheld the infringement claim, stating that performing tests on a number of 
patented compounds with the aim of selecting one particular compound as a drug candidate did 
not relate to gathering information for FDA approval. The defendant carried biomedical research 
with no relation to FDA submission of any tested peptides.491 The Supreme Court, however, 
permitted the application of the safe harbour onto pre-clinical, trials because nothing in the statue 
indicates that the safe harbour is limited to a particular development stage. It also affirmed that 
basic research performed without the intention of developing drugs, with the belief that the 
screened compound would have some physiological effect that the researcher intends to induce, 
could not enjoy the privilege of the safe harbour: 
It does not follow from this, however, that § 271(e)(1)'s exemption from 
infringement categorically excludes either (1) experimentation on drugs that are 
not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds 
in experiments that are not ultimately submitted to the FDA. Under certain 
conditions, we think the exemption is sufficiently broad to protect the use of 
patented compounds in both situations.492 
In the post-Merck period, only once did the Court rule in favour of the defendant.493 In Classen 
Immunotherapies v. King Pharms494, the defendant tested Skelaxin, a muscle relaxant drug, using 
what Classen claimed was its patented method of identifying new drug uses. Later, Elan submitted a 
citizen petition and a labeling supplement to the FDA presenting results of its study on drug 
bioavailability. The Court accepted the defendant’s argumentation that the use of Classen’s patent 
reasonably related to the FDA submission. The Classen process presented a research tool495. The 
Court acknowledged the application of the safe harbour for such process tools when they serve the 
aim of generating data for FDA application.496 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
later clinical testing in humans to support an application for a new drug. See John Carlin and Colin Cabral, 
"Hatch-Waxman Safe Harbor Construed in ‘Merck v. Integra’," New York Law Journal 234, no. 5 (2005). 
491 Integra Lifescience I, Ltd v. Merck KgaA, The Scripps Research Institute, *867-68, 72; Ruth Freeburg, "No 
Safe Harbor and No Experimanl Use: Is It time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools," Buff.L.Rev. 351, 
no. 53 (2005-2006): 355-56. 
492 Merck KGaA, Petitioner v. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD, et al., 545 U.S. 193, *206 (2005). 
493 Patrick Gattari and Nicole Grimm, "Federal Courts Debate Safe Harbour Exemption for Patent 
Infringement under 35 U.S.C 271(E) Following Merck v. Integra,"  
http://www.mbhb.com/pubs/xpqPublicationDetails.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=247, accessed 
05.02.2014. 
494 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc,, 466 F.Supp.2d 621(2006). 
495 Research tools are patented inventions that are used to discover or measure other substances or 
products. The application (and patenting) of research tools is of particular concern in pharmaceutical and 
biotechnological sectors. Several questions arise in this context, e.g. the scope of “the safe harbour” of 
experimental use, reach-through royalties (license fees from the sale of discovered substances).  
 Mueller, "No Dilettante Affair."; Walsh, Arora, and Cohen, "Effects of Research Tool Patents And Licensing 
on Biomedical Innovation."; Gerald J. Flattmann and Kaplan Jonathan M., "Licensing Research Tool 
Patents," Nature Biotechnology 20(2002); Dent, "The TRIPS Agreement and an Experimental Use 
Exception for ‘Research Tools’." 
496 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. King Pharms., Inc,, *625. 
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In Proveris Scientific Corp. v. InnovaSystems, the Court held that the provision was not designed to 
protect parties that do not seek FDA approval.497 In PSN v. Abbott, the Court asserted that the 
provision does not apply to ANY activity.498 Further case law shows that post-approval tests are 
legitimate only if they serve the purposes of the FDA, i.e. they are required to maintain FDA 
approval.499 
In conclusion, the Courts tend to dismiss infringement claims whenever they find a genuine 
intention to obtain (or maintain) FDA approval. They even accept the use of a patented solution as a 
research tool with the FDA proceeding in the background – this illustrates the privileged position of 
the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
4.5.4 Permissible Uses of Plant Materials (Research and Discovery) 
For centuries, plant breeding had not been recognised as inventive work because the process 
rested upon creating conditions in which plants could reproduce and mix. However, modern 
science has delivered leverages to control the process, including the multiplication of plants on the 
DNA level. To that end, plant breeding has become technically specialised and complex, or, in other 
words, ”patentable.”500 This shift was followed by the introduction of a proprietary regime over 
plant breeding, via either patents or plant variety certificates501. Both forms provide the owner with 
the advantage of being free from competition for a limited term. Patent law provides the said 
limitation in the form of a research exception, which constitutes a specialised norm within the 
classic experimental use exception. It exempts uses of biological material for research purposes, 
such as breeding, discovering, or developing other plant varieties.  
The German Patent Act lays down the exception in Section 11(2a), which clearly accentuates its 
relation to the experimental use conceived in Section 11(2). The provision covers the discovery, 
breeding, and development of new plant varieties, under the reservation that the obtained 
                                                          
497 Proveris Scientific Corp. v. InnovaSystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, *1265 (2006). 
498 PSN Illinois, LLC v Abbott laboratories and Abbott Bioresearch Center, Inc, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108055, *17 
(2011). 
499 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057(2011); Momenta Pharma, Inc. v. 
Amphastar Pharma., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348(2012). 
500 1919 – a landmarking discovery of techniques for hybridizing corn. See Craig Borowiak, "Farmer's Rights: 
Intellectual Property Regies and the Struggle over Seeds," Politics and Society 32, no. 4 (2004): 515. 
501 See Bernard Le Buanec, "Protection of Plant-Related Innovations: Evolution and Current Discussion," 
World Patent Information 28(2006); Max Thiele-Wittig and Paul Claus, "Plant Variety Protection - A 
Fascinating Subject," ibid., no. 25 (2003); Robert Tripp, Niels Louwaars, and Derek Eaton, "Plant Variety 
Protection in Developing Countries. A Report from the Field," Food Policy 32(2007); Oliver Mills, 
Biotechnological Inventions. Moral Restraints and Patent Law  (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).  
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materials cannot be commercially exploited. The term plant variety is construed as provided in the 
Council Regulation 2100/94502. In other words, the exception covers trials on plant varieties of all 
botanical genera and species, including hybrids; it exempts genetic workings on the genome (the 
independent parallel development of clones of protected genes, reprocessing for breeding 
purposes), and on the subject-matter of the invention. To reiterate, the experiments must deliver a 
new plant variety instead of disclosing one which is already known. In that regard, the subsection 
directly corresponds with the “classic” experimental use, certain questions can be answered 
therefrom. The current scope of the provision allows plant breeders to provide finished products on 
the market after the patent expires (or lapses), which bear a significant economic meaning when 
considering the enormous potential of the decorative plants market (e.g. roses, orchids). Some 
commentators indicate that the exception resembles a compulsory license, despite its systematic 
location under Sec. 11(2).503 The amendment of the Subsection solved the matter of the collision 
between patent law and the law on the protection of plant varieties504. A plant breeder must 
decide which type of protection is more suitable for the given solution: a patent or a plant variety 
certificate.505 The legislator amended the law on the basis of the declaration of the German 
delegation for the minutes in the Internal Market Council of 27 November 1997506 when 
implementing the Biopatent Directive507 to diminish the risk of collisions and secure the further 
development of plant varieties.508  
The UK Patents Act does not provide any corresponding regulation. Experiments performed on 
plant varieties are exempted in Section 8(b) of the Plant Varieties Act of 1997. If a certain plant 
variety is granted with patent protection, experimenting, i.e. discovering and developing new 
derivatives, underlies the experimental exception as laid down in Section 60(5)(b). However, in light 
of the upcoming entrance into force of the UPC Agreement, the UK legislator intends to introduce a 
corresponding breeders’ exception as stipulated in Article 27 of the Agreement. The aim of the 
                                                          
502 Article 5(2): “For the purpose of this Regulation, „variety” shall be taken to mean a plant grouping within a 
single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank.”  
 "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights ", Official 
Journal of the European Communities,  L 227/1, 1.9.1994. 
503 Michael A. Kock, Susann Porzig, and Eva Willnegger, "Der Schutz von pflanzenbiotechnologischen 
Erfindungen und von Pflanzensorten unter Berücksichtigung der Umsetzung der Biopatentrichtlinie.," 
GRUR Int. (2005): 190; Kraßer, Patentrecht, 790. 
504 "The Plant Variety Protection Law (consolidated text of December 19, 1997)," PVP Gazette 86, December 
1999. 
505 Kock, Porzig, and Willnegger, "Der Schutz von pflanzenbiotechnologischen Erfindungen," 190; Benkard 
and Editors, Patentgesetz, §11 at 9. 
506 WIPO, "Questionnaire on Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights. Germany," 
(http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/exceptions/replies/germany.html), 21. 
507 "DIRECTIVE 98/44/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions". 
508 The Plant Variety Protection Law envisages a similar exception in Section 10(1)(3). 
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amendment is the creation of a unified catalogue of patent exceptions that would be applicable to 
all patents valid in the UK.509 
In the US system, breeders’ privilege has found its expression in 7 U.S.C. §2544, which exempts 
activities on protected varieties for the purposes of plant breeding and research and underlies the 
regime of the Plant Variety Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §2321 et seq.)510 
Japan’s applicable law does not include any provision on this subject-matter. 
 
4.5.5 Medical Treatment and Derivatives (Extemporaneous Preparation of a 
Medicine) 
Liability for patent infringement is taken away from medical practitioners in regard to their 
treatment of patients. The origins of the exceptions are to be found in the patentability exclusion of 
medical therapeutic methods. An international standard is laid down in the TRIPS Agreement in 
Article 27 (c), which exempts from patentability diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans or animals. The article “copies” a corresponding norm from Article 52(4) 
of the EPC. The question of what constitutes “medical treatment” gives rise to discrepant legal 
interpretations and numerous judicial decisions511, as well as “inventive” claim writing512. The 
subject is complex, as it fuses patent and medical law with ethical considerations.513 Regardless of 
the scope of exclusion and related discussions (that are not handled in this chapter514), its 
                                                          
509 WIPO, "Questionnaire on Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights. The United Kingdom," 
(http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/exceptions/replies/uk2.pdf). 
510 W. Lesser, "Valuation of Plant Variety Protection Certificates," Review of Agricultural Economics 16, no. 2 
(1994): 231. 
511 Colm Murphy, "Methods of Treatment: Is There Any Protection Available in Europe?," Nature 
Biotechnology 19(May 2001); Martin Todd, "Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: a 
Comperative Study," J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 82(2000): 389. 
512 E.g. presenting a method in the form of a product, or claiming a dosage regime instead of therapeutic use. 
Nahoko Ono illustrates the diverse practices of the patent office on the example of a patent which was 
submitted to three patent offices: USPTO, JPO, and E PO. Only in the USPTO could the patentee claim his 
invention as a medical method. In the JPO he filed four different applications covering separate medial 
uses of medicaments for treating arterial disease, brain infarction, diabetes, and disease X. 
 See Nahoko Ono, "Better than Nothing: Japan's Next Move on Patentability of Medical Methods," IIC 
(2006): 201-05; Murphy, "Methods of Treatment: Is There Any Protection Available in Europe?." 
513 Todd, "Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: a Comperative Study," 381; Doris Thums, "Patent 
protection for medical treatment  - a distinction between patent and medical law," IIC, no. 27 (1996). 
514 See Todd, "Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: a Comperative Study."; O. Mitnovetsk and D. 
Nicol, "Are Patent for Methods of Medical Treatment Contrary to the Ordre Public or morality or 
"generally inconvenient"?," J Med Ethics, no. 30 (2004); Michael Davis, "Excluding Patentability of 
THerapeutic Methods, including Methods Using Pharmaceuticals, for the Treatment of Humans under 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Article 27(3)(A)," Hofstra L. Rev., no. 43 (2014-2015); 
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derivative provides patent space for medical practitioners (i.e. doctors) using medical methods and 
pharmacists preparing medicine for an individual patient within a specific medical treatment, and 
has been adopted in various jurisdictions. 
German law regulates this matter in Section 11(3), which excludes the preparation of medicine for 
the purposes of the medical treatment of a single patient. The norm directly corresponds to Section 
2a (1) of the Patent Act (as well as to Art.53(c) EPC), which prohibits patentability of “methods for 
the surgical or therapeutic treatment of the human or animal body or for diagnostic methods used 
on the human or animal body”515. 
The provision addresses solely pharmacists and does not extend to doctors. The exception does, 
however, pertain to the preparation of medicine for a single patient and not for a greater number 
of patients at the same time. It covers the prescription, production, and use of pharmaceutical 
products in individual cases. The preparation of a medicine is considered to be a part of the 
therapeutic treatment of the human body, and not as an element or part of a procedure to produce 
a certain substance applicable in the course of medical treatment.516 
The UK patent act stipulates this rule in Subsection 60(5)c and covers the same conditions. Its 
addressees are registered medical or dental practitioners. It corresponds to Section 4(2), which 
does not allow for patenting methods of treatment, diagnosis, and therapies pertaining to human 
and animal bodies.517 
The US patent law also limits the ability of the patentee to enforce the patent with regard to 
patented medical procedures that are practised by medical practitioners (doctors) in treating 
patients. 35 U.S.C. §287(c)518 stipulates an exemption for “medical practitioners performing a 
medical activity on a human or a laboratory animal.” Medical procedures concern the medical 
treatment of humans and animals, surgeries, therapies, and diagnostic tests, but do not extend to 
drugs or reagents. This subsection was introduced as recently as in 1996 at the request of the 
House of Delegates of the American Medical Association and the medical doctors’ lobby, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Alison Hill, "Ambiguous Regulation and Questionable Patentability: A Toxic Future for in Vitro Companion 
Diagnostic Devices and Personalized Medicine," Wis. L. Rev. (2013). 
515 The prohibition does not apply to “products, in particular substances or substance mixtures, for use in one 
of the above-mentioned methods.”  
516 Carvediol II, BGH, 19.12.2006 - X ZR 236/01 (BpatG) GRUR 2007, 404, 405; Peter Mes, Patentgesetz. 
Gebrauchmusterrecht., 3 ed. (Munchen: C.H. Beck, 2011), §11, Rn.6; Kraßer, Patentrecht, 791.  
517 Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 326 (8-49). 
518 Section 616 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1996, codified as 35 U.S.C. §287 (c). 
118 
 
eventually harmonised US law with foreign systems, considering that the exception is established 
on the international level (Article 27 (3) TRIPS).519 
In Japan, pursuant to Article 69(3), a patent right for the invention of a medicine does not affect the 
manufacture of a medicine (a product or a process) as prescribed by a physician or a dentist. The 
provision defines “the invention of a medicine” as a product used for diagnosis, therapy, treatment, 
or the prevention of human diseases. The provision relates to Article 2.1.1 of the Examination 
Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model520, which enumerates medical inventions that do not 
comply with the requirement of industrial applicability.521 
The objective of protecting medical treatments constitutes an argument against the patentability of 
medical methods of treatment. In 2002, the Tokyo High Court rendered a judgement in the appeal 
to the JPO’s rejection of a patent application for “process and device for the reproducible optical 
representation of a surgical operation.” The rejection was justified on the following grounds: 
1) the invention did not comply with the requirement of industrial applicability under Article 29 (1), 
because the claimed invention was a surgical and diagnostic method pertaining to human beings 
and; 
2) the invention lacked inventiveness522. 
The Tokyo High Court upheld the rejection, arguing inter alia that medical doctors must freely 
utilize their skills when treating patients, and not be preoccupied with the peril of possible patent 
infringement. The exclusion of medical activities from patentability under Article 29(1) 
complements Article 69(3). However, the Court signalized that no legal rationale exists to exclude 
medical methods from patentability, and that this matter requires the re-consideration of the 
existing patent policy.523 
                                                          
519 Fariba Sirjani and Dariush Keyhanii, "35 U.S.C. 287(C): Language Slightly Beyond Intent," Buffalo 
Intellectual Property Law Journal 3, no. 13 (2005). 
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2012": Part II Requirements for Patentability, Chapter 1 Industrially Applicable Inventions. 
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523 Ono, "Better than Nothing," 200-01. 
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4.5.6 Permissible Conducts on Vessels, Vehicles, and Aircraft (Temporary 
Presence) 
A set of rules exempts from patent liability conducts on patented devices on land vehicles, vessels, 
and aircraft which entered the territory of another country on a temporary or accidental basis. The 
reduction of the scope of a domestic patent right protects unauthorised uses of a patented 
technology necessary for the further operation of a vehicle or a vessel involved in international 
conveyance. Historically, the temporary presence exception goes back to the 19th century, with the 
adoption of the norm in 1852 in England and 1856 in the US. The exception gained international 
recognition in the first half of the 20th century with the appearance of the Convention Relating to 
the Regulation of Aerial Navigation in 1919, with the amendment to the Paris Convention in 1925 
(the Hague Revision of the Paris Convention) in Article 5ter, which ultimately reinforced the norm 
as an international standard of patent practice.524 Another provision that complements the 
“temporary presence” exceptions relates to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation 
form 1944, Article 27 of which limits the patent liability to construction operations such as repair, 
storage, and installation of spare parts performed on the patented device. The determinants of the 
protection are the nationality of the conveyance, e.g. whether the country of the flag is the 
signatory of the Paris Convention, and the temporariness of the entrance onto the territory. 
Under German patent law, the effect of a patent does not stretch to a number of actions conducted 
on international vehicles that enter the territory of German. These actions are stipulated in three 
sections of the Patent Act: 11(4)-(6). They adopt international regulations in this matter: Article 5ter 
of the Paris Convention in Sections 11(4) and (5); and Article 27 in Section 11(6).  
Section 11(4) exempts the use of patented subject-matter onboard vessels which enter the inland 
waters of Germany, under the condition that the patented devices are used exclusively for the 
needs of the vessel. Section 11(5) allows for the temporal or accidental stay of aircrafts and land 
vehicles within the territory of Germany. The temporal or accidental stay shall not exceed the scope 
of several days, but can be repeated.525 Section 11(6) exempts aircraft from seizure or detention on 
the grounds of patent infringement. The same applies to the storage of spare parts and equipment. 
The UK Patents Act stipulates similar rules in Subsections 60(5)d-f: for vessels and vehicles which 
enter the territory of the UK accidentally or temporarily. The first amendment to the patent law 
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providing the exception was introduced in 1852, and required reciprocity to protect the English 
shippers.526 
The provisions pertain to a “relevant ship, aircraft, hovercraft or vehicle” and concern a ship, 
aircraft, hovercraft, or vehicle not registered in the UK, but in another country which is a signatory 
of the Paris Convention and a member of the World Trade Organisation. The exception covers only 
“the exclusive needs” of such vessels or vehicles, i.e. uses that are necessary to safely continue the 
transport. The term temporal or accidental stay refers to a transient stay or a stay for a limited 
period of time, whether occasional or causal. Frequency, persistence, and regularity of the stays are 
not determinative.527 In Stena Rederi v Irish Ferries, the Court held that the intentions of the 
operator of the vehicle at the time of entry determine the qualification of a stay as temporal.528 
The US system implements the norm of “temporary presence” in Section 272 35 U.S.C.529. Like 
Article 5ter, it includes the reciprocity provision, but it does not differentiate between the 
conveyance types and does not include the aspect of construction, as laid down in the Chicago 
Convention. Due to the sparse legislative record on the adoption of the provision, it can be 
assumed that the legislator relied on the domestic construction of the exception from 1856530, 
which was found to be sufficient.531 In Brown v. Duchesne, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether an element patented under the US system, which constitutes part of a foreign 
vessel, can be improved upon without the consent of the patentee when such vessel entered the 
territory of the US temporarily for the purpose of commerce. The Court stated that US patent law 
did not extend to foreign vessels lawfully harboured in US ports, even when such practice was with 
to the detriment of the interests of the patentee, e.g. resulting in their financial loss. In addition, it 
was argued that a private person cannot exercise “a political power,” which would be the case if a 
patentee could enforce the patent right against foreign vessels, because that would “curtail the 
treaty-making power of Congress.”532 In a later case, Cali v Japan Airlines, Inc.533, the Court 
interpreted a temporal presence to include all instances of entering the US territory “for the 
purpose of completing a voyage, turns about, and continuation or commence of a new voyage.”534 
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In the Japanese Patent Act, the exception is included in Article 69(2)(i), which limits the effects of a 
patent on vessels or aircrafts merely passing through Japan, as well as the effects of machines, 
apparatus equipment, or other products used therefor. Like in other jurisdictions, this provision 
incorporates Article 5ter of the Paris Convention and the provisions of the Chicago Convention. In 
the unofficial translation of the Patent Act, temporary presence is expressed as “passing through 
Japan,” which can be interpreted as making an entrance for a finite duration with the purpose of 
international commerce. The distinction between vessels and aircrafts remains clear in light of 
Japan’s geographical location. Analyses of Japan’s law indicate that the country does not depart 
from the established standards on international transportation. 
 
4.5.7 Permissible Agricultural Uses (Farmers’ Privilege) 
Another class of exceptions, here treated as one type, concerns the so-called farmers’ privilege, 
which immunises uses of patented plant or animal material for agricultural purposes. This form of 
patent exceptions followed the introduction of patents on biological materials (“living matters”), 
which partially affected the practices of traditional farmers, e.g. seed saving and sharing.535 The 
objective of farmers’ privilege is to allow the farmers to use the products of their harvest for further 
agricultural work, with the exclusion of commercial activities. 
On the EU level, the privilege is safeguarded in Articles 11(1)-(2) of the Biopatent-Directive536 and in 
Articles 27(i)-(j) of the UPC Agreement for unitary patents, established on the basis of Article 14 of 
the Council Regulation 2100/94537. The latter allows for the propagation or multiplication of the 
harvest, provided that the material was purchased for agricultural use with the consent of the 
patent proprietor. 
The German Act includes this provision in Section 9c (1)538, with an analogous exception applicable 
to breeding livestock included in Section 9c (2)539. The exceptions concern the reproduction of plant 
or animal material for agricultural, but not commercial (reproduction) activities. Section 9c (3) 
excludes the applicability of Section 9a in regard to reproduced biological material that was 
obtained accidentally, or the reproduction of which was technically unavoidable, e.g. the 
                                                          
535 Borowiak, "Farmer's Rights: Intellectual Property Regies and the Struggle over Seeds." 
536 "DIRECTIVE 98/44/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions". 
537 "COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights ". 
538 Article 11(1) of Biopatent-Directive 98/44/EC. 
539 Article 11(2) of Biopatent-Directive 98/44/EC. 
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unintentional crossing of seeds.540 Brewing serves as a good illustration of the exception: the 
multiplication of seeds is inevitable in production of beer. For that reason, the limitation exempts 
the second tranche of reproduced seed. The objective of the exceptions is to allow farmers to 
pursue their harvesting or breeding activities, including the propagation of patented material, for 
agricultural purposes.  
The UK Patent Act regulates this matter in a similar manner. 
1) Subsection 60(5)g allows for the use of harvest material for propagation or multiplication, but 
applies solely to plant varieties specified in Schedule A1 (Subsection 60(6A)), which names the 
requirements for the violation, such as plant species, equitable remuneration to the patent 
proprietor, information provided by a farmer, a seed processor, and the existence of a 
rightsholder. 
2) Subsection 60(5)h permits the use of an animal or animal reproductive material for the 
agricultural breeding of stock or other animal reproductive material, which constitutes or 
contains a patented invention. Section 60(6B) excludes the sale of the material, as well as any 
commercial reproduction activity which falls within the scope of the provision (it does not 
impose any limitations upon the variety of animals, i.e. the subsection applies to all animal 
varieties). 
US patent law does not provide any similar provision which would regulate uses for agricultural 
purposes. However, since 1970, the US has granted certificates of plant variety protection541, the 
law of which provides corresponding farmers’ and breeder’s privileges. 7 U.S.C. §2543 stipulates 
the right to save seeds obtained from an authorised source for further seeding purposes, as well as 
the right to use saved seeds in the production of a crop for use on the farm or for sale. A bona fide 
sale should be for a reason other than reproductive purposes and should be carried out via other 
channels. Such a sale concerns small quantities of seeds that are not labelled by a variety name.542 
A purchaser who uses such seeds for seeding purposes infringes the right. Notably, US law departs 
from the legal practice adopted in the European system by legitimising the sale of seeds, which is 
excluded in other regimes that solely allows farmers the use and the reproduction of protected 
varieties on their own farms.543 
                                                          
540 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 792. 
541 7 U.S.C. §2321 et seq. 
542 Lesser, "Valuation of Plant Variety Protection Certificates," 232. 
543  ibid. 
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The applicable law in Japan does not include any provision corresponding to farmers’ privilege.544 
 
4.5.8 Permissible Use of Biotechnological Inventions 
In Article 27(l), the UPC Agreement permits, laconically expressed, acts pursuant to Article 10 of the 
Biopatent Directive. The said provision introduces the exhaustion principle in regard to biological 
materials, which in practice means that the purchasers of propagation material have the right to 
grow it (with market circulation in mind). This solution applies to the second generation of 
biological material obtained from the propagation and multiplication of the patented material, 
placed on the market (within the EU or the EEA) by the patent holder or with his or her consent, 
and with the intention of further propagation or multiplication. The exception does not absolve the 
user from patent liability if he or she further sells the obtained material for further propagation and 
multiplication, and does not cover third generation material.545 
The German legislator implemented this rule in Section 9b of the Patent Act. The UK Patent Act 
includes the exception in Schedule A2 in Section 10, which is a verbatim translation of Article 10 of 
the Directive. 
No directly related solutions in US and Japan applicable laws have been found. 
 
4.5.9 Permissible Use of Computer Programs 
The UPC Agreement presents a novel approach by incorporating an exception on computer 
programs for the purpose of decompilation and interoperability into the catalogue of patent 
limitations. German and UK legislators have not implemented similar instruments in their patent 
systems (to date); but regulate this subject matter via copyright law in reference to Articles 5 and 6 
of the Software Directive546: Sections 69d and 69e of the German copyright act, and Sections 50A(1-
                                                          
544  WIPO, "Questionnaire on Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights. Japan," 
(http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/exceptions/replies/japan_2.pdf), 14. 
545 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 792; Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, §9c at 2-5. 
546 "DIRECTIVE 2009/24/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 April 2009 on the 
legal protection of computer programs". 
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3) and 50B of the UK act.547 The same concerns the two other analysed jurisdictions, the US and 
Japan. 
The provisions of the Directive relevant to the named purposes concern the observation, study, and 
testing of the program's functioning with the aim of determining the ideas and principles 
underlying the program or its specific elements (similar to experimental use). The authorisation of 
the rightholder is not required to reproduce and translate the code for the purpose of achieving the 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs. The acts can 
be performed by the licensee or another person authorized to use a copy of a program. The 
information to achieve interoperability has not previously been readily available; the permissions 
extend solely to those parts of the original program which are necessary in order to achieve 
interoperability. 
Almost automatically, a chain of questions arises as to how and why transpose these norms in the 
environment of patents. The obtained information, which pertains to the source code (an 
interface), is protected under the copyright regime, whereas a patent covers a technical solution 
expressed and realized with a computer program (concerning primarily the quell code). When we 
consider that patents which cover the functioning of interfaces, or patents with protected elements 
contain interoperable information, does the patent interoperability exception apply instead of the 
corresponding copyright provisions, or does it complement it? More questions are to come. If the 
interoperability is achieved on the operation level by modifications of the source code “as such,” 
even if this induces certain patented technical results, but the code “as such” remains non-
patentable and falls within the ambit of the copyright regime, are we faced with a schizophrenic 
situation in which we accept the patenting of software “as such” despite clear exclusions in patent 
law? Why, then, would the decompilation of code constitute patent infringement and require 
insurance against such conducts in the form of a patent limitation? One should also consider that 
the legislator might have chosen the lesser of two evils and introduced the exception as “a 
backdoor” solution for patent infringements involving interoperability matters. …Time will tell.548 
                                                          
547 Reto Hilty and Christophe Geiger, "Towards a New Instrument of Protection for Software in the EU? 
Learning the Lessons from the Harmonization Failure of Software Patentability " Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 11-01 (2011). 
548 See John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Interop. The Promise and Perils of High Interconnected Systems  (New 
York: Basic Books, 2012); Karl H. Pilny, "Schnittstellen in Computerprogrammen. Zum Rechschutz in 
Deutschland, den USA und Japan," GRUR Int. (1990); Thomas Vinje, "Die EG-Richtlinie zum Schutz von 
Compterprogrammen und die Frage der Interoperabilitaet," ibid.(1992); Michael Lehmann, "Die 
Europaische Richtiline uber den Schutz von Computerprogrammen," ibid.(1991); Ulla-Maija Mylly, "An 
Evolutionary Economics Perspective on Computer Program Interoperability and Copyright," IIC (2010); 
Sally Weston, "Software Interfaces - Stuck in the Middle: The Relationship Between the Law and Software 
Interfaces in Regulating and Encouraging Interoperability," ibid.(2012); Begona Gonzales Otero, "On the 
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4.5.10 Prior Use 
The prior use right constitutes a separate category of patent limitations: it applies to a unique 
scenario in which a patented idea has been in use by a third person before the patent application 
has been filed, and does not require the permission of the patentee.549  
The main objective of the norm is the protection of legitimate possession and its economic status 
against destruction by the subsequent patent application of a third party.550 The prior use 
exception applies to commercial uses and serves the protection of the investment. It begins from 
the moment of the first use of the later-patented solution, and no from the recognition by the 
patent owner, who is not entitled to any remuneration for such use.551 In the first-to-file systems, 
where a party which decided not to patent an invention or was slightly behind the party which filed 
a patent application, would have to cease all operations and incur financial losses, the functionality 
of the prior use right is of particular concern, as it serves the overall fairness and the balance of 
interests. 
The prior use exception constitutes an original and separate right from the patent itself; it is neither 
equal to a patent license, nor represents any burden to it.552 Notably, in Helitune v Steward Hughes, 
the UK Court held that a prior use right can be recognised as “a statutory licence”; however, the 
conferred right does not entitle the licensee to grant further licences and does not constitute a 
license on a contractual basis – it only permits the aforementioned action(s).553 Any kind of 
contractual binding between the inventor and the user – e.g. an employment contract or a supply 
order – eliminates the possibility of invoking the prior use defence.554 
Prior use is a well-recognised instrument, which has been adopted in multiple jurisdictions. In the 
course of long-term practice, many aspects of the privilege have been unified among the legal 
systems.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Fence of Article 27(K) of the UPC: The Software Interoperability "Limitation","  
http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2014/11/14/on-the-fence-of-article-27k-of-the-UPC-the-software-
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implementation 
accessed 24.04.2015. 
549 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 819-20.  
550 Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, §11 at 2. 
551 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 819-20; Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, §12 at 6. 
552 Lacktränkeinrichtung, BGH 07.01.1965 Ia ZR 151/63, GRUR 1965, 411, 415-16. 
553 Helitune v. Stewart Hughes [1991] F.S.R. 171, 207, 206. 
554 Fullstoff BGH 10.9.2009 - Xa ZR 18/08, GRUR 2010, 47; Patentgesetz, §12 at 12; Kraßer, Patentrecht, 821. 
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The UPC Agreement lays down the limitation in Article 28, which does not regulate prior use on a 
EU-wide basis, but subjects it to national regimes. The exclusion of prior use from the unification 
process has been criticised for the incoherence of the undertaken steps. It seems that the 
lawmakers avoided a troublesome issue that the prior use constitutes, considering its derogating 
function of patent exclusivity and significant economic ramifications. On the other hand, the reason 
for removing the privilege from the unification agenda could be its low practical meaning, and 
procedural hurdles, such as the meticulous evidence that is associated with older materials.555 
The German Patent Act regulates the prior use right in Section 12 providing that a patent has no 
effect against a person who, at the time of the application's filing, had already begun to use the 
invention in Germany, or had made the necessary arrangements for doing so. 
In the UK system, the use of an invention by a third party before the priority date used to constitute 
an infringement and did not enjoy any protection in the Patents Act of 1949. With the enactment of 
the Patents Act of 1977, such uses were exempted from infringement by conferring a continuation 
right in accordance with Section 64. 
 
The US patent law allows for claiming the prior use defence in regard to commercial activities 
performed in the US, which is stipulated in 35 U.S.C. §273. The norm exempts from infringement 
commercial activities in good faith that occurred at least a year before the filing or disclosure 
date556 of the invention (whichever is earlier). 
Prior to the American Invents Act (AIA)557 the prior use defence applied solely to business 
method patents. Currently, the prior use exception applies to every technology: “a subject matter 
(…) consisting of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter used in a manufacturing or 
other commercial process.”558 This change resulted from the major modification of the US patent 
system introduced by the AIA, namely the shift to the first-to-file model: the system had to provide 
a defence mechanism to a party that used, but did not disclose, an invention.559 The defence applies 
to commercial uses and other specific uses, such as non-profit uses by research laboratories or 
other entities, such as universities or hospitals, to ensure that the public may benefit from the 
                                                          
555 Lise Osterborg, "Gedanken zur Vereinheitlichung des Vorbenutzungsrechts fur Erfindungen im 
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privilege.560 It also covers the premarketing regulatory view, during which the safety or efficacy of 
the subject matter is established (including any period specified in Section 156(g)561). 
Japan’s Patent Act implemented the prior use right in Article 69, which stipulates in subsection 
(2)(ii) that a patent right is not effective in regard to products which were in existence before the 
time of patent application. This rule corresponds with Article 79, which regulates the prior use right 
as a non-exclusive license. The provision states that a person who made or learned about the 
existence of an invention identical to the claimed in a patent application and has been using or 
preparing to use the said invention at the time of the patent application's filing, shall have a non–
exclusive license to use the patented invention. The license is restricted solely to the invention itself 
and the purpose for which the invention has been used or prepared. The activity must take place 
solely in Japan. 
Comparisons between the prior user rights in the analysed systems demonstrate many 
commonalities. The condition for invoking the application of the privilege is the commercial 
character of the undertakings. Private and non-commercial use excludes the application of the prior 
use right. The prior use exception applies when the innovative idea in possession was recognized, 
used, and (or) manufactured.562 
This assumes certain advancement in the workings on or the commercialization of the claimed 
invention. The UK provision clearly indicates that preparations must be effective and serious; 
intentions alone do not suffice to comply with the provision. Preparations must indicate certain 
advancement in accomplishing a given undertaking, e.g. business negotiations entering the 
contractual stage. Experimental trials may be considered to constitute serious preparations563: 
That conclusion can be illustrated by considering a person who had in good faith 
imported an infringing product. The section enables him to continue to import the 
product but not to sell it unless the importation amounted to an effective and 
serious preparation to sell it.564 
 
                                                          
560 Section 273(c) 
561 Section 156(g) regulates the extension of patent terms on following products: (1) new drug, antibiotic 
drug, human biological product; (2) food additive or colour additive; (3) medical device; (4) product which 
is new animal drug; (5) veterinary biological product. The provision explains the calculation of the review 
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562 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 825-26; Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, §12 at 10. 
563 Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 329-31. 
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When it comes to a legal dispute upon the prior user right, the party which invokes the privilege has 
to provide outstanding, flawless, and convincing evidence565 on the development of the invention, 
together with evidence on the attempts to put it into circulation – the advanced state of 
preparations for commercialization is of particular advantage in claiming the prior user exception. 
All materials on the trade secrecy of the invention in question play a role, not only those relating to 
the claimed patent (or certain patent claims). For example, in the US the prior use defence involves 
an extensive (and costly) discovery procedure, including covering other entities of the company. In 
addition, the prior use defence introduces the risk of establishing patent infringement if the 
evidence does not effectively prove advanced workings and use in good faith. In the course of 
proceedings, the court examines the patent claims and the similarities between the patented 
invention and the “prior use” object, along with the rectitude of technology acquisition and the 
development process.566  
The principle of good faith, i.e. an independent and rightful prior development of the patented 
solution without the intent to infringe, is a core determinant of prior use.567 It corresponds with the 
underlying purpose of the norm that addresses the use of an invention, completed without the 
knowledge of patent application, or granted patent protection, which safeguards fairness and 
justice in regard to a party that was “behind in filing the application.”568 
A prior user enjoys a wide privilege to exploit the invention for his or her own company, including 
the permission to change of the type of use. For example, if the prior user has manufactured 
products, but, despite intending to do so, has not succeeded in their commercialisation, the use 
may extend onto further business activities.569 The analysed norms do not explicitly limit the scope 
of the exercised right in a quantitative or qualitative manner. Modifications of the patented 
product are permissible if they do not substantially depart from the technical teaching embedded 
in the patent – the right covers working and modifications of the claimed use, provided that such 
modifications do not change the identity of the prior use product. 570 The use cannot extend to 
forms that do not relate to the state of the object at the time when the prior use was claimed. E.g., 
an exporter cannot claim a manufacturing right over the patent at issue.571 Likewise, the privilege 
does not allow its holder to change an act into e.g. importing or materially modifying the nature of 
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the prior use. The privilege, however, allows for the continuation of a given act and qualitative 
adjustments to the product, e.g. placing the product on the market and modifying it during its 
lifetime – otherwise, the objective of the prior use would only be illusory.572 
The prior use right constitutes personal use and cannot be bestowed to a third party; it can be, 
however, transferred or assigned with the entire business in which the prior use occurred. 573 The 
prior use privilege cannot be licensed, but it can be transferred only in conjunction with a business, 
which also includes transfer in the form of a general succession like inheritance.574 
Notably, US law reserves that no prior use right can be invoked in regard to patents owned by or 
assigned to universities or technology transfer institutions575. Otherwise, prior use could impair the 
ability of such institutions to license their research results.576 
The prior use defence serves the protection of non-patented innovations and trade secrecy. The 
legislator has acknowledged the fact that an inventor need not apply for a patent protection to 
pursue a business activity. The USPTO Report on the prior use right defence indicates that the 
defence does not affect the patent system by reducing the incentive to seek patent protection, as is 
claimed by its critics. The prior use defence calibrates the balance between different inventors of 
the same invention, providing the one who did not apply for a regulatory protection, but 
nonetheless used the invention commercially for a longer period of time, the privilege to continue 
the business.577 
In the light of theoretical considerations, the prior use exception represents a desired legal 
instrument that rightfully solves a conflict between the patentee and the prior user of an invention. 
It also constitutes a powerful instrument that delineates the market exclusivity granted with 
patent. In regard to the latter, an EU-wide prior use right could provide the prior inventor with an 
immense advantage e.g. by allowing for their business expansion in other countries, in which the 
patentee could have already “prepared” the conditions for commercial activities. This would build 
direct competition on the same subject matter in the whole common market578 – an unwanted 
outcome of EU-wide prior use despite the high saturation of patents on similar and overlapping 
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solutions. Under the current strong patent mindset, such a solution definitely could not have been 
adopted. Even when, in practical dimensions, prior use is a rare ground for patent litigations 
(patent revocation certainly represents a more promising strategy).579  
 
4.5.11 Exhaustion of Patent Rights 
The principle of the exhaustion of patent rights is widely acknowledged in the respective national 
legal orders. However, it has not been codified thus far, and works on the level of the legal doctrine 
itself. It appears under the statutory limitation, as the UPC Agreement incorporates the principle in 
Article 29. 
The exhaustion of patent rights occurs when an authorised person enters the patented product into 
commercial circulation, for which he or she obtains remuneration.580 In that moment, the 
supervision of the patentee over a product or a process is terminated. Exhaustion is a legal rule ipso 
iure and constitutes an immanent restriction within the patent law.581 Substantially speaking, the 
principle, like other patent limitations, serves the balance of interests. More particularly, it ensures 
the free movement of goods, and stresses that a patentee should not be able to exercise boundless 
control over the use on of a protected sold product. It also limits the potential demands of the 
patentee for additional compensations once he or she obtains a reward.582 Until the product enters 
market circulation, the patentee enjoys all privileges of the patent to determine the price and the 
sale conditions; however, once the article is sold, the patentee cannot instruct the lawful purchaser 
on the use, distribution, or the re-sale of the given product (the relation resembles an exclusive 
license over a sold product).583 
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The exhaustion principle as such has not been enforced internationally.584 However, the principle 
has a regional effect within the territory of the EU and the European Economic Area.585 In practice, 
it pertains to the fact that when a product is put on the market in one of the EU Member States 
with the authorisation of the patent holder, patent rights exhaust automatically in all Member 
States. De jure, the principle arises from Article 34 of the TFEU, which prohibits quantitative 
restrictions on imports and equivalent measures between the Member States. 
The territoriality principle within the EU with respect to the exhaustion principle was abandoned to 
stimulate trade and commerce between the Member States, and to strengthen the Common 
Market, with the objective of achieving stronger competitiveness within the EU market with the US 
and other leading economies.586  
In the German order, the principle evolved as a scholarly doctrine founded upon the principles of 
Josef Kohler.587 The right of use obtained by the purchaser used to be explained on the grounds of 
an implied license, but that approach proved insufficient in clarifying the patentee-purchaser 
relationship. Kohler replaced it with the concept of Zusammenhang der Benutzungsart (the context 
of the type of use), and initiated the evolution of the modern exhaustion principle. His theory 
acknowledged e.g. the replacement of spare parts if the identity of the product was to remain 
unchanged.588 Later, Lindenmaier introduced an understanding which regarded the exhaustion 
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principle as a special principle which applied only to protected articles put into circulation.589 The 
exhaustion allowed for the further exploitation of a patented product, its repair, and re-sale; but 
did not exclude the patent right when the use exceeds the scope of permissible patent utilization.  
The German Patent Act does not conceive a general principle of exhaustion, with the exception of 
the propagation of biological material, which implements Article 10 from the Biopatent Directive. 
No general exhaustion rule has been codified to govern other cases. As mentioned above, 
exhaustion occurs as a well-established doctrine on a national level, with a strong grounding in EU 
law (a regional European exhaustion). 
UK Law applies the doctrine of an implied license, which functions as the exhaustion doctrine. The 
latter was introduced to the Patents Act as an implementation of corresponding CPC rules, but 
remains out of force.590 Similar to German law, a regional exhaustion applies within the EEA 
territory under Articles 34 and 36 of TFEU. 
The implied license doctrine was established in Betts v Willmott591 and pertains to a situation in 
which the patent holder transfers a license to exercise control over a particular patented product to 
a purchaser in the course of a sale. Unless the patentee expresses certain restrictions, the user 
enjoys by the virtue of an implied license the right to freely use the product.592 Once an implied 
licence is given, it cannot be withdrawn to curtail the use of the good: 
If not limited licence was imposed at the time of the supply on the person originally 
supplied then no amount of notice to that person or persons deriving title form him 
could turn the general licence into a limited licence.593 
The implied license can be overridden once an authorised person sets conditions defining the 
permissible use of a patented product upon is sale, which apply to all purchasers.594 
An implied license allows the purchaser to have the article repaired, but does not extend as far as 
renewal.595 If some elements of machinery tend to wear out easily, the use can have them replaced 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Replacement and Recycling - Patentee's Rights in the Aftermarkets. Germany, the U.S. and Japan  (Munich: 
Herbert Utz Verlag, 2010), 38. 
589 Lindenmaier, "Über Erschöpfung des Patentrechts," 295. 
590 Ammîrām Binyāmînî, Patent Infringement in the European Community  (Weinheim VCH, 1993), 290, 
Footnote 14. 
591 Betts v. Willmott, LR 6 Ch App 239(1871). 
592 Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 324-25. 
593 Roussel Uclaf U.S. v. Hockley Inernational and Ltd. and Anr., [1996] R.P.C. 14, 441, 442. 
594 Dunlop v. Longlite Battery, R.P.C. 473(1958); National Phonograph Company v. Menck, 28 R.P.C. 
229(1911). 
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within the bounds of the implied license, or even order a greater number of parts for unanticipated 
breakdowns.596 
In one recent case, DataCorporation v. Eagle Technologies597, the Court merged the application of 
the implied license with the exhaustion principle. The Court asserted the implied license to claims 
19598 and 22599, and infused into the reasoning on the implied licence the notion of patent 
exhaustion, by stating that claimant rights exhausted with the unrestricted first sale of the device: 
(…) those purchasers had an implied licence to work the invention of claims 19 and 
22; or the claimant’s rights in respect of those two claims had been exhausted by 
sale of the printers. It relied on the fact that there were no conditions on the sale of 
the claimant’s printers restricting the user to using only ribbons sold by the 
claimant.600 
 
In the US system, the exhaustion doctrine, better known as the first sale doctrine, originates from 
the old English common law “disapproving imposing any restraints on the personal property”601. 
The doctrine introduces balance into the patentee-purchaser relation and has a strong pro-
competitive meaning.602  
In a precedent-setting case on repair and reconstruction, Wilson v. Simpson, the Court vocalized the 
notion of the exhaustion of rights: 
The right to replace them [cutting-knives] was a part of the invention transferred 
to the assignee for the time that he bought it (…). It has not been contended, nor 
can it be, that such can be a limitation of the assignee's right in the use of the 
invention.603 
An unconditional sale exhausts the patent monopoly over the manufactured article: it hands “the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
595 British Leyland Motor Co. v. Amstrong Patents Company Ltd., [1986] F.S.R. 221, 237; United Wire Ltd. v. 
Screen Repairs Services (Scotland), [2001] R.P.C. 24, 439; Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Wallington, Weston & 
Co., [1907] 24 R.P.C. 539; Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd.  v. Barton, [1977] R.P.C. 537. 
596 British Leyland Motor Co. v. Amstrong Patents Company Ltd., 256. 
597 DataCorporation v. Eagle Technologies [2011] R.P.C.17, 443. 
598 “The inventive concept lays in the cooperation between the spindles of the carrier, the pins at the end of 
the spindles and the features of the supply item- a method claim.” Ibid., 502. 
599 “The inventive concept lays in the cooperation between the spindles of the carrier, the pins at the end of 
the spindles, the feature of the supply item and the support structures in the printer. In general, it is a 
product claim.” Ibid. 
600 ibid., 449. 
601 Frank Porcelli, "Bowman v. Monsanto and an Introdcution to the Patent Exhaustion/First Sale Doctrine in 
the United States," GRUR Int. (2013): 27; see also  David H. Horowitz, "The Record Rental Amendment of 
9184: a Case Study in the Effort to Adapt Copyright Law to New Technology," Colum.-Vla. J.L. & Arts 31, 
no. 12 (1987). 
602 Binyāmînî, Patent Infringement in the European Community, 292. 
603 Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109, *124 (1850). 
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absolute dominion” over the sold product to the purchaser, who has the right to use the device 
“until it is worn out,” to repair it or improve upon it “as he pleases, in same manner as if dealing 
with property of any other kind.”604 In return, the patentee obtains a satisfying compensation – a 
gratification for the invention: 
Patented implement or machines sold to be used in the ordinary pursuits of life 
become the private individual property of the purchasers, and are no longer 
specifically protected by the patent laws of the States (…).605 
In Mallinkrodt v. Medipart, the court stressed that “no restrictions can be imposed on patented 
goods after their sale (…) and [a restriction] could not convert (…) a sale into a license. The principle 
of exhaustion does not affect a conditional sale to change it into an unrestricted one.”606 
A conditional sale restricts the purchaser’s rights – the purchaser is not entitled to go beyond the 
given limitation. The conditions of such a sale must be lawful and mutually accepted; however, if 
the patentee exceeds the legitimate scope of patent exclusivity, the doctrine of patent misuse may 
restore the proper balance. This applies to conducts that represent lawful measures, but have an 
anticompetitive strength and are against the public interest, e.g. tying restrictions and price 
fixing.607 
The difference between the two principles derives from the type of conduct trigger: the exhaustion 
principle arises from the fact of selling a product, whereas an implied license results from the 
conduct of a party (its intentions), e.g. an acquiescence, equitable estoppel, or legal estoppel.608 
One does not exclude the other. In Quanta, the Court affirmed:  
It is axiomatic that the patent exhaustion doctrine, commonly referred to as the 
first sale doctrine, is triggered by an unconditional sale.609 
Failure to understand the circumstances involved in certain conduct may result in the erroneous 
and unlawful application of an implied licence. In the famous case Monsanto v. Scruggs, the legal 
argument of the defence, which was based on the implied license doctrine, was not confirmed by 
the findings of the Court. The defendant attempted to expand the concept of the implied license 
                                                          
604 Mitchell v. Hawley, 84 U.S. 544, *548 (1872). 
605 ibid. 
606 The Court of Appeals acknowledged that certain types of restrictions are enforceable if they remain within 
the reward a patentee is entitled to by a patent. Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc. , 976 F.2d 700, *703-05 
(1992); Goodyear v. Beverly Rubber 10 F. Cas. 638, *640 (1859); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 
U.S. 659, *666 (1895); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, *457 (1873). 
607 Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc. , *703-05. 
608 Amber Hatfield  Rovner, "Practical Guide to Application of (or Defense against) Product-Based 
Infringement Immunities under the Doctrines of Patent Exhaustion and implied License," Tex. Intell. Prop. 
L.J., no. 12 (2003-2004): 246; Harmon, Harmon on Patents, 623. 
609 LG Electronics Inc., v. Quanta Computer Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, *1369 (2006). 
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over the second generation of the self-replicating seeds. He argued to have an implied license on 
replicated seeds. However, the structure of Monsanto’s license agreements excluded any possibility 
of implied licensing, since every link in the distribution chain, as well as the use thereof, were under 
license conditions. The Federal Circuit panel affirmed that “in order to establish an implied licence 
the circumstance of the sale must plainly indicate that the grant of a licence should be inferred.” In 
the case, Monsanto’s licenses were classic licensing agreements. They imposed significant 
restrictions on the seed sellers, who were not permitted to sell seeds to growers unless they signed 
one of Monsanto's licence agreements.610 The seed distributors were not authorised to grant any 
sort of a licence611: 
Without the actual sale of the second generation seed to Scruggs, there can be no 
patent exhaustion. The fact that a patented technology can replicate itself does 
not give a purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the technology. Applying 
the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations of self-replicating technology 
would eviscerate the rights of the patent holder.612 
 
Likewise, while in Japan the exhaustion of a patent right has not been proclaimed in the JPA, it 
nonetheless remains a well-known institution in the legal doctrine. 
However, unlike in the other presented jurisdictions, the old statutory patent law, the Patent Act of 
1922, based the norm on the principle the implied license.  
It stipulated that a lawful purchaser was entitled to use, sell, and allow others to use the protected 
product. Some scholars merged the implied license with the patent exhaustion, arguing that “it 
could be thought to be the expiration of the right due to the achievement of the right.”613 
It was not until 1997 when in BBS Wheels614 the Supreme Court set forth the principle of domestic 
patent exhaustion. 
                                                          
610 The growers could use seeds with Monsanto's biotechnology for planting a single crop only (“exclusivity 
provision”). The transfer or re-use of seeds, as well as research or experimentation, were prohibited (no 
replant policy and no research policy). Last but not least, the growers had to pay a technology fee. 
611 Monsanto Co v. Scruggs, 459 F. 3d 1328(2006). See also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d. 1291(2002); 
Porcelli, "Bowman v. Monsanto and an Introdcution to the Patent Exhaustion/First Sale Doctrine in the 
United States," 29; Monsanto v. Bowmann, 686 F. SUpp. 2d 834, *839 (2009). 
612 Monsanto Co v. Scruggs, *1336. 
 In another case involving Monsanto, the Court repeated the same principle: “No unconditional sale of the 
Roundup Ready 9R trait occurred because the farmers could not convey to the grain dealers what they did 
not possess themselves. (…) The grain elevator/dealer from whom Bowmann bought the soybeans had 
not right to plant the soybeans and could not confer such a right on Bowmann.” Monsanto v. Bowmann, 
*839. 
613 Mohri, Maintenance, Replacement and Recycling, 50.  
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The case involved a German manufacturer, BBS, which produced a certain type of car wheel with 
patents in Germany and Japan. The defendant obtained the wheels in Germany and imported them 
to Japan. The import was not restricted by BBS: notifications neither on the products nor on the 
purchase were given or expressed. BBS wanted to prevent the defendant from importing its 
product and claimed damages. In the first instance, the Tokyo District Court consented to the 
plaintiff’s claims. In the appeal, the Tokyo High Court dismissed the claim, arguing that the plaintiff 
was sufficiently compensated upon the act of the first sale. BBS appealed from the decision to the 
Supreme Court. The defendant raised the principle of international patent exhaustion. The 
Supreme Court rendered a judgement in favour of the defendant: 
However, if patented products are sold domestically, either by the patentee or with 
his consent, the patent is deemed exhausted because it has fulfilled its purpose.615 
(…) It is assumed that the patentee who has transferred the ownership of patented 
goods abroad has also endowed the transferee or any subsequent purchaser with 
the right to undertake further transactions with third parties, including the 
importation to Japan, use in Japan, and transfer of ownership on our domestic 
market.616 
(…) The importation of products covered by a domestic patent and marketed 
abroad by the patentee is only infringing if the patentee has clearly excluded such 
importation.617 
The Court accentuated the overall benefits of patent exhaustion:  
a) the balance between the patent protection and the public benefit, 
b) unimpeded free movement of goods,  
c) fair and just reward for an inventive effort.618  
The construction of the exhaustion principle does not depart form acknowledged standards and 
legal practice: provided the seller explicitly indicates that the distribution of goods in Japan is 
restricted or prohibited, the exhaustion of rights does not occur and a double reward is 
permissible.619 
The exhaustion rule does not derogate the rights from a patent completely. Such rights remain only 
unenforceable as long as the exploitation stays within the scope of law. It plays a role in debates on 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
614 BBS Wheels 2, Tokyo High Court 23.03.1995 Case No. Hei 6 (ne) 3272; BBS Wheels 3, Supreme Court 
01.07.1997 H6-(Ne)-3272, IIC 1998, 331. 
615 BBS Wheels 3, 333.  
616 Ibid., 334. 
617 ibid., 331. 
618 ibid., 333.   
619 Etuso Doi, "U.S. Supreme Court Judgment on Patent Exhaustion Rendered - A Comparative Overwiev with 
Japanese Patent Law - Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.," Patents and Licensing (Jun 2008): 37. 
See also Canon Injekt Printer, IP High Court 21.01.2006 Hei 17 (ne) 10021, IIC 2006, 867, 868. 
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the permissible acts of the end users, such as the scope of the repair doctrine, where the 
effectiveness of the principle terminates if the conduct in question manifests the preponderance of 
infringement indications, i.e. the reconstruction of a patented device. 
 
4.6 Non-statutory Limitations 
4.6.1 Repair v. Reconstruction Doctrines 
Whether and to what extent an improvement, re-manufacturing and replacement 
of elements that relate to any patented product, device, arrangement 
(composition) or a process and its results, is covered by the patent, was always 
one of the most complicated patent questions. 620 
Drawing clear and concise boarders between permissible repair and impermissible re-
manufacturing is “a hard nut to crack” in the patent practice.621 Apart from the definition of repair 
itself, i.e. all conducts performed on a product that prolong its usefulness, other issues pertaining to 
repair remain complicated.622 Certain guidelines can be extracted from case law; however, not a 
single case can be determined a priori without a detailed examination of patent claims and the 
circumstances of the conduct in question. 
Not without reason, the question of permissible repair arises together with the issue of indirect 
infringement623: control over the spare-parts market is a much sought-after prize.624 Indirect 
(contributory) infringement occurs when without the patentee’s consent a third party offers or 
supplies to unauthorized persons “means relating to an essential element” of an invention with the 
intention of making or using the invention, if either the third party knows or it is obvious from the 
circumstances themselves that such means are suitable and intended for the use of the 
invention.625 An element can be recognised as relating to an essential feature of the invention on a 
                                                          
620 Lindenmaier, "Über Erschöpfung des Patentrechts," 294. 
621 Clemens Rübel, "Patentschutz bei Reparatur- und Ersatzteilfällen," GRUR 7(2002): 565. 
622 Klaus Haft et al., "Die Erschöpfung von Rechten des Geistigen Eigentums in Fällen des Recyclings oder der 
Reparatur von Waren (Q 205)," GRUR Int. (2008): 946. 
623 For example, Section 10 of the German Patent Act; Section 60(2) of the UK Patents Act. 
624 Niels Hölder, "Mittelbare Patentverletzung und Erschöpfung bei Austausch- und Verschleißteilen Die 
„Flügelradzähler”-Entscheidung des BGH," GRUR (2005). 
625 This is similar in the UK doctrine: pursuant to Section 60(2), a person infringes a patent if he or she 
supplies or orders to supply a person not entitled to work the invention with means relating to an 
essential element of an invention for putting the invention into effect in the UK. The infringement occurs 
if the person knew that those means are suitable and intended for putting the invention into effect, i.e. a 
supplier knows that the end user intends to work the invention. The place of infringement: “putting the 
invention into effect in the United Kingdom,” is defined by the place of operation of the end users. 
 Intellectual Property Office UK IPO, "Manual of Patent Practice,"  (2013), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-
types/pro-patent/p-law/p-manual/p-manual-practice/p-manual-practice-pat1977.htm 
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functional basis when, together with one or more claimed elements, it contributes to the 
realization of the technical concept of the invention.626 Its identification remains an indispensable 
condition of rendering fair judgement in every case on indirect infringement. 
4.6.1.1 Germany 
In old German patent law, such “essential” parts had to meet the requirement of 
erfindungsfunktionellen Individualisierung (invention-related functional individualization), which 
referred to elements that demanded special invention-related adjustment due to the fact that 
alone, i.e. when separated from the given invention, the elements did not fulfil the invention-
related function.627 This abstruse approach was abandoned and replaced with the concept of 
functional cooperation.628 As determined by jurisprudence, an element is essential “when it 
functionally supports the realization of the inventive concept.”629 If the element in question fulfils 
the above criterion, its supply can be considered indirect infringement. However, that still does not 
clarify whether the replacement of the essential element constitutes permissible repair. However, 
such an approach nonetheless takes each case a step further, because understanding the 
essentiality of an element constitutes an important reference in the repair-reconstruction 
dichotomy. 
German courts examine how changes introduced in the course of the alleged repair correspond 
with the identity of the invention; how the element in question contributes to the technical 
teaching; last but not least, how the repair affects the balance of interest. The courts investigate 
the following issues:  
1) the identity and essentiality of an element (a technical solution embedded in the device),  
2) the technical teaching (defined in patent claims),  
3) the trade-off. 
Small nuances between cases have proved sufficient in shifting the judgements in a different 
direction. This fact introduces a certain dose of unpredictability and uncertainty when anticipating 
the judgements. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
www.gov.uk/government/publications/patents-manual-of-patent-practice: 60.19-60.20. 
626 Flügelradzähler [Impeller flow meter], BGH 4.5.2004 - X ZR 48/03, GRUR 2004, 758; Hölder, "Mittelbare 
Patentverletzung," 21-22. 
626 Flügelradzähler [Impeller flow meter], 761; Schutz (UK) Ltd v. Werit UK Ltd., [2010] F.S.R. 22, 553, 554. 
627 Lindenmaier, "Über Erschöpfung des Patentrechts," 298-99; Förderrinne, 234. 
628 Rigg, BGH 10.12.1981 X ZR 70/80, GRUR 1982, 165, 165-67; Michael Nieder, "Die mittelbare 
Patentverletzung - eine Bestandsaufnahme," GRUR (2006): 979. 
629 Flügelradzähler [Impeller flow meter], 761; Schutz (UK) Ltd v. Werit UK Ltd., 554. 
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The following list of most relevant decisions highlights how Courts handle this subject-matter in 
various scenarios: 
a) a replacement of one element in a patented device comprising of two elements 
In Impeller flow meter630, the patent at issue concerned a device designed to measure 
water consumption, which comprised of two elements: housing (a capsule) and a 
removable measuring unit (a filter mesh). The defendant made and sold measuring 
capsules compatible with the patented housing. 
The Court found the party guilty of infringement, since the replaced part, a measuring 
capsule, functionally corresponded with the features of the patent claims – it was covered 
by patent claims; and had significant meaning for the technical teaching embedded in the 
invention, and for that reason was ruled to be an essential element. The measuring capsule 
directly interoperated with the housing (claim no. 1); as well as enabled non-rotational 
admission flow and lowered the risk of clamping the two elements together 
(Gesamtvorrichtung). 
The replacement of the measuring capsule constituted an unlawful re-manufacturing. 
b) A replacement of an element of no technical and functional effect upon the patent solution 
In Flanged Tire631, the plaintiff was the owner of a patent for a rail vehicle wheel. The 
defendant supplied the plaintiff’s customers with flanged tires produced according to 
drawing of the plaintiff provided for the purposes of maintenance. 
The Court stated that the ultimate receiver of the flanged tires, i.e. the customer, was a 
lawful receiver and had the right to restore the utility of the device after this had been 
worn-out. It also admitted that there was a functional cooperation between the flanged tire 
and the rubber ring, which sufficed to qualify the supply of flanged tires as indirect 
infringement, but this did not serve as evidence to qualify the replacement as a 
reconstruction. The exchanged part did not add any value to the technical effects of the 
invention and did not reflect any of them. Therefore, the replacement of a worn-out part 
constituted permissible repair. 
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631 Laufkranz [Flanged Tire], BGH 3.5.2006 - X ZR 45/05, GRUR 2006, 837. 
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The case Pallet Container632 concerned the refurbishment of a worn-out inner part of a 
pallet container, which constituted direct infringement in light of Section 9(2). Not only did 
the the defendant replace a used part, he also produced new ones. However, the 
replacement of a used container represented a lawful use of a device in light of the 
exhaustion principle. Otherwise, the device would be of no use for its buyers. 
The Court found no functional relation between the container and the patented structure, 
and stressed that containers did not contribute to the technical teaching of the invention. 
The exchanged container had no impact on the identity of the invention, which comprised 
of the outer coat designed to improve the stability of the inside container. No reference 
regarding any particular arrangement with the container was introduced into the patent 
claim. The replacement of the container was thus ruled to be permissible. 
c) A replacement of an easily wearing-out part (within a daily use of a device) 
In Pipette system633, the patent suit covered a manual pipette system. The defendants 
supplied syringes suitable for the plaintiff’s device. 
The Court regarded the claimed syringes as a non-significant and subordinate element of 
the invention, since they did not contribute to the technical solution of the invention 
whatsoever. The syringes interoperated with other elements of the invention, and for that 
reason constituted a part of a functioning unit (Funktionseinheit), which sufficed to fulfil the 
premises of indirect infringement. However, the product qualified neither as a 
reconstruction, nor as a repair; it was qualified as the replacement of a part wearing-out on 
a daily basis within the ordinary use of a device – a syringe was a part that solely 
interoperated with an improved locking system. 
The Court referred to the balance of interests and asserted that it cannot be expected from 
the purchasers to be satisfied with a device, the lifespan of which would be limited to the 
number of syringes provided with the device by the manufacturer. Protecting the interest 
of the manufacturer (here, the patentee) by ensuring the position of an exclusive supplier 
of syringes would go beyond the inventive concept and the preservation of the identity of 
the patented solution. 
                                                          
632 Palettenbehälter 2 [Palett Container 2], BGH 17.7.2012 - X ZR 97/11, GRUR 2012, 1118. 
633 Pipettensystem, BGH 27.2.2007 - X ZR 38/06, GRUR 2007, 769. 
141 
 
The Nespresso case634, highly awaited due to its economic impact on the coffee-capsules 
market, had a similar outcome635. The patent at issue concerned a system for extracting 
coffee from a capsule. The plaintiff argued that non-Nespresso capsules infringed its 
patent. 
The Court asserted that the capsules, though indispensable for the use of machines, neither 
embodied nor referred in any manner to the technical teaching of the machine. The 
interoperability of capsules with a machine was clear: the device would be useless without 
the coffee capsules it was made for. However, the invention concerned solely the 
mechanical process of extracting the coffee from the inserted capsules, which was 
improved by simplifying the extraction. The capsules themselves did not require any 
improvement. The patent at issue did not determine their form and structure; they were 
indicated as an exemplary embodiment. The Court upheld that the replacement of capsules 
constituted an ordinary use to maintain the usefulness of a machine (see Pipetten System). 
The exhaustion took place – the Court evaluated whether the patentee was properly 
remunerated for placing the invention, defined through patent claims, on the market.  
Nespresso, however, insisted on the court acknowledging the replacement of capsules to 
be re-manufacturing, since capsules are its main business: after all, the company is known 
as the biggest maker of coffee capsules, and not the coffee machine producer.636 The 
capsules market keeps growing. 
The following guidelines can be extracted from the analysed decisions: 
1) the patent claims are the departure point – they indicate the technical solution and the 
identity of the invention; 
                                                          
634 Nesspresso Capsules, LG Düsseldorf 18.8.2012 4b O 81/12; BeckRS 2012, 17607. 
635 The encapsulated coffee is “the fast-growing segment of the coffee market: pods now account for 20 to 
40 percent of the value of ground sales in the $17 billion European coffee market according to 
Euromonitors International.” See Liz Alderman, "Nespresso and Rivals Vie for Dominance in Coffee War,"  
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 Nespresso carries a fierce war over the dominance on the market of “encapsulated’ coffee with e.g. 
Tassimo by Kraft and Senseo by Sara Lee. It fortified its position with 1700 patents – some of them expired 
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636 Nespresso sales almost tripled within just four years: from $1.4 billion in 2010, to $3.2 billion in 2010. It is 
estimated that almost one-fifth of the coffee may be made from capsules. See Mulier, "Nespresso Will 
Survive." 
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2) if an ordinary use of the invention requires the recurrent replacement of an element, this 
will be recognised as a permissible action; 
3) if measures go beyond the necessary scope of restoring the normal utility of the device, the 
introduced changes are regarded as a reconstruction, since they affect the identity of the 
patented device and exceed the inevitable ambit of maintenance; 
4) the number of parts replaced does not play any role as long as their replacement does not 
change the identity of the invention; 
5) the functional relation of the element to the invention is not determinative (see syringes in 
Pipetten System); 
6) how the element contributes to the technical teaching affects the court rendering – patent 
claims are the reference. 
 
4.6.1.2 The United Kingdom  
The distinction is as challenging in the UK doctrine: 
The principle is quite clear, although its application is sometimes difficult; you may 
prolong the life of a licensed article but you must not make a new one under the 
cover of repair637. 
Again, the simplicity of the definition indicates a troublesome application: repair is everything 
“which does not amount to an act of making a patented article anew.”638 In other words, a repair is 
each action apart from manufacturing: “repair was one of the concepts (like modifying or adapting) 
which shares the boundary with “making” but did not trespass on its territory.”639 
This approach opens up an endless spectrum of repair models; repair is determined as a matter of 
degree (it may be simple and complex) and a question of facts.640 Similar to the German courts, the 
UK courts screen the patent claims and analyse the modification in the identity of an invention and 
its impact on the technical teaching. In fact, courts from both countries often reach the same 
conclusions: 
a) The replacement of an element in a two-element patented device 
                                                          
637 Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Wallington, Weston & Co., 543. 
638 United Wire Ltd. v. Screen Repairs Services (Scotland), 442; Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v. Green Cartridge Co. 
(Hong Kong) Ltd., [1997] A.C. 7285, 7356. 
639 Sirdar Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Wallington, Weston & Co., 543. 
640 United Wire Ltd. v. Screen Repairs Services (Scotland), 448-50; Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd.  v. 
Barton, 547, 55. 
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In United Wire v Screen Repair641 (German Impeller Flow meter), the claimant argued that 
the process of replacing meshes amounted to re-making the screens by re-assembling, 
cleaning, and, in the end, exchanging certain parts with new ones. A permissible repair, in 
his view, would consist of “filling up holes in the mesh with rubber compounds.”642 The 
Court of Appeal agreed with the argumentation and found the replacement infringing and 
falling within the patent claims. Meshes were enclosed in patent claims and truly reflected 
the inventive idea. As the invention consisted of two elements, they presented a true 
combination; the Court stressed that a device consisting merely of two parts can hardly 
exist when one part is removed.643 
b) The replacement of an element of no contribution to the technical teaching 
In Schutz v Wire644 (German Pallet Container), the Court clarified that the relation between 
a replaced element and the rest of a product can be determined if “what was left embodied 
the whole of the inventive concept of the claim”645. The claimant argued that containers 
were integrated products and could not serve their function without the “filling” bottle. 
That was insufficient to convince the Court, which stated that the inventive concept was 
embodied in the Schutz cage, which retained that concept even without the bottles. The 
plastic bottles did not contribute in any way to the technological teaching that concerned 
the improved resistance of the cage – particularly the joints of the rods.646 The fact that the 
specification demonstrated that the inner containers were intended to be 
“interchangeable” or “exchangeable” spoke against the patentee.647  
Solar Thomson Engineering v. Barton648 (corresponding with the German Flanged Tire) 
concerned a patented pulley with an easily replaceable elastomeric ring in its peripheral 
groove. The alleged infringer was replacing the used rings based on patentee’s drawings. 
The plaintiff did not offer the rings for sale, since his economic calculation showed it to be 
unprofitable and excessively troublesome. Neither did the first defendant, who sub-
contracted the replacement due to insufficient manufacturing capacities. However, re-
fitting worn parts was common practise in the steel industry. 
                                                          
641 United Wire Ltd. v. Screen Repairs Services (Scotland). 
642 ibid., 451-52.   
643  Schutz (UK) Ltd v. Werit UK Ltd. 
644 ibid. 
645 ibid., 570. 
646 The two EP-patents referred: 1) to the inner side of the cage lying closely against the bottle and 2) to the 
alleviation of forces. Ibid., 554. 
647 ibid., 559. 
648 Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd.  v. Barton.[1977] R.P.C. 537 
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The Court held that the replacement of the rings did not fall within the patent scope. The 
inventive idea resided in the facilitated removal of the split mould without dismantling the 
whole apparatus in order to e.g. to re-fit the worn rubber parts. As in Schutz v. Wire, the 
specification itself suggested the rubber ring is readily exchangeable.649 The Court brought 
up the notion of an implied license and asserted that the users were accordingly licensed by 
the plaintiff, which could be easily inferred from the facts, and so the defendant was 
entitled within the bounds of the implied license to perform the repairs requested by the 
first defendant. 
In conclusion, the following aspects of the Courts’ analyses can be accentuated: 
1) patent claims are the focal point and define the degree of permissible repair; 
2) in some cases the specification clarifies whether certain elements can be exchanged, and it 
gives clear indications in regard to the manners in which the elements in question can be 
re-fitted; 
3) if a given part constitutes an essential element of the invention, its replacement is 
infringing; 
4) contribution of the element to the technical teaching plays a role in establishing 
infringement; 
5) “No repair would be deemed as an infringement as long as it does not infringe the 
patentee’s right to prevent other form making the product”650; 
6) whether a user had an implied license or the patent right had exhausted plays a secondary 
role when the act under investigation constitutes a prohibited making – neither an implied 
license nor exhaustion can exempt the act from patent liability.651 
 
4.6.1.3 The United States 
In the US doctrine, the concept of repair derives from the common acceptance of the belief that 
nobody should be penalised merely for repairing a worn-out element. Permissible repair is further 
justified by the first sale doctrine (or implied license), which exhausts the rights of the patentee 
over the invention. Due to the non-existence of the private and non-commercial exceptions in the 
US system, the repair doctrine can be regarded as a form of a permissible personal use for non-
commercial purposes. 
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Permissible repair comes dangerously close to the infringing act of making something anew 
(reconstruction) – the borderline between the two remains vague and unclear. Two instrumental 
questions which should be considered in this regard are: how much is allowed, and how much is too 
much.652  
The jurisprudential origins of the doctrine date back to 1850, when in Wilson v. Simpson the 
Supreme Court upheld that the replacement of a worn-out part represent a permissible repair: 
When the wearing or injury is partial, then repair is restoration, and not reconstruction.653 
The Court asserted that when a device is completely broken or worn-out and can no longer be used, 
any attempt to restore the entire device constitutes an infringing reconstruction. It introduced two 
additional criteria to scrutinise the degree of changes: the essentiality and the intentions of the 
inventor. In the aforementioned case, the replaced parts were cutting knives with a short lifespan 
(of 60-90 days), which constituted an essential part of the invention. Without them, the users could 
not operate the machine. However, as the court affirmed, replacing them at short intervals was 
intended by the inventor, and hence the inventor could not complain about the purchaser’s 
behaviour, which consisted of restoring these parts on a regular basis. New knives prolonged the life 
of the machine and maintained the “identity of the machine.” In other words, the purchaser did 
exactly what the inventor intended them to.654 Ultimately, the essentiality of an element was 
categorised as being lower than what the inventor intended, as expressed in the patent itself. (The 
court did not consider the relation between the knives and the technical solution.) 
Cotton Tie v. Simmons was the first case in which the Court ruled impermissible reconstruction. The 
defendant combined an old buckle, originally used to confine the cotton bales, with a new band 
with the aim of making a new cotton-bale tie. The court recognized the action as the unlawful 
reconstruction of a patented article, which the inventor designed as a single-use product: as “[the 
tie] left the bale it could not be used again as a tie.” Above that, defendants obtained a licence to 
use the invention and, once it has worn-out, discard it.655 The licensing condition spoke against the 
                                                          
652 Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc. , *709. 
653  Wilson v. Simpson. 
654 ibid., *122-24. 
 The decision in Wilson v. Simpson was criticised for elusive analysis and ambiguous standards in regard to 
the  repair-reconstruction dichotomy. Mark D. Janis, "Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, 
and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law," Maryland Law Review 58(1999): 440-41. 
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defendant, but the inventor’s intention was the key factor in affirming infringement. 
In Aro Manufacturing v. Convertible Top Replacement656, the court challenged the question of 
whether the replacement of one unpatented part in a combination patent constituted 
infringement. The patented structure was a “convertible folding top with automatic seal at rear 
quarter.” The invention comprised of supporting structures, a closing mechanism, and a top 
covering fabric. All of the elements were unpatented and merely their combination was filed as the 
invention. The first two court instances affirmed infringement; the Supreme Court reversed it. The 
pivot of its examination rested upon the status of an individual unpatented piece (a cover textile) 
within the patented combination. None of the elements – the shape, the colour, and the fabric – 
were claimed in the patent; only the complete arrangement was under patent protection. Hence, 
the Court decided that the patentee could not require the protection on each part taken separately: 
The fact that an unpatented part of a combination patent may distinguish the 
invention does not draw to it the privileges of a patent. That may be done only in 
the manner provided by law. However worthy it may be, however essential to the 
patent, an unpatented part of a combination patent is no more entitled to 
monopolistic protection than any other unpatented device.657 
Additionally, the perishable character of the element in question could suggest to the purchaser 
that its replacement merely constituted the repair of the product. The court referred to Wilson v. 
Simson and reaffirmed that the purchaser buys “the use of the whole” of the combination and 
thereby has right to replace a worn or broken part to restore the utility of the device.658 
The court contested the multi-factor test659, suggested in earlier decisions660, for its inaccuracy. The 
application of the test would erroneously establish that the replacement of the piece constitutes 
reconstruction. The fabric was a major and expensive component which wore out after a longer 
period of time; hence the owner would consider the replacement of a cover to be a major 
reconstruction rather than a repair.661 The Court rejected the heart-of-invention approach, arguing 
that an unpatented element, regardless of its essentialness, cannot usurp the privileges of the 
patent. It focused on spentness as the determinative factor in the repair-reconstruction dichotomy: 
                                                          
656 Aro Manufacturing Co. Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 365 U.S. 336(1961). 
657 ibid., *338. 
658 ibid., *342. 
659 The multi-factor test includes: 1) the life of the part in reference to the expect life of the whole product, 2) 
the importance of the replaced element, 3) costs, 4) common sense, 5) the intension of the patent owner, 
6) the buyer’s intension. See ibid., Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, *362; "Tale of the Apocryphal 
Axe," 444-46. 
660 Wilson v. Simpson; Heyer v. Duplicator Manufacturing, 263 U.S. 100(1923). 
661 Aro Manufacturing Co. Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., *343. 
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We hold that maintenance of the "use of the whole" of the patented combination 
through replacement of a spent part, unpatented element does not constitute 
reconstruction.662 
Notably, in Wilbur-Ellis v Kuther the Court recognised as a repair an act of extensive refurbishment 
involving re-sizing of certain parts with the intention of extending the useful lifespan of the original 
device.663 However, as a disclaimer it should accentuated that, in pre Manufacturing, which 
governed the said case, the extensive modifications were performed on unpatented elements (the 
patent covered a combination of fish-canning machine): 
When six of the 35 elements of the combination patent were resized or relocated, 
no invasion of the patent resulted, for as we have said the size of cans serviced by 
the machine was no part of the invention; nor were characteristics of size, location, 
shape and construction of the six elements in question patented.664 
Likewise, repair is asserted when a patented combination device is dismantled, renovated, injured 
parts are replaced, and then reassembled with original parts that remain serviceable.665 
The US jurisprudence applied various approaches when ruling in repair-reconstruction cases, such 
as the identity of an invention666, the heart of invention667, the multifactor-test668, and 
spentness669.670 
In Husky671, the Court listed three primary repair-reconstruction circumstances: 
1) the entire patented invention is spent, and a user reconstructs it to make it usable again – 
when the invention is intended by the patentee to be used only once and be destroyed 
afterwards, the use constitutes an infringing reconstruction672; 
2) only a spent part is replaced – the part has a shorter lifespan than other parts and/or the 
whole combination, and so it should be assumed that replacement was accounted for by 
the patentee – a repair; especially when673; 
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3) a part is not worn out, but replaced with a part to perform a different function – a situation 
“akin to repair, with a reservation that the replaced part is not a patented part of the 
invention.”674 
In conclusion, any attempts at shaping general standards applicable in diverse types of cases appear 
futile due to the immense diversity of innovations675: 
It is impracticable, as well as unwise, to attempt to lay down any rule on this 
subject, owing to the number and infinite variety of patented inventions.676 
Thus, there may be some concept of proportionality inherent in the distinction 
between repair and reconstruction.677 
 
4.6.1.4 Japan 
Japanese practitioners and scholars also struggle with the dilemma in question. As each time, the 
definition itself remains plain and simple: maintenance of a patented product (a check-up or the 
repair of worn-out elements) with the intent of preserving its utility is lawful. Lawful repair neither 
achieves the purpose of a patented invention, nor modifies the identity of the protected product, 
and hence does not constitute the use of the invention. Under the principle of patent exhaustion, a 
purchaser has the right to consume the acquired product by replacing and repairing broken 
parts.678 
When examining the conducts performed upon patented products, Japanese courts exercise two 
methods: 1) substantial analysis employing comprehensive standpoints to understand the type of 
the act, 2) the limit of exhaustion analysis – the two-exception test.679 Courts apply them 
interchangeably, which leads to discrepant outcomes, like in the case of the Canon Injekt Printer.680 
(Japanese courts a lack clear policy in this regard.) 
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The named case concerned repaired (or re-used) ink cartridges originally manufactured by Canon, 
which were later refilled by a Chinese company seated in Macao, and subsequently imported to 
Japan by the Tokyo-based company Recycle Assist. 
The Tokyo District Court applied the substantial analysis and dismissed the claim, arguing that the 
defendant did not create a new patented product. The Court considered a number of issues, such 
as the intention of Canon, the structure of the patented products, the patentable subject-matter, 
and the distribution.681 It asserted that the ink tank was still usable when emptied, i.e. it had a 
longer lifespan than the ink itself. Moreover, “filling with the ink up to the top of the ink tank is an 
inevitable method of filling it, and ink is not a patented part”.682 Otherwise, the ink tank would have 
to be discarded after one use, which would be detrimental from an ecological and an economic 
point of view.683 
The IP High Court employed the two exceptions test and overruled the previous judgement. It 
introduced two new standards in which the exhaustion does not occur: 
However, a patent right is not exhausted and the patentee can enforce its right in 
the following situations: 
Scenario 1: When a patented product is reused or recycled after the patented 
product has fulfilled its original service life and thus fulfilled its function, or 
Scenario 2: When a third party adds or exchanges part or all of the substantial 
elements of the patented invention of the patented products.684 
In this particular case, Scenario 1 did not apply, since the Court did not assert the fulfilment of the 
product when the original ink had been consumed. The refilling of an empty ink tank represented 
the replacement of a consumable part, and not the use of the product itself. The analysis confirmed 
Scenario 2: the defendants modified elements that were essential to the patented invention. 
Patent infringement arose in the process of refilling the liquid container. The Court asserted that 
the defendant employed the same process as claimed in the patent.685  
During the appeal to the Supreme Court, the identity of the infringed product was scrutinized by 
employing (again) substantial analysis and the comprehensive standpoint. The following features 
were provided as reference points:  
1) the attributes of the patented product, 
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2) the substance of the patented product, 
3) the description of fabrication and replacement of parts, 
4) the actual condition of distribution/transaction. 
The Court concluded that the patentee did not intend the ink to be refilled, and hence the 
cartridges were not provided with any opening to facilitate the refilling. Consequently, it deemed 
the refilling as a “deformation of the ink tank.”686 The Supreme Court stated that the rule of patent 
exhaustion applied solely to the sale of patented products under the condition that they remain 
unchanged. Processing or replacing part of the patented product leads to the creation of a new 
product, which I distinct from the original one. Therefore, the patent did not exhaust.687 
The judgement worked solely in favour of the printer producers by bestowing on them the 
exclusivity on the ink cartridge market and excluding other suppliers. The judgement does not feel 
correct because the analysis concerned the sold product “as such” and not the patent and the 
scope of protection granted. Moreover, the Court introduced into the analysis a rather vague 
notion of public perception which should not be anyhow a yardstick for rendering a judgment on 
patent infringement. Illustratively, from a European perspective refilling of an ink tank is considered 
as a common practice– more cost-effective and much more reasonable than buying a new 
cartridge. Such a public perception might comply with a judgment as long as ink refilling is not 
confirmed to be protected with a patent. Finally, yet importantly, the interests of third parties and 
the pragmatic examination of the patent effects were not considered in this litigation.688  
A brief overview of Japanese case law shows that the approach of the courts is not satisfactory: 
they lack a unified approach and a comprehensive understanding of patents with their (immense) 
economic impact. 
In Tissue Paper689, the patented invention related to a tissue paper dispenser that hospitals were 
supplied with. The patentee imposed an obligation on the buyers to obtain tissue paper only 
through the patentee. The defendant was the company that refilled the patentee’s dispensers with 
tissue paper. The first instance upheld the patentee’s claim; the appeal court rendered a 
contradictory judgement based on the exhaustion principle. The perspective of patent exhaustion is 
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surprising, considering that the tissue paper did not contribute to the patented solution itself.690 In 
Hammer691, the patented invention concerned a device for crushing stone. It was designed to last a 
couple of years, but the battering plate lasted for approximately a week. The Court acknowledged 
the replacement as an infringement.692 
The most commented Fuji case693 concerned the infringement of Fuji single-use cameras after 
inserting a new film and a battery into used devices. The Tokyo District Court employed the 
comprehensive standpoint and found infringement in the act of replacing an essential element of 
the invention and making a new product which is identical with its original patented counterpart: 
Once a patented product has fulfilled its function, the patentee is allowed to re-
enforce its patent rights over these used patented products. (…) Once the 
defendant exchanges the main component which comprises a substantial part of 
patented invention, and thus manufactures new products, the patentee can 
enforce its patent rights over such products to the extent that these are products 
identical to the original patented products the patentee has sold.694 
The Court recognized the permissible replacement of minor components such as batteries, filters, 
or parts with a shorter lifespan than the product itself, e.g. light bulbs. The replacement in question 
does not amount to the re-manufacturing of the patented invention. The Court explained that the 
lifespan of a patented product should be estimated from a comprehensive standpoint, 
“encompassing the function, structure, material, usage of the patented product and actual 
conditions of the distribution.”695 
The Court measured the product and its use, but did not measure the patented invention 
embedded within it. The invention related to the winding mechanism and the whole device (a 
single camera). The replaced elements: a battery and a film, remained unrelated to the claimed 
invention – an important aspect missed by the Court.696 The Court remarked on the level of 
destruction and difficulties by opening the back cover, as if this possibility were an invitation to 
perform permissible repair or a reconstruction. The Court made a reference to the public 
perception of single-use disposable cameras that gained a wide public recognition. However, as 
correctly noted by commentators, the common understanding in society can be manipulated by the 
                                                          
690 ibid., 860. 
691 Hammer for a sand-making machine, Osaka District Court, 24 April 1989, 1315 Hanrei Jiho 120 from 
Mineko Mohri, "Patents, Repair and Recycling from a Comparative Perspective," ibid.(2010): footnote 39. 
692 Christopher Heath and Mineko Mohri, "Ending is Better than Mending - Recent Japanse Case Law on 
Repair, Refill and Recycling," ibid.(2006): 860. 
693 Tokyo District Court, 31 August 2000, (unreported) – Fuji Camera from ibid., footnote 18. 
694 ibid., 861. 
695 Mohri, Maintenance, Replacement and Recycling, 107. 
696 Heath and Mohri, "Ending is Better then Mending," 861-62. 
152 
 
influx of information. The patent claims demonstrate that the winding mechanism could be re-
used, but the patentee’s intention was to block the reuse by making the removal difficult.697 
Japanese Courts performed complicated (convoluted) legal analyses and reached (disappointingly) 
perplexing conclusions. Comparing the original product with the “re-made” product seems to be 
one-way street in favour of the patent holder. A “repaired” product is and should be identical with 
the original one: that is the main purpose of repair. An issue which needs to be addressed here is 
the extent to which a patented solution (described in patent claims) is changed due to the 
replacement of worn-out parts. The overview of available cases and corresponding comments 
suggests that in this subject matter Japanese jurisprudence introduces more confusion than 
clarity.698 
 
4.6.2 Defence Against Claims on Equivalents 
Infringement liability can arise when infringing embodiments cover the patented solution 
functionally and technically, i.e. fall within the zone of equivalent solutions. 
Despite differences between jurisdictions in defining the notion of what is equivalent. In general, it 
can be said that an equivalent is an element that solves the problem of the invention with means 
that objectively have identical effects, based on the literal meaning of patent claims. The literal 
meaning pertains both to the plain and the strict meaning of words as found in dictionaries, and to 
their comprehension by a person skilled in the art. 
The reading of patent claims is determinative in infringement lawsuits. Their interpretation and 
ambit may evolve and alternate despite the first construction of the patent office. The alternation 
does not imply a complete shift from the initial construction, but relates to the extension in the 
patent construction over embodiments that have not been anticipated before the patent 
infringement.  
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Patent claims build the boundaries of patent exclusivity. Their wording must be extremely well-
weighted – not too broad, and not too narrow, or otherwise mistakes might be very costly.699 
Claims do not stand-alone in and of themselves, but are supported by a description (a specification) 
and drawings, which can clarify ambiguities in regard to the formulation of patent claims.700 This a 
widely accepted approach, which is codified in the European system (e.g. Section 69 EPC and the 
Protocol701)702, and confirmed in US jurisprudence703. Once patent claims are defined, an accused 
device is scrutinised “claim-by-claim” in light of the patented solution with the said “boundaries as 
the reference,” to determine the type of infringement: literal or non-literal (i.e. equivalent).704 To 
that end, every patent, regardless of the grade of precision to which it has been drafted, covers 
more than it explicitly says. 
Doctrines governing the defence of non-equivalents do not constitute a patent limitation in the 
classical meaning, unlike all of the above-mentioned instruments, as they apply solely to post-
infringement procedures (ex post). They do not create a space free from the effects of a patent, but 
have a strictly litigation-related purpose. They derogate and limit patent exclusivity when it could 
be misappropriated by claims over forms and uses outside the scope of protection. 
The delimitation of the protection scope constitutes the main axis of every patent lawsuit, and all 
the pre-trial considerations on the probability of infringement. Certain skilfulness in reading patent 
claims is required to map out the boundaries of the monopoly, with the ultimate interpretation 
being made by the court itself. The legal practice established multiple tests, questions, and 
approaches that guide the construction of claims, which in the end demand a scrupulous reading of 
                                                          
699 The case Radio Broadcasting System illustrates cases of misfortune in the drafting of patent claims. The 
patent at issue covered a radio transmission system intended for car radios with the intent of transmitting 
traffic information. The patent claims encompassed the transmitting device, but not the receiver that was 
produced by the defendant. The Court held the complaint unfounded, since receivers were not included 
in the subject matter of the patent at issue. The Court doubted whether the receiver could adopt the 
features of the invention. See  
 Radio Broadcasting System, BGH 24.3.1987 X ZR 20/86, IIC 1988, 811; Jochen Pagenberg, "New Trends in 
Patent Claim Interpretation in Germany - Good-bye to the "General Inventive Idea"," IIC (1988): 788-93. 
700 Klaus Grabinski, "„Schneidmesser” versus „Amgen” Zum Sinn oder Unsinn patentrechtlicher Äquivalenz," 
GRUR (2006): 714; Schneidmesser I [Cutting Blade I], BGH 12.03.2002 - X ZR 168/00, IIC 2002, 873. 
701 "Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC,"  (the new text adopted 28 June 2001). 
 Section 69 of the EPC Agreement (and the Protocol): “the patent protection is determined by the terms of 
the patent claims, with the description and drawings used to interpret the claims.” 
702 Pursuant to the Section 14 of the German Patent Act, patent claims are determinative for the scope of 
patent protection. If any ambiguities arise, specifications and drawings assist in clarifying them. Kraßer, 
Patentrecht, 706-07; Grabinski, "„Schneidmesser” versus „Amgen”," 714; Formstein [Moulded Curbstone], 
BGH 29.4.1987 X ZR 28/85, IIC 1987, 795, 799; Radio Broadcasting System, 813; Windsurfing International, 
Court of Justice of the European Communities, Decision vom 25.02.1986 - Case No. 193/83, IIC 1986, 362.  
703 E.g., General Electric Company v. United States. 
704 Mueller, Patent Law, 446-49. 
154 
 
claims and an investigation into the features of the infringing embodiment. Experience and 
knowledge are the best advisors. 
In terms of making, equivalency comes into play in the likelihood of patent infringement. The 
following presentation on equivalency determination intends to present a broad picture of 
principles and doctrines, with the focal point set on the defence of non-equivalents. 
 
4.6.2.1 Germany: Formstein Defence – The Free State of the Art705 
 
The German doctrine delivers an interesting perspective on the interpretation of the patent scope. 
Historically, there have been two concepts: the two-tier theory (Zweiteilungslehre), and the three-
tier theory (Dreiteilungslehre706). 
In short, after 1940 patent law 707 distinguished three layers of a patent within the three-tier theory: 
1) the direct subject matter of an invention (der unmittelbare Gegenstand der Erfindung), 2) the 
subject matter of the invention (der Gegenstand der Erfinung), and 3) the general inventive idea 
(allgemeinere Erfindungsgedanke). The first layer denoted the narrowest scope, the third the 
broadest.708 The term direct subject matter referred to an inventive idea in its literal meaning 
(unimpeachable). The second layer covered the technical teaching derived from patent claims, 
drawings, and the specification by an average person skilled in the art. It stretched over the most 
obvious equivalents, and was recognised as the most relevant. The general inventive idea expanded 
the protection over other equivalents a person skilled in the art could infer from the content of the 
patent without inventive endeavours, simply based on his or her knowledge and experience.709 
The Formstein710 decision brought back the two-tier system (Zweiteilungslehre) 711, which takes into 
account: 1) the subject matter of the invention (its identity), and 2) the general idea of the 
                                                          
705 Historical insight into discussions upon the free state of art in Paul Ströbele, Die Bindung der ordentlichen 
Gerichte an Entscheidungen der Patentbehoerden  (Köln: Heymann, 1975), 92-97. 
706 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 708; Hans Dieter Gesthuysen, "Der „Formstein”-Einwand bei einer nach der 
Entscheidung „Befestigungsvorrichtung II” äquivalenten Ausführungsform," GRUR (2001): 910. 
707 Applicable to patents granted based on the Patent Act of 1968. Ströbele, Die Bindung der ordentlichen 
Gerichte an Entscheidungen der Patentbehoerden, 81. Ströbele, Die Bindung der ordentlichen Gerichte an 
Entscheidungen der Patentbehoerden, 81.  
708 Gesthuysen, "Der „Formstein”-Einwand," 910; Eduard Reimer, "Für Professor Dr. jur. Dr.-Ing. e. h. Fritz 
Lindenmaier zum 75. Geburtstag Äquivalenz, Erfindungsgegenstand, allgemeiner Erfindungsgedanke in 
Theorie und Praxis," GRUR (1956). 
709 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 708-09; Gesthuysen, "Der „Formstein”-Einwand," 910-11; Reimer, "Äquivalenz, 
Erfindungsgegenstand," 392-95. 
710 Formstein [Moulded Curbstone], BGH 29.4.1987 X ZR 28/85; IIC 87, 795. 
711 Applied before 1940. 
155 
 
invention (the equivalent field). The identity of an invention covers the meaning of the patent 
claims together with the description and drawings, as well as the prior art provided in the patent 
application. The equivalent field covers all application forms with at least one patented feature 
which fulfils the requirement of inventiveness.712 
As provided in Section 14 of the Patent Act, which corresponds to Article 69 EPC, patent claims are 
recognised as the essence of the protection: the basis is construed as the literal meaning of the 
wording together with the meaning comprehended by the person skilled in the art. Figures, 
numbers, or dimensions also underlie the interpretation of content, i.e. if the person skilled in the 
art identified other numbers or figures having the same effect to the ones named in the patent 
claims, then they are regarded as equivalents.713 Embodiments named by the expert that go 
beyond the literal meaning constitute absolute equivalents. Non-absolute equivalents, which 
cannot be deduced by patent examiners, emerge during the infringement proceeding.714 
In the landmark BGH case, Formstein, the Court promulgated limitations to the scope of 
equivalents, which does not extend over an equivalent element that does not represent a 
patentable invention with respect to the prior art: 
The defence that the embodiment alleged to be an equivalent would not be 
patentable over the prior art is admissible.715 
The defence does not challenge the validity of the patent at suit and as such is more challenging 
than its succinct definition suggests. The Formstein defence should not be confused with the 
revocation of the patents, as this is not its objective. It does not suffice to state that an element 
belongs to the prior art; it must be located exactly between the prior art and the inventive, novel, 
and non-obvious level of patentability. More precisely, it is “known from the prior art” and 
“obvious in view of the prior art,” but nonetheless non-patentable due to the missing inventive 
step.716 
The Formstein objection can be raised if the claimed element is equivalent to its patented 
counterpart, that is, when it functionally resembles the patented device, but is not identical 
thereto. In Formstein, the Court held that: 
                                                          
712 Gesthuysen, "Der „Formstein”-Einwand," 911; Reimer, "Äquivalenz, Erfindungsgegenstand," 393. 
713 Schneidmesser I [Cutting Blade I];  likewise in the UK order - Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. 
714 Gesthuysen, "Der „Formstein”-Einwand."; Reimer, "Äquivalenz, Erfindungsgegenstand," 392-93. 
715 Formstein [Moulded Curbstone]. 
716 ibid., 800; Kraßer, Patentrecht, 736; Pagenberg, "New Trends in Patent Claim Interpretation in Germany - 
Good-bye to the "General Inventive Idea"," 788. 
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An equivalent use of an invention requires that the means of the solution of the 
alleged infringement are not identical with those protected by the patent at issue, 
but coincide in their technical function, i.e. reach substantially the same effect. 
(…) the alleged infringement in spite of the same problem, is not based on the 
patented solution principle.717 
The reference point remains the evaluation of an average person skilled in the art, who determines 
whether the given embodiment falls within the scope of equivalence and whether an alleged 
infringement can be deemed as obvious from the prior art without any inventive efforts.718 The 
defence works under two conditions: the embodiment does not literally correspond to the 
invention and represents an equivalent variation (äquivalente Abwandlung).719 
The Formstein objection may partially question the validity of a patent if a person skilled in the art 
finds the missing inventiveness or novelty of the patented solution at suit720; however, the 
Formstein defence does not serve to revoke the patent, but rather, to determine whether the 
claimed element was anticipatable in light of the state of the art.721 The intention of BGH was not 
to combine the infringement and nullity proceedings and, in consequence, to shift the competence 
of the patent court on patent re-examination to the civil court. The Formstein objection is 
exclusively concerned with the equivalency of the infringing element and deals with the re-
definition of the protection scope, but not the accompanying validity standards.722  
In Schneidermesser723, the Court specified the elements of the equivalency examination process. 
Equivalency is ruled if: 
1) the deviating embodiment solves the problem underlying the invention by means which, 
although modified, objectively have the same effect; 
2) a person skilled in the art is capable of finding the modified means as having the same 
effect; 
3) a person skilled in the art recognises the deviating embodiment and the modified means as 
an equivalent solution in light of the technical teaching of the patent claims.724 
                                                          
717 Formstein [Moulded Curbstone], 798. 
718 "New Trends in Patent Claim Interpretation in Germany - Good-bye to the "General Inventive Idea"," 788. 
719 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 737; Rollstuhlfahrrad, LG Düsseldorf 21.12.1993 4 O 235/92, GRUR 1994, 509, 511; 
Grabinski, "„Schneidmesser” versus „Amgen”," 715-16. 
720 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 737; Rollstuhlfahrrad, 511; Grabinski, "„Schneidmesser” versus „Amgen”," 715-16; 
AIPPI, "Germany. Report Q175. The Role of Equivalents and Prosecution History  in Defining the Scope of 
Patent Protection." 
721 Kabeldurchfurhrung [Cable Duct], BGH 04.02.1997 - X ZR 74/94, IIC 1999, 558, 565-66. 
722 Eugen Popp, "Formstein-Einwand -reine Theorie?," GRUR (2009). 
723  Schneidmesser I, BGH 12. 3. 2002 - X ZR 168/00, GRUR 2002, 515. 
724 "Formstein-Einwand -reine Theorie?," 321-22; Christian von Drathen, "Patent Scope in English and 
German Law under the European Patent Convention 1973 and 2000," IIC (2008): 405. 
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Such considerations do not take place when determining the validity of the patent, which rests 
upon weighing the patented solution against the state of the art: its contribution, the level of 
departure from the existing knowledge, the quality of the problem-solution concept. In practical 
dimensions, the preparatory works and the delivered evidence might be much more similar 
between the two types of proceedings, and in certain aspects, they might be equal. Nonetheless, 
the argumentation lines depart from each other.725 
4.6.2.2 The United Kingdom: Gillette Defence – The Prior Art Defence 
In the UK doctrine, the scope of patent claims must remain rigid, i.e. the patentee cannot adjust 
them according to the strategy acquired in a certain case – the claims must be construed “before 
the defendant was borne”726. The doctrine does not accept the “full-blooded” doctrine of 
equivalents727 known in the US system; however, it does not reject the concept of equivalents 
outright. 
UK jurisprudence has developed a method of claim construction based on the patentee’s 
intentions. In the landmark decision, Catnic v. Hill&Smith, the Court formulated the purposive 
construction (the Catnic principle), which indicates that the patentee is given the ambit of a full 
protection (monopoly) as specified by the person skilled in the art who construes the claims in a 
manner intended by the patentee.728 
                                                          
725 Popp, "Formstein-Einwand -reine Theorie?." 
726 Nobel’s Explosives Co Ltd. v. Anderson [1984], 11 R.P.C. 519, 523. 
727 Understood as a “full-blooded” doctrine of equivalents. Leonard Hubert Hoffmann, "Patent Construction," 
GRUR (2006): 722. 
728 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., 242-43. 
 In Improver v. Remington the Court restructured the Catnic principle into three questions (steps), labelled 
later as “Improver”Questions, and re-named into “Protocol Questions”: 
 “(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? If yes, the 
variant is outside the claim. If no— 
 (2) Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material effect) have been obvious at the date of 
publication of the patent to a reader skilled in the art. If no, the variant is outside the claim. If 
yes— 
 (3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the language of the 
claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the primary meaning was an 
essential requirement of the invention. If yes, the variant is outside the claim.” 
 Improver Corporation v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., [1990] F.S.R. 181, 189-90. 
 Known also as Epilady case, it illustrates well the equivalents analysis according to Catnic principle. The 
case concerned a depilatory device under the brand name Epilady, which comprised of an electric motor 
in a hand-held housing with attached helical steel spring. The in fringing device (known as “Smooth and 
Silky”) replaced the metal spring with a rubber rod having the same effect of plucking hair out of the skin. 
The question was whether that rubber rod “was” a helical metal spring in light of language used in the 
patent claims at suit; whether the alleged infringement was covered by the language of the patent claims. 
The Court decided that the rubber rod id not infringed based on the following:  
1) a rubber rod had no material effect on the way the invention worked – it worked the same ways the 
helical spring; 
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The Court formulated the question-objective method (Lord Diplock’s three questions) with the aim 
of understanding whether the terms used by the patentee are meant literally or figuratively, which 
allows for the further inclusion (or non-inclusion) of certain variants.729 First, the question arises of 
when the embodiments under investigation have any material effect on the way the invention 
works. Second, this should be cleared “in the light of then-existing knowledge,” i.e. at the date of 
publication730. Afterwards, it must be considered whether the patentee intended to include (or 
exclude) minor variants in the meaning of the wording or phrase at issue. Figurative meaning 
significantly broadens the spectrum of potential forms, figures, and structures applied in the 
performance of an invention.731 
Although the Catnic principle was introduced in the Patent Act of 1949, it was also included later 
without hesitation in the Act of 1977.732 It also corresponds to Article 69 of EPC and Protocol, as it 
takes the same approach to construing patent claims.733 
Equivalence analysis underwent a thorough examination in Kirin-Amgen734, which concerned a 
completely new technology field that the Catnic principle has not been examined against to date: 
the production of erythropoietin by recombinant DNA technology. As far as the adopted 
interpretation model worked impeccably with “numbers, measures, figures, angels” it faced 
difficulties with words (or phrases), the conventional or broader meaning of which could not be 
decided upon. The Court pointed to the existence of cases in which questions about the meaning 
were not asked. The term used in the patent claims was as follows: “an exogenous DNA sequence 
coding for EPO was confronted with an endogenous DNA sequence for EPO.” The two terms – 
exogenous and endogenous – could obviously not be treated as variants of the conventional 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
2) it would have been obvious to an expert that the rubber rod would work in the same way;  
3) the expert would have understood from the patent that the patentee meant to confine his claim to a 
"helical spring,” in its primary meaning and not in a wide generic sense. 
729 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., 243. 
730 Ibid. 
 It is held that that the priority date should remain the reference point because: 1) an invention must 
already be novel and non-obvious at the time of the application; 2) a variant not having an effect upon the 
invention can be claimed obvious (“disclosed”) if it is obvious to a person skilled in the art at the point of 
patent application. 
 Niels Holder, "Exogenous Equals Endogenous? Claim Construction After the Amgen Decision," IIC (2006): 
667. 
731 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., 243. 
732 Improver Corporation v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., 190. 
 In 1994, the Court of Appeal rejected the Catnic principle and named it as perilous to the future patent 
certainty despite its wide recognition and application. This was followed by two decision bringing back 
pro-Catnic approach. See PLG v. Ardon, [1995] R.P.C. 287, 309; AssioDoman Multipack v. Mead, [1995] 
R.P.C. 321, 328-337; Beloit Technologies Inc. v. Valmet Paper Machinery Inc. (No.2) R.P.C. 705, 719-721, 
quoted in Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 130-31. 
733 Improver Corporation v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd., 190. 
734 Karin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marin Roussel Ltd., [2005] R.P.C. 9. 
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meaning. In effect, a certain level of generality must have been required in order to cluster them 
under the same method of making EPO. The Court consequently stated that the variants could not 
be derived from the words themselves by means of “loosening” their meaning, but instead must be 
conveyed by a skilled person who would interpret the other possible variants, retaining the level of 
generality as assumed by the patentee.735  
Against this complex background of claim interpretation and equivalent determination, the Gillette 
defence appears plain and simple (at least theoretically). The doctrine refers to a scenario in which 
the defendant proves that the act in question was known from prior art (and was therefore 
obvious) and prior publications. However, not only the validity of the patent, but also the 
equivalency of the infringing embodiment are at stake. The Gillette defence combines two aspects 
in one proceeding: first, it determines whether the embodiment falls within the scope of the 
protection, and second, if this is found to be true, whether the embodiment was easily conceivable 
in light of the prior art, which in turn may affect the validity of the patent itself. 
The findings upon equivalency are decisive for further argumentations: 
1) if the patent claims include the infringing embodiment, the Gillette defence may result in 
patent revocation and no infringement; 
2) if the infringing act remains outside the scope of the patent claim, no further validity 
examination is required – the patent remains valid, but there is no infringement. 
                                                          
735 ibid., 193-97; Holder, "Exogenous Equals Endogenous? Claim Construction After the Amgen Decision." 
 The amendments to the purposive approaches were later summarized in 11 points in Technip France SA, 
updated in Halliburton v. Smith. The list-summary facilitates the comprehension of the purposive 
approach and clarifies certain aspects: 
 1) Article 69 remains the “main governing provision”; 
 2) The terms of the claims constitute the basis of determining the ambit of patent protection. They must 
be interpreted contextually, i.e. within the context of descriptions and drawings, which serve as the 
background knowledge (the contextualisation); 
 3-5) Description and drawings serve the proper understanding of the inventor’s intention. In the case of 
ambiguity, they are looked upon as the source to clear all doubts. As the inventor may have many 
purposes, it is the general idea that counts; 
 6) The protocol is merely a guideline, the claim terms demarcate the patentee’s territory; 
 7) Limitations introduced by the patentee cannot be ignored. The protocol guidelines are of particular 
value when the meaning of words conveyed out of the context must be compared within the context. E.g., 
the phrase vertically in the Catnic case did not mean “geometrically vertical,” but “vertical enough to do 
the job”; 
 8) Words and phrases must be construed within the given context; 
 9) There is no need for a general doctrine of equivalents: this is because  that is the fair way of reading the 
claim in context; 
 10) Trivial and minor variants fall within the scope only when the claims are read in a fair way. It is not the 
effect of the doctrine of equivalents;  
 11) Pedantry and patents are incompatible. 
 Technip France SA's Patent, [2004] R.P.C. 46, 950-52; Halliburton Energy Services Inc. v. Smith 
International (North Sea) Ltd., [2006] R.P.C. 2, 55-56. 
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The defence derives from an old judgement rendered in 1913 – Gillette Safe Razor Co. v. Anglo-
American Trading Co. – in the case of which the defendant infringed on a safety razor patent, and 
claimed that the infringing item is almost identical to the one known from prior art. Gillette found 
itself in trouble and the Court enunciated a defence based on the conviction that: 
The defence that the alleged infringement was not novel at the date of the 
plaintiff’s latters patent is a good defence in law, and it would sometimes obviate 
the great length and expense of patent cases if the defendant could and would put 
forth his case in this form, and thus spare himself the trouble of demonstration on 
which horn of the well-known dilemma the plaintiff had impaled himself, invalidity 
or non-infringement.736 
The defence was construed on the constitutional patent law principle that no patent protection can 
be claimed once an idea was disclosed and in that manner become obvious and publicly available:  
It was still the law that any person was entitled to do that which was old, namely 
that which had been described in a prior published document, and be confident 
that he would not infringe the patent of another.737 
The standard of proof is very high; the defence directly targets the validity of the patent. Its 
complexity results from the fact that it combines claim construction in light of equivalency and 
certain aspects of validity. Its peculiarity rests upon the fact that it may revoke the patent on the 
grounds of obviousness and anticipation.738 The evidence must be flawless and unequivocal; 
otherwise, the efforts may be in vain and erroneous, like in the case of Hickman v. Andrews: 
There were inconsistencies in the defendants' evidence as to how the prototype of 
their product had come to be made. In addition, no contemporaneous 
corroborative material had been put forward by the defendants to support their 
evidence on this point. The balance of probabilities led to the conclusion that the 
defendants' product had originated from use having been made of knowledge of 
the plaintiffs' “Workmate”. Since the standard of proof in a “Gillette” defence was 
strict, the defendants had accordingly failed to make good this defence.739 
Like the Formstein defence, the Gillette defence demands scrupulous preparatory works and 
thorough analysis of strategies that would best support the objectives of the defendant. 
 
                                                          
736 Gillette Safty Razor Co. v. Anglo-American Trading Co., [1913] R.P.C. 465, 480. 
737 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. HN Norton & Co., Ltd., [1994] R.P.C. 1, 13; Windsurfing International 
Inc. v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 60. 
738 Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 341. 
739 Hickman v. Andrews, [1983] R.P.C. 147, 148. 
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4.6.2.3 The United States:  The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents 
The US jurisprudence formulated the doctrine of equivalents (DoE), which applies in scenarios in 
which an element “performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain 
the same results.”740 
DoE scrutinises three aspects of similarities – function, method, and results – to determine the 
degree of departure of the accused device from the patented one, i.e. whether differences between 
the two objects in question can be recognised as insubstantial. When ”the insubstantiality” is 
confirmed, the infringing embodiment falls within the scope of equivalents. This further indicates 
that the device is infringing when it covers every element of the patent claim (the all-element test), 
which limits the application of the doctrine. The doctrine does not affect embodiments directly 
based on prior art or disclosed in a patent description, but not claimed (the doctrine of “dedication 
to the public domain”). The purpose of the DoE is to compensate in some fashion for the natural 
constraints of patent drafting, as well as the constraints of language, which cannot foresee new 
forms and technological changes. However, it is not intended to restore the scope of protection 
once the patentee excluded certain forms during patent prosecution (prosecution history estoppel). 
One of the key decisions upon scope interpretation was the Markman case741, in which the 
Supreme Court recognised claim construction as a question of law that judges rule upon, and not a 
question of facts decided by the jury. In the aftermath of the decision, courts began to review 
infringement claims involving literal claim construction and the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents in summary judgements, in a Markman hearing (a pre-trial examination). 742 
As mentioned above, the doctrine has been usually asserted to the benefit of the patent owner.743 
Therefore, to maintain the balance of interests, and to limit, if necessary, the DoE, it was established 
that the doctrine could operate “in reverse”.744 
The reverse doctrine of equivalents (RDoE) absolves the infringement liability when the accused 
product appears to perform “the same function as the claimed invention” (i.e. represents a literal 
                                                          
740Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. Inc. et al., v Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, *607 (1950). 
741 Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc. , 517 U.S. 370(1996). 
742 John Allison and Mark Lemley, "The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents," Stanford Law 
Review 59, no. 4 (2007): 959-61, 77. 
743 The statistics prepared by Allison and Lemley clearly indicate that a small rate of cases on DoE was 
asserted in favour of the patentee, only 24% of studied cases. Authors indicate the Markman hearing as 
the cause of the decline. 
 See ibid. 
744 Mueller, Patent Law, 476. 
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infringement), but does it “in a modified and substantially different way.”745 In other words, based 
on the reading of patent claims, the accused device literally corresponds to the patented invention, 
but it has been modified to the extent that it appears to be a different invention altogether. 
The notion of the reverse doctrine of equivalents was first pronounced in Westinghouse v. 
Boyden746. The patent at issue concerned an automatic air brake mechanism used in trains, which 
was allegedly infringed on by defendants who manufactured and sold fluid-pressure brakes that 
sere similar to the patented invention. The Court did not find infringement since, the means used 
“were quite different and not equivalent of one another, though the function performed was the 
same.”747 It asserted that mere correspondence with elements of the patent did not suffice to state 
infringement: 
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his claims, but if the 
latter has so far changed the principle of the device that the claims of the patent, 
literally construed, have ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little 
subject to be adjudged an infringer (…), when he has done nothing in conflict with 
its spirit and intent.748 
RDoE finds its pronunciation in the words referring to Boyden’s ingenuity as an independent 
inventor who improved on the plaintiff’s patented solution by enriching it with elements that 
achieved the same functions, albeit in a more efficient and simple manner.749 
In Graver Tank v. Linder Air Products, the Court affirmed the infringement based on the doctrine of 
equivalents: “the infringing device performed substantially the same function and in substantially 
the same way obtained the same results”; but at the same time made an important reference to 
RDoE: 
The wholesome realism of the doctrine is not always applied in favour of a 
patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus, where a device is so far 
changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar 
function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal 
words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to [in reverse – 
author] restrict the claim and defeat the patentee's action for infringement.750 
                                                          
745 Harmon, Harmon on Patents, 151; Texas Instruments, Inc., v. United States, 846 F.2d 1369, *1371 ( 1988). 
 In light of the doctrine of equivalents, a device is deemed an equivalent “if it performs substantially the 
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.” See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. Inc. et 
al., v Linde Air Products Co., *608; Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, *125 (1878); Sanitary Refrigerator 
Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, *42 (1929). 
746 Westinghouse v. Boyden, 170 U.S. 537(1898). 
747 Charles F. Pigott, "Equivalents in Reverse," J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 48, no. 5 (1966): 294. 
748 Westinghouse v. Boyden, *568.  
749 ibid., *573. 
750 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. Inc. et al., v Linde Air Products Co., *608-09. 
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In the aftermath of Graver Tank, the Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. §112, which imposed requirements 
for “written description, enablement, definiteness, and mean-plus-function claims that are co-
extensive with the broadest possible reach of the RDoE.”751 
RDoE was also invoked in Scripps v. Genentech, which concerned an imitation of a complex protein. 
In reference to the RDoE, the defendant questioned scientific and evidential facts underlying the 
patent, but did not succeed in proving non-infringement. None of furnished evidence proved the 
infringing recombinant to be structurally and functionally different. In effect, the Court ruled 
infringement on the ground of the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit panel stressed, 
however, a pro-patent purpose behind RDoE in preventing the unwarranted extension of the claims 
beyond the fair scope of the patentee’s invention.752 Nonetheless, in Tate v. Interface, the Court 
clearly signalised that there was no single case where non-infringement was affirmed upon 
RDoE.753 
Proving non-infringement by the means of RDoE is very challenging – it requires that claims be read 
outside of their literal meaning in order to narrow down their construction.754 The RDoE can be 
invoked when claims appear more extensive then in the authorised disclosure. RDoE preserves the 
“validity of the claims in their original intended scope”755 and moderates the patentee's power over 
the invention. Thus, RDoE represents an important (but rarely applied) tool which intended to 
ensure that the patent system is capable of serving its public purposes. When nascent technologies 
wash away the soil under traditional patent protection, the preservation of the patent claims in the 
appropriate borders is of special concern. Biotechnological patents that cover product-by-process 
claims, like in Scripps v. Genentech, may concern the same products achieved through different 
substances and different mechanisms. The same applies to inventions concerning living organisms 
that undergo rapid modifications.756 The concept of RDoE could possibly be applied already during 
the patent prosecution stage. However, the patent office refrains from doing so and gives the 
broadest possible interpretation of the claim to avoid the rejection by anticipation or unsupported 
disclosure.757 Theoretically, the probability of applying RDoE increases when the claims are written 
broadly and in an ambiguous way, like in pioneer inventions, and when the patentee fails to provide 
                                                          
751 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc. , 279 F.3d 1357, *1368 (2002). 
752 Scripps Clinic v. Genentech, 927 F.2d 1565(1991); Texas Instruments, Inc., v. United States. 
753 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc. , *1368. 
754 Scenarios presented in Karl Bozicevic, "The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents in the World of Reverse 
Transcriptase," J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y  71, no. 353 (1989): 354-58. 
755 Texas Instruments, Inc., v. United States, *1371. 
756 Harmon, Harmon on Patents, 151; Bozicevic, "The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents in the World of Reverse 
Transcriptase," 367. E.g., (oncogene mouse) transgenic animal patent US 4,736,866. 
757 "The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents in the World of Reverse Transcriptase," 354-55. 
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sufficient evidence explaining the intentions embedded in patent claims.758 Practically, the 
application of RDoE does not guarantee that the Court finds non-infringement because the 
infringement might occur even if the RDoE narrows down the patent claims. 
 
4.6.2.4 Japan: The Fourth Criterion of the Equivalence Test 
The Japanese system does not provide any clear doctrine of non-equivalents. It had, however, 
developed a doctrine of equivalents comprising of five requirements, with the fourth criterion 
allowing for the defence of non-infringement. It works when the infringer proves that the claimed 
device does belong to the state of the art or can be easily anticipated therefrom (and contradicts 
the fourth requirement).  
The patent claims are the point of departure and the main indicator for the patent scope – the 
Japanese system does not deviate in that regard from international standards. The claims are 
supported by the patent specification (an abstract, drawings, and a detailed explanation). 
According to Article 36(6)(i) of the Patent Act, an invention for which a patent is sought should be 
stated in the detailed explanation of the invention. The scope of patent claims shall not be broader 
than the specification itself. Otherwise, the protection would be granted to an invention that was 
insufficiently disclosed. The IP High Court identified this principle as support requirement.759 Non-
compliance with the requirement results in an objection to or the invalidation of a patent. 
For a very long time, Japanese courts construed claims literally (and rarely departed from this 
approach): once no literal infringement was found, the infringement claim was rejected. Only when 
the fairness and clarity was in peril, the literal meaning was slightly stretched in order to cover the 
alleged infringement.760  
In the mid-1990s, the Courts lessened that rigid trend in favour of the greater flexibility of “the 
doctrine of equivalents.” 
                                                          
758 ibid., 356. 
759 The support requirement formulated in Polarizing Film (IP High Court (Grand Panel), 11 Nov. 2005, 1911 
Hanrei Jiho 48) stipulates that “the detailed explanation in the specification should be stated in a way that 
a person skilled in the art” could easily recognized how the claimed solution solves a certain technical 
problem. The compliance with the support requirement should be decided upon the comparison of the 
scope of claims with the detailed explanation – likewise in Examination Guidelines cited above. From 
Kazuyo Kadota, "Claims Support in Japanese Patent Law," IIC (2012): 333-37. 
760 Toshiko Takenaka, "The Doctrine of Equivalents in Japan," CASRIP Symposium Publication Series: 
Rethinking International Intellectual Property, no. 6 (2001): 125-26. 
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In 1996, the Osaka High Court rendered a judgement on the modified embodiment of a human 
tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA), in which it affirmed the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents within the general meaning of Article 70(1)761. The Court acknowledged that in certain 
cases the interpretation of patent claims cannot be limited to the literal wording, and that a certain 
level of flexibility must be introduced in order to safeguard appropriate patent protection.762 
Previously, Courts were reluctant to offer figurative interpretations due to the uncertainty of 
outcomes, but in the aforementioned case, the Court affirmed that “the establishment of 
equivalence also does not destroy the confidence of third parties in the scope of patent claims.”763 
However, it was not until the Ball Spline that the Supreme Court set forth conditions upon the 
applicability of the doctrine of equivalents.764 The patent at issue concerned “ball spline bearings 
for infinite sliding.” The alleged infringer made and sold bearings similar to those claimed in the 
invention. While Tokyo High Court found infringement, the Supreme Court dismissed it in the 
appeal and named the criteria under which an infringing device may fall within the scope of a 
patented invention. Equivalence can be affirmed if: 
1. an element in the accused product that differs from the claimed element is not an essential 
part of the invention, 
2. the allegedly infringing element achieves the same function and effect, and hence, the 
same objective as the claimed invention,  
3. a person skilled in the art could have easily anticipated the replacement at the time of 
production, 
4. the allegedly infringing device at the time of the patent application did not belong to the 
state of the art or could have been easily anticipated therefrom, 
5. in the course of patent application proceedings, the scope of the patent claims was not 
meant to exclude the allegedly infringing device.765 
The first criterion concerns the non-essentiality test: to what extent the non-similar part of the 
accused device represents a non-substantial part of the claimed invention.766 In Ball Spline, the 
Court defined an essential element as a key technical feature of the claimed invention constituting 
a basis to solve a unique problem stipulated in the invention.767 The distinction between essential 
                                                          
761 The technical scope of a patented invention shall be determined based upon the statements in the scope 
of claims attached to the application. 
762 T-PA 2, Osaka High Court 29.03.1996 Heisei 6(ne) 3292, IIC 1997, 391. 
763 ibid., 394. 
764 Ball Spline remains the sole source of the doctrine of equivalence. 
765 Junichi Yamazaki, Yasunori Ohtsuka, and Sakata Yasuhiro, "Recent IP High Court Decision Involving 
Infringment under Doctrine of Equivalents," Patents and Licensing (June 2010): 33; Ball Spline Bearing 3, 
Supreme Court 24.02.1998 AB-1997-5, IIC 1999, 443, 444. 
766 "Recent IP High Court Decision," 36. 
767 ibid., 34.  
 “Essentiality refers to the key technical idea of the claimed invention which supports the solution of the 
invention.” From Mohri, Maintenance, Replacement and Recycling, 103, footnote 454. 
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and non-essential elements provokes understandable reservations. As reported, 70% of cases on 
equivalent infringement were denied for non-compliance with this requirement.768 The non-
essentiality test may lead to divergent results when comparing various prior art references. 
Another shortcoming of this approach is bias (and surprising), or the favouring of minor inventions 
that gain a greater ambit of equivalents over pioneer inventions that have fewer equivalents, but 
which have a greater number of essential elements.769 
The second criterion, replaceability, assumes that the differing element shall have no effect upon 
the objective of the patented invention: its purpose and results. 
According to the third requirement, the element should be easily conceived by the expertise of a 
person skilled in the art at the time of production or exploitation. The time reference is crucial 
because the patent protection changes with time: it differs between the priority date and the date 
of manufacturing. The patent claims remain unchanged, but their construction evolves as 
technology and language develop – the patentee cannot predict all possible and future 
applications. Hence, when the Supreme Court introduced variability at the time of production, it 
stretched the scope of patent protection over forms that emerged after the patent application.770  
The fourth requirement resembles the German Formstein defence and stipulates that the accused 
product cannot be obvious from the prior art at the time of filing the patent application. The 
infringing equivalent must meet the requirement of non-obviousness and fall within the ambit of 
the invention as a similarly innovative solution. The defendant must prove “in reverse” that the 
accused device was obvious and easily conceivable based on the prior art, and that it was not 
inventive. If this approach succeeds, the patented solution might be challenged on the grounds of 
the lack of novelty and non-obviousness.771 
The fifth requirement excludes the doctrine of equivalents when an element has been intentionally 
removed from the scope of the patent during the patent prosecution, comprising the so-called filed 
wrapped estoppel.772 This may occur when the applicant wanted to avoid rejection for insufficient 
novelty or inventive step by narrowing the claim and excluding certain prior art for the 
                                                          
768 Yamazaki, Ohtsuka, and Yasuhiro, "Recent IP High Court Decision," 34-36. 
769 Takenaka, "The Doctrine of Equivalents in Japan," 131. 
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aforementioned purposes.773 Japanese Courts seldom reject the claim for not complying with this 
requirement.774 
As reported, in the 10-year-period after Ball Spline only in 17 decisions did the courts find 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.775 Japanese courts have established a clever 
practice when dealing with equivalents: they start the analysis by determining the second and third 
requirements in order to constitute a merits-related grounding that is later applied to deal with the 
first requirement. When addressing the essentiality-test, they define elements that are not 
essential, and not the elements that are non-essential.776 
The defendant must prove that the accused product does not comply with any of the five 
requirements – with the Formstein-like requirement being of special concern.777 
                                                          
773 Takenaka, "The Doctrine of Equivalents in Japan," 128-30. 
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4.7 Patent Exceptions Which Could Prove Beneficial for Makers 
4.7.1 Patent Exceptions Incompatible with Making 
A group of flexibilities does not correspond with the conditions of making, as they serve different 
purposes than making itself. The exception for preparation of a medicine, the exception concerning 
permissible conducts on vessels, and aircraft, as well as permissible conducts for agricultural 
purposes, do not find a place in the adopted making scenario – no maker would be able to make a 
use of them. The same concerns the exhaustion rule pursuant to Article 10 of the 98/44/EC 
Directive. The “extensions” of experimental use exception, such as Bolar exception and plant variety 
exception, are not helpful for regular makers, since they do not operate in those fields. 
Admittedly, the expanding do-it-yourself bio (DIYbio) movement is opening a new era in making and 
patent exception use: in many biohackerspaces, various activities involve genetic engineering and 
reverse engineering on actual organisms. Nonetheless, exceptions applicable for biotechnological 
patents refer to activities that demand advanced facilities, resources, and time. While the latter is 
not an obstacle in regular hardware and software making, the first two are obstacles indeed. 
The UPC Agreement introduces an exception for computer programs for the purposes of 
interoperability. Its current form does not resonate with the needs of free making, where tinkering 
with software and hardware represents a baseline for many projects (see Arduino). First, makers 
work with and on open source programs. Second, the scope of provisions remains narrow: it merely 
concerns the part of the source code which is inaccessible, albeit required in creating interfaces. 
The entitled subject is required to either be a licensee or another authorized person, and the 
information obtained should solely serve the purpose of interoperability in order to be 
disseminated. Launching any interoperability works in the first place requires obtaining a license, 
which may involve a very high cost. The communal character of making and its varied organizational 
structures represent another hurdle in this regard. The exception does not work in the context of a 
free software environment, since it was intended to control the process of creating interfaces which 
are inevitable in software-based industries and markets. Finally, yet importantly, the interoperability 
exception for patents only spell troubles. 
The defence of non-equivalence does not assist makers in their daily routine, as it does not create a 
space which would be free from patents. As the name itself indicates, the concept of non-
equivalents serves as a defensive measure against claims of patent infringement. For this reason, 
knowledge on and an understanding of the mechanism in determining the patent scope and 
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extension over equivalents might be helpful for makers who deal with patents in their workings and 
attempt to determine their meaning, like in the EFF program to keep the 3D printing free from 
patents.778 To reiterate, regardless of the specific defence, whether Formstein, Gillette, or RDoE, 
makers still lack the ex ante freedom to operate, but are nonetheless supported in clarifying the 
borders of patent exclusivity in intensively patent-rich fields. 
 
4.7.2 Patent Exceptions (Partially) Compatible with Making 
4.7.2.1 Private and Non-commercial Use 
The private and non-commercial use exception is an appealing option for makers when we consider 
the following scenario: (1) a maker starts making without any business motivation and (2) keeps 
working without revealing the idea to others (in the adverbial basement or garage). The 
requirements of the provision are complementary and cannot be considered individually. Thus, as 
long as making remains within the border of private and personal use and without any indication of 
commercial application, the exception is applicable. 
Continuing the story: the instant the idea (e.g., how to improve a device or how to add to it a new 
functionality) is disseminated among friends and neighbours (now a group of makers), making loses 
its pure private and personal character and the exception cannot be invoked. 
According to the letter of law, the use must literally stay behind “the walls” – patents are 
instruments of public use and intended to control the use of the patented solution in the public 
sphere. Even when the idea is shared and appreciated among other individuals, who themselves do 
not generate any profit from making, its sharing nonetheless represents an unauthorised public use 
over the patented idea and is forbidden by law (indirect infringement or inducement to infringe). 
Such public use may “grab” the power away from the patent holder by taking away a part of the 
market. For example, when a maker produces a high-tech gadget, the price of which solely covers 
the material expenses, not earning its creator even a penny, he or she still creates competition for 
the patent holder, who has had his or her privilege granted with a patent (to exclude third parties 
from using, manufacturing, offering to sell, or selling the solution) infringed. If the maker starts 
making a profit from the sale of the gadget, referring to the exception is out of the question – the 
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use is both public and commercial. As we know, making may result in commercialization (see 
Adafruit products), because hobby and commerce are not far from each other.779  
The legal construction of the exception permits uses for private and individual purposes. Each 
situation in which the borders are blurred calls the exception into question, since the information 
might leak into the public sphere. In conclusion, a private and non-commercial use exception cannot 
actively protect makers who share their ideas (a fundamental concept of making) and are engaged 
in community workings.  
 
4.7.2.2 Experimental Use 
The space left by the private use exception is filled by the experimental use. Conceived to facilitate 
acts performed with the intention of gaining new information on and an understanding of the 
patented substance (product), it corresponds with the profile of making and, in addition, allows 
public activities. 
The scope of the exception differs among jurisdictions. The US doctrine represents its conservative 
wing and accepts acts done “solely for amusement or to satisfy idle curiosity or for a strictly 
philosophical inquiry” – which is exactly what makers do. Activities with the slightest commercial 
implication do not fall within the scope of US experimental use. The German approach, along with 
its UK counterpart, is more liberal, since it recognizes the commercial motivation behind 
experimental conducts as long as experiments and tests serve the purpose of expanding knowledge. 
Although this generous interpretation has been articulated in decisions relating to pharmaceutical 
products, the experimental use exception as a general norm embraces all fields, e.g. hardware 
engineering, pharmaceuticals, or biotechnology, on a non-discriminatory basis. Nonetheless, it 
might be questioned whether the same approach would be manifested in non-pharma-related 
cases. Biotechnological and pharmaceutical sectors are, for obvious reasons, privileged. Even the US 
courts have accepted the commercial background of experiments in these fields. The Bolar case 
illustrates this matter very well. Though judged against a generic company invoking the 
experimental use exception, the case initiated many changes on a global scale and demonstrated 
that the objective of fluent drug supply and fair market relations could not be achieved without 
additional measures. The need for a wider interpretation of the experimental use exception in this 
particular scenario was evident and led to further legislative steps, namely the construction of the 
Bolar exception. 
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The classic experimental use exception permits reverse engineering, measuring, and experimenting 
on the patented substance, with the aim of measuring its feasibility and utility; but does not permit 
acts which move toward manufacturing. This means that any further works require a license. In 
terms of quantity, the exception allows operations on small samples and, inferring from the case 
law, conducted in one specific place (e.g. a laboratory). In terms of objectives, it serves two main 
goals: 1) the pursuit of scientific knowledge, and 2) determining the adequacy and validity of the 
patent information – exactly what is done in many makerspaces and biohackerspaces. 
Making includes testing, measuring, and experimenting, but this is not its full spectrum – it also 
covers mixing, adding new elements, and changing a certain portion of elements. In the present 
form, the exception covers only a small portion of making activities and requires a careful and exact 
application that partially addresses the making scenario. Moreover, with open sharing of ideas 
projects (prototypes) are being tested and re-made globally in various maker community at the 
same time – this is much more than experimenting in one specific place. 
In addition, the already strict US doctrine fortified the exception with the notion of a legitimate 
interest. What would the legitimate interest be in case of makers? 
Based on the case law, a legitimate interest pertains to the business profile of a company or 
institution in question. For example, the legitimate interest of the US defence department is 
defence, and hence includes the testing of military helicopters. The interest of a university is 
education and attracting students to collect tuitions. In this light, the interest of maker communities 
is attracting more participants to work on projects that might (but do not have to) change into 
marketable products, educating a larger number of people, bringing joy, and making people happy. 
Makerspaces works like gyms in which you need a (paid) membership to use the equipment – the 
fee covers the operational expenses. Could the concept of a legitimate business (understood as 
commercial implications) go to such extremes as to cover making activities? The affirmative answer 
cannot be excluded. 
The fact that the experimental use exception only partially complies with making activities 
corresponds with the declining quality of patents in terms of novelty and non-obviousness. This 
leads to the relative easiness of comprehension in regard to the patented technical teaching, which, 
consequently, is detrimental to the significance of the exception: its core idea and functionality. 
Substantially speaking, there is very little substance to experiment on when it comes to poor-quality 
patents. 
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4.7.2.3 Prior Use 
As was posted on the RepRap forum: “Go check any DIY, makers website and I bet you find a patent 
for ANY item described there.”780 This ironic statement indicates two things: the novelty-destructive 
character of the makers’ internet publications and posts, and the importance of prior user privilege 
once “a patent is found.” In regard to the latter, prior use is compatible with making under specific 
circumstances which makes it inapplicable to the adopted model of making. 
The prior use privilege protects the legitimate possession and its economic status against 
destruction by the subsequent application of a third party. It applies to commercial activities or 
serious preparatory works and serves the protection of investment; in principle, it protects trade 
secrecy. When translated into making, the privilege would support makers when their works are at 
an advanced stage (close to commercialisation) and then patented by a third party. 
When it comes to court investigation of the prior use right, the stakes parties play for are high – the 
evidence they deliver must be unequivocal, impeccable, and flawless. Otherwise, the alleged prior 
user risks the accusation of patent infringement (by the preponderance of infringement-
indications); and the patentee – of trade secrecy theft. But because makers’ projects are well 
documented and supervised in principle, it is safe to assume that the evidence requirement can be 
met without much difficulty. 
The preparations, i.e. conceptualization, testing, and prototyping, are often made within a 
community (see Makerbot established by Bre Pitts after leaving the RepRap community). A question 
arises of whether community collaboration could be recognised as serious preparations before 
establishing a start-up. Should this be the case, the next question pertains to the public circulation 
of an idea prior to the application of a patent, and the validity of the latter (though prior use as such 
does not invalidate prior art). 
Secrecy does not constitute a distinguishing feature of making behaviour, which is based mainly 
around sharing and communal working. Secrecy is considered only if certain pieces of information 
are not disclosed. Let us assume the following scenario – an individual maker develops a solution 
that gains a marketable form, and wishes to commercialise it. To collect the necessary starting 
capital, the maker launches a project on one of the many crowdfunding platforms (like Kickstarter 
or Indigogo), where the project must be presented and promoted to gather the funding. Trade 
secrecy might be questionable, unless it concerns methods, or processes undisclosed in the 
                                                          
780 RepRap Forum, smartfriendz, November 26, 2013 03:52PM. 
173 
 
promotional presentation. In the latter case, the prior use privilege can protect the commercial 
maker. 
The prior user right addresses a very specific scenario which deviates substantially from classic 
making conduct – a successful individual innovator establishing a start-up while keeping technology-
relevant information secret. The scenario runs against the communitarian ethics of makers. 
Furthermore, the objective of the prior use, i.e. the protection of investment and trade secrecy 
within a company, marginally corresponds with the needs of makers and maker communities. Once 
the privilege is asserted by a court, it applies solely to one particular enterprise (a party in the court 
proceeding), but the community is left “blocked” by a granted patent. In that regard, prior use 
represents a defensive measure, but not the ultimate goal, which is in such case the invalidation of 
a given patent with the aim of keeping the field free from any legal encumbrances. 
 
4.7.2.4 Repair Doctrine 
The repair doctrine could serve as protection for makers only under very specific conditions. The 
doctrine is vague, hard to comprehend, and requires single-case analysis. And while certain 
guidelines can be extracted from the case law, accurate examination demands a profound 
understanding of patent claims and the protection scope. Therefore, due to the high level of 
uncertainty, the doctrine remains a less appealing option to lean on. 
Furthermore, the scope of lawful repair remains narrow. It allows for the replacement of a worn-out 
element that does not change the identity of an invention, but merely restores the normal utility of 
a device. That approach is common in all of the analysed systems. The US doctrine also permits 
conducts “akin to” repair, but this exemption pertains solely to the modification of unpatented 
elements. 
Making, meanwhile, has become much more advanced and has left the safe harbour of permissible 
repair. Not only do makers replace broken parts, but also enhance and modify products. One 
additional aspect deserves consideration, namely the phenomenon of the home 3D printing of 
required parts – “a home-made indirect infringement.” Desktop 3D printing builds competition for 
the suppliers of replaceable parts. Makers can manufacture parts at home (for themselves and for 
friends). As long as repairs remain within lawful borders, homemade parts are acceptable. If further 
enhancements and replacements remain unnoticed, they do not attract much trouble. However, 
makers like to share. Some solutions that gain attention and appreciation are further improved 
upon. As they become popular and successful, patent holders might target the makers. The repair 
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doctrine would not be much helpful in such situations (neither would it be feasible to squeeze such 
“viral” workings into the experimental use exception). 
Certainly, the repair doctrine is inevitable in the system and everyone intuitively understands its 
significance. However, legal considerations make its usefulness more challenging. To apply the 
lawful dose of repair, it is necessary to become familiar with patent claims, as well as consider the 
essentiality of the replaced elements and their contributions to the technical teaching. Marking of a 
patented article by fixing the patent number onto the article or its package helps in increasing the 
awareness of embedded patents; however, reading patent claims to determine the scope of 
permissible changes represents a huge challenge in terms of the required legal knowledge. Finally, 
yet importantly, who would think of reading patent(s) before repairing a device? 
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Chapter 5. PATENT COMPULSORY LICENSING 
This chapter focuses solely on patent-related aspects of compulsory licensing (CL), and does not 
investigate the anti-competitive factors that the misuse of patent exclusivity might involve. Not 
every refusal to license and not every aggressive negotiating position of a patent holder is anti-
competitive in terms of competition law. 
The following analysis of grounds for patCL in examined jurisdictions presents the diverse 
ways in which this mechanism is structured. Each subsection on a specific national compulsory 
licensing scheme follows the same pattern, and consists of a general presentation of norms, the 
applicable criteria, and the practice of granting CLs. Attention was given primarily to the 
substantive aspects of compulsory licensing, with additional short insights into procedural matters. 
Considering the economic significance and political impact of compulsory licensing, its practical 
dimension builds a crucial reference point when applying circumstances of patCL in the context of 
makers. 
 
5.1 The TRIPS Agreement as the International Foundation for Compulsory 
Licensing 
A patent compulsory license (patCL) is a countervailing instrument with a long historical record, 
adopted in almost all patent systems worldwide. Unlike a classic voluntary patent license, in which 
a patentee voluntarily enters into a license agreement, a compulsory license is concluded without 
the patentee’s authorisation by the power of an administrative or judicial decision that restrains 
the exclusive right conferred with a patent. 
In terms of international codification, compulsory licensing was introduced in Article 5.A.2 of the 
Paris Convention781 as a measure against the insufficient working or a failure to work a patent. 
Currently, the TRIPS Agreement (in reference to the Paris Convention) construes a legal framework 
for granting compulsory licenses and lists other eligible circumstances. Notably, the term 
compulsory licence as such does not appear in any of the TRIPS provisions; but functionally it is 
conceived in Article 31, which lays down this measure along with the grounds and terms for its 
awarding782. Next to Article 30, Article 31 can be recognised as a patent flexibility and a supplement 
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to limitations of patent rights.783 It was not a novel mechanism, but a synthesis of circumstances 
and grounds upon which a compulsory license had traditionally been granted upon. 
The primary goal of patCL is to re-establish the balance of interests when access to patented goods 
is hindered by the malpractice of the patent holder. While the idea itself is plain and simple, its 
implementation is complicated: a patCL is a forceful instrument which tempers patent monopoly, 
and for that reason it must be employed wisely, which in practice translates into scarcely. To this 
end, the CL mechanism has been fortified with a number of conditions, such as public interest, 
economic significance of a patented solution, to avoid the abuse of this instrument.  
Some scholars classify CL as a trade-restricting regulation784, which in the author’s own opinion 
contradicts the primary goal of CL, i.e. enabling the use of a patented invention, safeguarding the 
access to the solution and, ultimately, safeguarding product variety on the market. In practical 
terms, owing to the stringent requirements for issuing a CL, the limitation of patent exclusivity 
resulting therefrom occurs in “special” cases, which mainly concern governmental uses. As a rule, 
private parties refrain from resorting to this measure. 
The TRIPS Agreement delivers guidelines on the issuance of a patCL: there is no golden rule, each 
case must be determined individually, and countries (theoretically) enjoy full discretion in regard to 
defining the conditions and circumstances for compulsory licensing. Article 31 merely names the 
conditions, like anti-competitive practices, national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, public non-commercial uses, and cases of dependent invention, when patCL comes into 
question, and indicates that every request and procedure underlies judicial examination.785 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
  Failure to work or  the insufficient working of a patent is not covered explicitly in the TRIPS Agreement, 
but remains under the jurisdiction of the Paris Convention in Article 5.A.2. Moreover, during the TRIPS 
negotiations, countries recognised importation as a sufficient use of patents. To that end, the Agreement 
solves this issue by proclaiming in Article 27 “patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable 
without discrimination (…) whether products are imported or locally produced.”  In addition, the TRIPS 
Agreement does not derogate the older regulations - Article 2states that Parts I to IV of the Agreement 
must comply with obligations Members have under the Paris, Berne and Rome conventions. 
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5.1.1 General Criteria of Article 31 TRIPS 
1) Individual Merits – Section (a) 
Each patCL request must concern a particular product and a specific patent holder, and underlie a 
thorough material and procedural judicial examination. This requirement hinders granting 
“blanket” patCL, approved e.g. for a whole technology field or for a group of patentees.786 To 
reiterate, patent exclusivity is given special consideration, and therefore any endeavour to limit its 
scope is strictly scrutinized, especially when it takes the form of a compulsory license. 
2) Patentee Protection – Sections (b, h, i-j) 
All conditions on patCL prosecution safeguard the rightful assessment of circumstances underlying 
a CL-request to avoid an unlawful curtailment of patent rights. A patCL should be recognised as a 
measure of last resort to “enforce” a user right upon a blocked patented solution. To that end, a 
group of criteria serves the protection of the patent holder and regulates the indemnification of the 
“compulsory” loss in the patent exclusivity: 
a) Unsuccessful Prior Negotiations – Section (b) 
Unsuccessful prior license negotiations on reasonable commercial terms and within a reasonable 
time must predate every patCL application. In that regard, a license-seeker must prove to have 
undertaken credible attempts at acquiring a license: a single one-time attempt does not suffice to 
justify the request, as the right to refuse a license and to choose a licensee builds the core of patent 
exclusivity. Continuous refusals on the side of the patent owner reflect not only an unwillingness to 
conclude a license agreement, but also constitutes anti-competitive behaviour directed at the 
patentee.787 What the term reasonable objectively means, remains uncertain and undefined; its 
factual meaning can be ascertained only based on case-by-case analysis.788 
The requirement of prior negotiations might be waived in situations of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, as well as in situations of public non-commercial uses. The TRIPS 
Agreement, however, does not define those terms either; it devolves the competency in this matter 
to particular countries, which determine these notions at their own discretion.789 In fact, the Doha 
Declaration indicates that a national emergency or urgency relate to public health crises like 
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HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics790; however (and unfortunately), the list does 
not exhaust all possibilities. Some commentators suggest that in the future the waiver might also 
cover environmental issues.791 
The waiver of prior negotiations applies in the field of semiconductors. Although, the TRIPS 
Agreement as a principle remains non-discriminatory towards technologies, integrated-circuit 
technology is the sole exception.792 Accordingly, Article 31 of Section (c) names this technology and 
relinquishes the requirement of prior negotiations for non-commercial uses or in cases of anti-
competitive practices.793 
b) Adequate Remuneration – Section (h) 
The rightsholder must obtain reasonable and adequate compensation, which should correlate with 
the ordinary license depending on various factors: the type of inventions, its quality, 
innovativeness, but also the market size. In case of anti-competitive practices, the level of 
remuneration might be lower than the normal market price.794 Once again, the TRIPS Agreement 
leaves the vague term adequacy without any further clarification.795 
c) Judicial Review – Sections (i-j) 
All aspects of compulsory licensing, i.e. its scope, duration, remuneration, and validity, must pass 
judicial scrutiny by a court or another responsible authority. This safeguards the objective and 
factual assessment of the circumstances of a patCL request. 
3) Scope and Duration – Sections (f - g) 
In regard to the scope of patCL, Section (f) stipulates that a compulsory license applies solely to the 
purpose for which it was granted, e.g. to produce a given patented solution, and may concern only 
certain patent claims or a single patent application. In practical terms, the objective of patCL is to 
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ensure supply on the domestic market via either importation or production within the requesting 
country.796 
 This requirement (still) constitutes an enormous challenge for countries which lack 
sufficient manufacturing capacities, or do not have them to begin with. This corresponds with the 
situation of many developing countries, which are affected by diverse public health crises. In 
practice, this criterion has translated into blocking the export of generics to affected countries. 
Although exportation as such was not excluded from the list of permissible acts falling under a 
compulsory license, it was accepted only if the country with a CL to manufacture pharmaceuticals, 
invoked an equivalent CL to export the medicines.797 Subsequent declarations and documents798 
narrowed this restriction down to facilitate the management of the public health crisis. 
Nonetheless, exportation as such is not the main function of a compulsory license.799 
With regard to the duration (Section (g)), a compulsory license stays in force as long as the grounds 
for its granting exist, and ends when the objective can no longer be longer justified. A competent 
authority must review those circumstances (and the changes) and verify the legitimacy of the 
decision. 
4) General Licensing Terms – Sections (c-e) 
A patCL is non-exclusive and non-assignable (with the exception of the transfer of an enterprise and 
goodwill). Its non-discriminatory character is evidenced in awarding compulsory licensing only upon 
individual requests that concern a specific product and the patent owner. As mentioned before, in 
the case of semi-conductor technology, compulsory licensing is granted for public non-commercial 
use or as a remedy against anti-competitive practices.  
5) Anti-competitive Practice – Section (k) 
First and foremost, a patCL prevents the abuse of patent exclusivity, which might be pronounced as 
anti-competitive. In such circumstance, the requirements of “prior negotiations and supply of 
domestic market,” do not apply. This, however, does not mean that Article 31(k) facilitates the 
granting of a patent compulsory license. On the contrary, it sets higher requirements than an anti-
trust compulsory license: a competent authority must decide in the course of judicial or 
                                                          
796 Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, 392. 
797 Duncan Matthews, "WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?," Journal of 
International Economic Law 7, no. 1 (2004): 78. 
798 See the following part: Access to medicine – Doha Declaration and Article 31bis. 
799  Guy Tritton, Richard Davis, and et al., Intellectual Property in Europe (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), 
64; Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, 390-91. 
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administrative proceedings whether the claimed practice is or is not anti-competitive800, and 
whether it complies with the further conditions of Article 31.801 
6) Dependent Patents – Section (l) 
Obtaining a compulsory license for a dependent patent is possible only if the patent presents a 
significant technical improvement of considerable economic benefit.802 As reciprocation, the first 
inventor must receive a cross-license to utilize the invention of the second patent.  
 
5.1.2 Access to Medicine – Doha Declaration and Article 31 bis 
Patent compulsory licensing became the central issue of a heated debate on the access to medicine 
in less developed countries that recognise a patCL as an effective measure to supply domestic 
markets with affordable generic pharmaceuticals inevitable in combating deadly epidemics. 
In the opinion of many, by lifting the prices to unaffordable levels, patent protection constitutes an 
enormous impediment in distribution of pharmaceuticals in developing countries.803 Civil groups 
and governments of developing countries launched intensive campaigns targeted first at loosening 
the grip on IP protection, which were then followed with a series of discussions and resolutions of 
the WHO.804 In the aftermath of a controversial South African legislative challenge805, the milestone 
                                                          
800 Member States freely decide upon the nature of anti-competitive practice. Munoz Tellez, "Dispute 
Settlement under the TRIPS Agreement: the United States-Brazil (2000) and United States-Argentina 
(2002) Patent Disputes," 219. 
801 Henrik Meinberg, Zwangslizenz im Patent- und Urheberrecht als Instrument der kartellrechtlichen 
Missbrauchsaufischt im deutschen und europäischen Recht  (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2006), 63. 
802 Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, 394. 
803 IP protection builds only a part of the total cost of medicines. Taxes, distribution costs (which are very 
high in DC), transfer prices, operation costs contribute as well. Moreover, the general market situation, 
insufficient infrastructure, a weak health insurance system, and the poverty of people who are unable to 
afford the needed medicines, complete that sad picture. In the situation of a failing public market, which 
otherwise would allow preferential prices in increasing demand, pharmaceutical companies resort to a 
“cherry picking” strategy, in which prices are determined according to the very narrow wealthy class, and 
are hence set on the same level as in the developed countries. See  Yamane, Interpreting TRIPS, Part III 
'Access to medicine" p. 264-342; A. Attaran and L. Gillespie-White, "Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs 
Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment an Africa?," JAMA 286, no. 15 (2001); See also R. Beall and R. Kuhn, 
"Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis," 
PLoS Med 9, no. 1 (2012); Matthews, "WTO decision." 
804 Yamane, Interpreting TRIPS, 292-93. 
805 In 2001, South Africa enacted CL that allowed local manufacturers to produce drugs against AIDS and 
import them from neighbouring countries for affordable prices. The patent owners –  European and US 
pharmaceutical companies – argued that the decision violated international patent law, as it was 
undertaken without prior negotiations, with no compensation promise, and without proving any patent 
abuse – the companies withdrew the suit eventually. Although South Africa commenced the international 
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Doha Declaration responded to growing concerns on the implications of the TRIPS Agreement for 
the access to medicine.806 The Declaration granted countries wide discretion and flexibility in 
issuing CL, including the legal ground and the remuneration mechanisms. Paragraph 6 of the 
Declaration addressed the problem of the inapplicability of Article 31(f)807 of TRIPS in countries with 
weak or no manufacturing capacities, compelled to import generic drugs. The Declaration obliged 
the Members “to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report the General Council by 
the end of 2002.” 
That weakness of TRIPS was addressed later in Decision 2003808, which led to the Amendment of 
Article 31 (in Article 31bis).809 The Decision facilitates the management of public health crises in 
developing countries. It contains restrictions intended to prevent the misuse of rights, e.g. by non-
eligible Members, via the obligation of notification. It allows the export of pharmaceutical products 
to the least-developed Member States, which made an appropriate notification about their 
intention to use the system. The importing country should name the products and the quantities 
needed, and confirm that it has insufficient or no-manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical 
sector. (However, should the importing Member State develop such capacities, the system no 
longer applies). The exporting country must name the products, as well as and their required 
quantities, the target countries, and the duration. Re-export is forbidden. Although the Decision 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
dispute, only recently  has it undertaken measures to incorporate into its patent law a regulation on 
parallel import and compulsory licensing (according to the TRIPS standards). 
  Donald Harris, "TRIPs after Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory Licensing," J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 367, no. 18 (2010-2011): 384-86; Yamane, Interpreting TRIPS, 276; Ed Silverman, "South 
Africa embraces Compulsory Licensing over AIDS Crisis,"  http://www.pharmalive.com/south-africa-
embraces-compulsory-licensing-dueto-aids-crisis, accessed 13.11.2013; Matthews, "WTO decision," 78-
79. 
 806 Silverman, "South Africa embraces Compulsory Licensing over AIDS Crisis."; "As Pharma Eyes Patent 
Changes in South Africa, a Government Minister Cries 'Genocide',"  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edsilverman/2014/01/18/as-pharma-eyes-patent-changes-in-south-africa-
a-government-minister-cries-genocide/, accessed 31.01.2014. 
807 Supply on the domestic market. 
808 The 2003 Decision (WT/L/540) instructed the TRIPS Council to initiate by the end of 2003 workings on an 
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, with a view to its adoption within 6 months. In December 2005, the 
General Council with Decision 2005 (WT/L/641) agreed to amend the TRIPS Agreement by ”inserting 
Article 31 bis after Article 31 and by inserting the Annex to the TRIPS after Article 73”. The amendment 
would enter into force after its ratification by 2/3 of the WTO Members. Upon ratification, the 
amendment becomes immediately effective in the ratifying countries. Originally, the deadline was set for 
December 1, 2007, but the General Council extended it to December 1, 2009, and later – to December 31, 
2011. The waiver to the amendment will continue to apply until the remaining Members accept the 
amendment and takes it effect.  
  Yamane, Interpreting TRIPS, 318; "Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003," WT/L/540 and Corr. 1, 
1 September 2003. 
809  Harris, "TRIPs after Fifteen Years," 386. 
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names certain permitting circumstances, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other 
epidemics, the list is not exhaustive.810 
In 2005, WTO Members adopted an Amendment to Article 31 (Article 31bis), which enabled non-
manufacturing countries to import generic drugs from other countries without the fear of infringing 
patent rights under a domestic compulsory license.811 However, as long as the Amendment is not 
ratified, the provisions of the Decision 2003 apply.812 
Among various international attempts to solve this delicate and utterly important issue, the EU 
undertook decisive steps toward the harmonisation of legal procedures in this particular context, 
and adopted Regulation 816/2006813, which implements the conditions and requirements for 
releasing patCL for exportation, as stipulated in Decision 2003.814 The EU Member States were 
given the competence to determine administrative aspects such as language regime, the 
application form, the identification of patents, and supplementary certificates. 
 
5.1.3 Compulsory Licensing in Practice – the International Level 
Despite a relatively wide discretion in granting patCL in times of crisis, reality does not affirm the 
willingness to practice compulsory licensing, nor interest in the idea, even in countries where this 
measure would be beneficial.815 The perspective of repercussions and criticism from the counter-
parties is enough to deter potential beneficiaries from requesting this remedy. Additionally, such a 
time-consuming procedure (long negotiations) does not incite prompt action – even in the case of 
governmental orders, an immediate response in face of urgent needs is impossible.816 
A study by Beall and Kuhn on compulsory licenses granted between 1995-2011 shows that the 
Doha Declaration had a low impact on facilitating access to medicines. The issuance of patCL 
                                                          
810  Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, 398-400. 
811  Harris, "TRIPs after Fifteen Years," 386. 
812  Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, 397. 
813  "REGULATION (EC) No 816/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 May 2006 
on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to 
countries with public health problems," Official Journal of the European Union, L 157/1, 9.6.2006. 
814  Kraßer, Patentrecht, 832; "Compulsory Licensing System for the Production and Export of Generic 
Medicinal Products to Developing Countries,"  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/sectoral_development_policies/l21172_en.htm, 
accessed 30.01.2014. 
815  Beall and Kuhn, "Trends in Compulsory Licensing." 
816  The Canada-Rwanda case, where the involved parties decided to invoke the waiver of Article 31bis, 
illustrated the arduousness of the procedures, despite the alleged simplifications of the procedure. 
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skyrocketed in the short period of 2003-2005, owing to a torrent of social campaigns against rigid IP 
protection, only to decline after that period.817 
The analysis of CL cases demonstrates that their recognition depends to a large degree on the 
political and economic status of the requesting country. 
In 2006 and 2007, Thailand introduced a compulsory license to produce antiretroviral drugs that 
included drugs delivered by Merck and Abbott. In 2010, the CL was prolonged until the expiration 
of patents on the required drugs. That decision was met with the prompt reaction of the involved 
companies: Abbott held the introduction of new drugs into Thailand. Moreover, the United States 
placed Thailand in the Special 301 Report818 of countries that fail to provide an adequate level of IP 
protection or enforcement.819 
In contrast, Brazil’s requests for antiretroviral drugs were more successful. Initially, Brazil 
threatened to employ a CL to obtain a price reduction on Merck’s Efavirenz, and their attempt 
ended with considerable success. However, Brazil ordered a CL regardless, as generic drugs were 
still much cheaper than their original counterparts. The same solution worked in regard to other 
companies, e.g. Gliead reduced their prices by 50%.820 Brazil did not experience any burdensome 
consequences of its decision. 
The above illustration demonstrates that the functionality of patCL depends on a large degree on 
the political climate. Indisputably, the negotiation power of Brazil outstrips Thailand’s position. Due 
to its economic potential and resources (crucial for developed countries), Brazil can take care of its 
interests more victoriously than small Thailand, with its incomparably lower political and economic 
impact. 
Another drawback of the patCL scheme is the so-called red tape, which runs counter to even the 
best intentions, as it was in the case of the Canda-Rwanda CL request based on the waiver of Article 
31bis. The two countries intended to ship the generic medicine ApoTriAvir (AIDS drug), which was 
                                                          
817  Beall and Kuhn, "Trends in Compulsory Licensing." 
818  The Special 301 Report is an annual review of global IP protection measures adopted by countries which 
adversely affect the US companies and economy. It is prepared pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act 
of 1974. 
  Harris, "TRIPs after Fifteen Years," 386-87; International Intellectual Property Alliance IIPA, "Special 301,"  
http://www.iipa.com/special301.html, accessed 30.01.2014; U.S. Trade Representative, "USTR Releases 
Annual Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Rights," accessed 30.01.2014. 
819 As of 2015, Thailand has already been on the Special 301 Report for nine consecutive years, following the 
issuance of three compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals. 
 "US Keeps Thailand on Intellectual Rights Watch List," Bangkok Post, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/548239/us-keeps-thailand-on-intellectual-rights-watch-
list.html, accessed 07.05.2015.  
820 Harris, "TRIPs after Fifteen Years," 387-88. 
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to be delivered by Apotex Inc. Prior to this initiative, Canada implemented Canada’s Access to 
Medicine Regime to facilitate the transfer of medicines to less-developed countries. In spite of such 
measures, the whole operation took 6 years: from 2002 (initiation by Apotex to produce a new drug 
combination) to 2008 (two shipments); and was fraught with immense bureaucracy.821 Apotex was 
trapped in 2-year-long negotiations with patent holders: GlaxoSmithKline, Boehringer Ingelheim, 
and Shire BioChem Inc.. Eventually, the Canada Commissioner of Patents granted Apotex a license 
to use their patents to produce the drug. However, the Canadian government blamed Rwanda for 
the late notification to WTO about its desire to import the drug, since, once notified, it took Apotex 
15 days to obtain the necessary CLs. In other words, the national regulation worked as intended, 
but international regulation hindered the process by requiring “various notifications, packaging, 
labelling, and website tracking requirements.”822 The Canada-Rwanda case was a test on the ease 
of applying Article 31bis waiver, one which received rather poor notes: the process was too 
cumbersome for both parties involved. 
 
5.1.3.1 Recent Cases of Compulsory Licensing 
Recently, India has provoked a storm around patCL and itself became the subject of fierce criticism 
after issuing its first patent compulsory license. 
In March 2012, India granted a CL to Natco Pharma (an Indian generic company) on Bayer’s liver 
and kidney cancer drug Nexavar for 3% of the patented drug’s price in return for 6% royalties on 
sales to Bayer (which requested 15%). In effect, the price of the drug plunged from 280,000 (ca. 
$5,000) to 8,800 rupees (ca. $160).823 Bayer appealed the decision, but India’s Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board upheld it. The decision created widespread international resonance, with the 
USPTO criticising India over decreasing IP protection.824 
The decision reignited debates on access to medicine via compulsory licensing. The proponents of 
the decision underlined that it provided India's generic section with much more security and legal 
                                                          
821  ibid., 390-91; Apotex Inc., "Submission to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology 
Bill C-393; an Act to Amend the Patent Act (Drugs for International Humanitarian Purposes) and to Make a 
Consequential Amendment to Another Act,"  
http://www.apotex.com/global/docs/submission_order_en.pdf, accessed 15.11.2013. 
822 "TRIPS Council: Debate over Effectiveness of System for Access to Medicine,"  Bridges Weekly Trade News 
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823 Patralekha Chatterjee, "India's First Compulsory Licence Upheld, but Legal Fights Likely to Continue,"  
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certainty. The organization Medecins Sans Frontieres expressed its utmost satisfaction and urged 
Bayer “to address the reality that their prices are too high and not to appeal this decision. It is not 
the use of a compulsory licence that should be challenged, but the continued pursuit of excessively 
high profits over public health needs.”825 In reply, Bayer argued that poor services, and 
infrastructure, and not the patents themselves limit access to medicine.826 
In contrast, in 2013 India rejected two CL-requests: for Roche Trastuzumab (Herceptin; July) and for 
Bristol Meyer-Squibb’s Dasatinib (October). In both cases, the refusal was based on the non-
fulfilment of the formal criterion of prior negotiation. Some commented, however, that the 
decisions were the outcome of imposed international pressure.827 
Additionally, India’s government appointed a special panel to evaluate drugs for generic 
manufacturing against HIV, diabetes, and cancer. The Indian government strives to make medical 
treatment affordable and available to low-income citizens. The primary-drug companies like Merck 
& Co. and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. still question Indian IP policy, pointing to its detrimental impact 
on the innovation sector.828 
In 2013, the Republic of South Africa emerged again in the spectacle of compulsory licensing for 
lifesaving medicines. The government intended to implement rules facilitating the production of 
generics via compulsory licensing and parallel importation according to international agreements – 
a move made only a decade after its pioneering battle over AIDS drugs. The idea automatically 
sparked outrage among patent proprietors, who indicated that a weak IP system would deter the 
whole life science sector in the country (i.e. lower the investment rate), a development which might 
resonate in other countries. As a counter-measure, the companies: Merck, Alcon, Bayer, 
Boehringer-Ingelheim, Roche, and others, launched a lobbying campaign in favour of a strong IP 
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826 According to sources, Bayer’s import policy was as follows: in 2007, Bayer received approval to import and 
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system by delaying the finalization of the governmental program829. In 2014, almost 50,000 people 
worldwide signed a petition condemning the attempts of pharma companies to hinder the reform 
of South Africa’s patent system (a campaign launched in 2012 under the slogan “Fix the Patent 
Law”). Apart from the CL mechanism, the said reform concerns establishing substantive patent 
examination and strengthening the patentability criteria with the objective of slowing down the 
issuance of evergreen patents for pharmaceuticals and boosting competition in the generics sector. 
The Department of Trade and Industry announced the implementation of the reform from April 
2015. Further developments are to come.830  
Countries applying CL for vital public interests, such as public health and access to medicines at 
affordable prices, not only become subjects of strong criticism, but also face the threats of lower 
foreign investment and a decrease of R&D operations. The proponents of a “strong IP system” 
argue that solely a system of firm IP rights can ensure and support technological development. 
Allegedly, compulsory licensing destroys the image of the issuing country and creates an 
atmosphere of mistrust toward the IP system and among market players. 
In the author’s opinion, such claims appear disproportionated and unsuitable. Patent compulsory 
licences are issued extremely rarely and if they are issued in the first place (like in 2012 in India), 
they do not and cannot directly affect comprehensive trade relations with the issuing country and 
the development of its patent system. It is therefore difficult to acknowledge that a single issuance 
of a patent compulsory license for a particular product can do so much harm to the national 
industry. Every compulsory license is granted after a diligent and meticulous procedure examining 
all circumstances of the given request. In the case of governmental uses, which constitute the 
majority of granted CL, it is no exaggeration to say that patCL are instruments intended for drastic 
circumstances and should only be issued when such circumstances arise. 
Accusations against countries that apply the CL mechanism manifest the bad intentions of their 
authors, who repeat conventional statements of no technical progress without patents. If a certain 
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measure was constituted to counteract specific situations under specific conditions, and only in 
such conditions is it implemented, why so much panic and so many exaggerated statements? 
 
5.2 Germany 
5.2.1 The Norm 
Section 24 of the German Patent Act enumerates the conditions and requirements of granting a 
patCL. In 1998, the norm was adjusted to correspond with the TRIPS Agreement. Later in 2005, it 
adopted the Biopatent Directive831 with its provision on dependent patents. 
Initially, the Patent Act of 1911 did not envisage any similar measure. It introduced, however, an 
instrument with much more stringent repercussions, namely patent revocation. Obligatory licensing 
constituted a countermeasure to maintain the patent. The strict legal tool in question was not 
abandoned until in 1998.832 The current patent act remains in accordance with the international 
standards: the TRIPS Agreement (Articles 27 and 31), the Paris Convention (Article 5A (2)), and the 
EU law. 
The examination of CL requests rests within the competencies of the Federal Patent Court, which 
renders decisions based on the individual merits of each case. The law only provides grounds for 
justifying the use of a CL; the proper trade-off of interests follows the general rule of law and 
reason.833 
The procedure for granting a CL follows the rules of the patent nullity procedure provided 
in Sections 81-85 of the Patent Act. The Patent Court renders a judgement as the first instance834, 
which might be subsequently appealed to the Federal Court835. (Sections 81-85 of the Patent Act 
apply in the first instance procedures; Sections 110-121 – in the appellation836.) 
The parties are entitled to deliver evidence; however, the court may carry out its own 
investigation and, in principle, is not dependent on the parties’ argumentations.837 The application, 
i.e. the scope of a requested compulsory license, may change in the course of the proceedings (or 
in the appellation). The issuance of a patCL comes into force when the court decision becomes 
                                                          
831 "DIRECTIVE 98/44/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
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832  Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, § 24 at 4; Kraßer, Patentrecht, 833. 
833  Polyferon, BGH 05.12.1995 - X ZR 26/92, GRUR 1996, 190, 192-93. 
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final838; however, it is neither registered nor published. Under certain circumstances, such as 
special public concern, a patCL can already be ruled temporarily enforceable in the second 
instance.839 Above that, German law includes an instrument of preliminary injunction in CL 
requests, but only under the condition of extreme urgency, i.e. when a patCL serves special public 
interest and all requirements of Section 24 are met.840 The preliminary injunction becomes 
unenforceable if the main claim is withdrawn. In such case, the license-seeker must pay the patent 
owner an adequate remuneration for the use of invention.841 
The Court decides upon the adequate remuneration for a compulsory license842; and as a 
rule, a patent owner cannot unilaterally terminate a CL for unpaid remuneration or another breach 
of obligations.843 
 
5.2.2 Grounds for Awarding a Compulsory License 
1) Prior Negotiations and the Public Interest 
Section 24(1) lays down that each CL request shall be examined on a case-by-case basis. Each 
request must comply with two strict conditions, i.e. prior negotiations with the patent holder and 
being in the public interest. 
The first condition pertains to unsuccessful negotiations to obtain a license within reasonable 
period of time and on reasonable licensing terms. A single request for a license is not sufficient; the 
negotiation process must be a sustainable and repeated.844 Reasonable licensing terms denote an 
offer of an adequate compensation for the patentee: not only a certain amount of money, but also 
a guarantee to pay the sum.845 The license fee stays between one and ten percent, and is calculated 
upon the abstract sale price and per license analogy. Technically, it resembles the calculation of an 
inventor’s fee.846 
The condition of public interest pertains to the key concept of compulsory licensing: safeguarding 
public access to the invention. It also elevates the threshold for CL requests to ensure that CL only 
addresses situations of high public concern. The requirement corresponds with Section 13(1) of the 
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Patent Act, which concerns the interests of public welfare.847 In Polyferon the Court ruled that 
patCL addresses situations of unconventional patent exploitation, which contradict normal and 
reasonable patent utilization, a state which needs to be eliminated with a countervailing 
measure.848 
The term public interest is broad, and hence unclear. Defined by social, economic, and 
technical factors, it refers to diverse circumstances, such as public health, economic crises, 
environmental catastrophes, and social matters.849 German Courts maintain a flexible construction 
of the term and avoid formulating a single general definition. Some commentators indicate that a 
single definition could support the predictability of judicial decisions, and could thus serve as 
guidepost. Others stress the fluctuation of the general socio-political circumstances, which would 
make the application of a general definition unfeasible.850 For this reason, German courts 
conscientiously scrutinize the context of public interest in every case to avoid misjudging the 
interests of the involved parties.851 The criterion of public interest is not met by providing an 
invention at lower cost. However, if the production costs of an invention are lowered, access to the 
invention might be recognized as serving the public interest.852 
The requirement of public interest is only referred to by name in Section 24(1), which does 
not mean, however, that it is abandoned in subsequent provisions. The public interest is the main 
indicator for a CL request, because it is not the purpose of patCL to serve the private interests of 
the license seeker. 
2) Dependent Patents 
Section 24 (2) pertains to blocking (dependent) patents: when a given use of a new patent is 
hindered by an older patent under the reservation that the new invention represents a significant 
improvement with a relevant economic meaning (making it in the public interest).853 The request 
must be predated with unsuccessful endeavours to obtain a license from the holder of an older 
patent under the usual trade condition (Section 24(1)). The owner of the older patent has the right 
to request a cross-license to utilize the younger invention (compulsory cross licensing).854 
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850 Even more challenging would be craving out one general definition of public interest for the international 
forum. "Ausschließlichkeit," 189; Zwangslizenz, 100.  
851 Meinberg, Zwangslizenz, 54-55. 
852 Kraßer, Patentrecht, 836-37. 
853  ibid., 836. 
854  Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, §24 at 24. 
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In Zwangslizenz, the German jurisprudence acknowledged that small improvements may have 
significant contributions to welfare, and therefore, awarding a CL for such improvements is not 
excluded. Furthermore, it affirmed that such a possibility also exists in small markets with 
innovative and effective pharmaceutical products, e.g. cancer drugs. In terms of the general public 
interest, the court classified a disease of prevalence of 1-2M as a national disease.855 
Section 24(3), appended in the course of the implementation of the Biopatent Directive856, 
regulates the situation of dependent patents in regard to plant breeding: when a certain plant 
variety cannot be utilized without violating of an earlier patent. The prerequisites of Section 24(2) 
must be met to request a patCL in that subject-matter.857 
3) Semiconductors 
Section 24(4) stipulates a CL in the area of semiconductor technology to terminate the anti-
competitive practice of the patent holder.858 
4) Insufficient Working 
Section 24(5) introduces a patCL for the insufficient working of a patent. Patent use is manifested 
through the manufacture of a patented device, the application of a patented process, or 
importation.859 Compulsory licensing addresses the problem of product shortages on the domestic 
market, but only if greater supply is preferable with the public interest in mind, e.g. if insufficient 
working impairs a technology transfer. A patCL awarded under this provision does not allow for the 
use of a patent in another country – in such circumstance, the exhaustion principle does not apply. 
Furthermore, the provision does not cover the condition of unmet demand whenever anti-trust 
measures (including compulsory licensing) can be employed. Notably, not every underutilisation 
bears traits of patent misuse: working a patent in certain markets might be unprofitable due to 
various factors, such as insufficient infrastructure and inherently low demand, and the decision to 
refrain from patent exploitation under such circumstances rests within the ambit of patent 
exclusivity. Such aspects must be considered when examining a CL-request, otherwise, compulsory 
licensing practices would remain unreasonable and erroneous.860 
                                                          
855  Zwangslizenz, 101-03. 
856 "DIRECTIVE 98/44/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions". 
857  Meinberg, Zwangslizenz, 66.  
858  ibid., 65; Kraßer, Patentrecht, 831. 
859  Meinberg, Zwangslizenz, 65; Rudolf Busse, Patentgesetz  (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), §24 at 66. 
860 Meinberg, Zwangslizenz, 56; Beier, "Ausschließlichkeit," 190; Polyferon, 192. 
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More importantly, in light of intensive international trade, the import of a patented product is a 
response to the problem of market deficiency and, as commentators suggest, consequently 
undermines the relevance of this specific regulation.861  
5) General Licensing Terms: 
Section 24(6) specifies the general licensing terms of compulsory licensing. A patCL has a non-
exclusive character and is granted solely for the period the grounds it rests on exist. It cannot be 
viewed as a contract.862 The patent holder may request adequate remuneration estimated e.g. on 
the market value of the CL. A holder of a CL cannot transfer it as an ordinary license; however, it is 
permissible under Section 24(7) to transfer a CL with the transfer of an enterprise or of a 
dependent patent. 
 
5.2.3 Practice 
The statistics of the Federal Patent Court, established in 1961, indicate only 20 applications for a CL 
until 2004, with only one granted to Polyferon in the first instance, but then dismissed in the 
appellation863. German courts have never been too generous in awarding a patCL. In the case of the 
aforementioned Polyferon, the Federal Patent Court issued a CL for the production and sale of the 
medicine; however, the Federal Supreme Court turned down the decision due to the missing 
requirement of public interest. 
The low rate of requests does not challenge the purpose of the norm. On the contrary, the spectre 
of compulsory licensing (with its arduous court proceedings) incentivises parties to hold regular 
licensing negotiations.864 
 
5.3 The United Kingdom 
5.3.1 The Norm 
The Patents Act elaborately regulates the matter of compulsory licensing in Sections 48-58. It 
differentiates between conditions of granting a compulsory license according to: 
1) the type of use: commercial (Section 48 – 54), and governmental uses (Sections 55-59); 
                                                          
861 Meinberg, Zwangslizenz, 65. 
862  Klinische Versuche; Mes, Patentgesetz, § 24 at 32. 
863 Polyferon.  
864  Beier, "Ausschließlichkeit," 189-90; Benkard and Editors, Patentgesetz, §24 at 4. 
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2) the proprietor of rights: WTO-proprietors865 – Section 48A, and non-WTO proprietors – 
Section 48B. 
The provisions comply with international agreements: the TRIPS Agreement, the Paris Convention, 
and the EU Treaties. 
Patent compulsory licensing in the UK system is an instrument with a long legal tradition. The first 
statutory provisions emerged in the Patent, Designs, and Trade Marks Act of 1883, which 
postulated awarding a CL due to the insufficient working of a patent, that is, when the patentee did 
not work the invention or the requirements of the public to use the invention were not satisfied. 
The Patent Act of 1949 introduced a separate provision for inventions regarding food, medicine, 
and surgical and curative devices – the legislator omitted this provision when adopting the Patent 
Act of 1977.866 The EU compulsory licensing scheme for exporting pharmaceuticals after Regulation 
816/2006867 was incorporated into the Patents Act in Section 128A.868 
The current law determines diverse grounds for a CL request but, with a single definite time point 
of 3 years from the date of patent issuance.869 Section 48A(6) lays down the common licensing 
terms of a compulsory license: 
1) it must be non-exclusive and non-assignable (except when in the course of assigning of an 
enterprise or part of the goodwill); 
2) it should predominantly serve to supply the domestic market; 
3) the patent owner shall obtain remuneration adequate to the circumstances of the case; 
4) it has a specified scope and duration – it is limited to the purpose for which it was ordered. 
Section 48(2) stipulates that a license seeker must make efforts to obtain a license and only if they 
are not successful within a reasonable period (determined on single-case merits), an order, or entry 
for a patCL might then be considered. 
The procedural aspects are stipulated in Section 52, supplemented with the Rules 68-71 of the 
Patent Rules of 1995. The decision upon granting a CL rests in the hands of the Comptroller. The 
license seeker shall provide all facts and evidence in a statement delivered to the Comptroller, who 
                                                          
865 Section 48(5) defines the term of “WTO Proprietor” as a person who (a) is a national of, or is domiciled in, 
a country that is a member of the World Trade Organisation; or (b) has a real and effective industrial or 
commercial establishment in such a country. 
866  Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 433.  
867   "REGULATION (EC) No 816/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 May 2006 
on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to 
countries with public health problems". 
868  UK IPO, "Manual of Patent Practice": 128A. 
869  Section 48(1); Section 48B(2) extends this period if the time has been insufficient to make the invention 
working. 
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may dismiss them if the statement does not clarify the purpose of the CL to a satisfactory degree. 
Accepted applications are published in the Official Journal and announced to all parties involved. In 
reply, the patentee presents a notice of opposition verifying the evidence of the applicant - only 
then may the Comptroller decide. At the request of the Comptroller, the applicant may deliver a 
draft licence. If the case requires, an arbitrator may enter the procedure to clarify certain questions 
pertaining to the science or the documentation. The Comptroller’s decision may be appealed to the 
Patents Court – the Attorney General may enter the proceedings at this stage. The parties are 
allowed to furnish additional evidence. Pursuant to Section 97 the parties may appeal from the 
Comptroller's decision to the Patents Court.870 
 
5.3.2 Grounds for Awarding a Compulsory License 
5.3.2.1 Commercial Compulsory Licensing 
1) Unmet Demand 
Sections 48A (1) (a), 48B (1) (b) stipulate the condition of unmet demand, i.e. a situation in which 
the demand for a certain product is not met on reasonable terms. Both manufacturing and 
importation may sufficiently fulfil this requirement.871  
The demand must be real and actual, i.e. it must already exist and a potential licensee must be 
willing to satisfy it.872 The notion of reasonable terms, which also emerges in other provisions, 
remains vague and is very flexible. The Manual of Patent Practice provides the following guidelines:  
What constitutes “reasonable terms” depends on a careful consideration of all the 
surrounding circumstances in each case, e.g. the nature of the invention, the terms 
of any license under the patent, the expenditure and liabilities of the patentee in 
respect of the patent, and the requirements of the purchasing public. The price 
charged by the patentee should be bona fide one and not one adopted to suppress 
or depress demand. 
[A reasonable royalty is] How much are manufacturers who are anxious to make 
and deal with the patented article on commercial lines ready and willing to pay? 873 
If the Court does not recognise the given pricing and supply terms as unreasonable and in regard to 
the market874, no patent misconduct occurs. In other words, if the demand is met via either 
                                                          
870  Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 459-61. 
871  ibid., 452-53. 
872  UK IPO, "Manual of Patent Practice": 48A.02; also Cathro’s Applications 51 R.P.C. 75. 
873  ibid., 48A.03; also Brownie Wireless Co Ltd's Applications 46 R.P.C. 457. 
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manufacturing or importation875, pricing and supply terms are irrelevant. Thereby, a claim that 
demand would be higher by lower pricing scheme remains futile if the given supply covers the 
demand.876 In Swansea Imports Ltd v Carver Technology Ltd, the Court refused to award a CL. 
Despite the fact that the high price for the remaining stock of a patented heater adversely affected 
the demand, the applicant (Swansea Imports) did not succeed in proving that this condition led to a 
failure to meet demand on reasonable terms.877  
2) Refusal to License and Unfair Prejudice 
Sections 48A (1) (b), 48B (1) (d)878 lay down that if the patentee’s conduct hinders or prevents the 
exploitation of a dependent patent that contributes to “an important technical advance of 
considerable economic significance,” a license seeker may apply for a CL. The same pertains to 
license refusal that leads to unfair prejudice in establishing and developing commercial and 
industrial activities (including the use of the patented product or process, or the manufacture, use, 
and disposal of materials not protected with a patent).879 The applicant must prove one of the two 
named situations. Non-WTO applicants must additionally prove that the domestic market (the UK 
market) is insufficiently supplied.  
The oblique phrase unfairly prejudiced practice does not find a clear explanation in the case law. It 
is indicated that it might apply in specific circumstances under the phrase unreasonable terms. It 
rests within the discretion of a court to consider certain aspects within one or the other category. 
When approaching the matter of an unfair and a prejudice conduct, the court considers its overall 
market impact, as well as the investment the patentee intends to recoup, and refrains from 
evaluating the notion of individual unfairness, regardless of its substantiality.880 
3) Insufficient Commercial Working 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
874  Charles Lawson, "Public Interest Compulsory Licensing under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth): A Real Incentive 
or a Barrier to Working?," Australian Intellectual Property Journal 19, no. 3 (2003): 135-38. 
875  Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 452-53. 
876  ibid., 442-43. 
877  Intellectual Property Office UK IPO, "Swansea Imports Ltd. v. Craver Technology Ltd,  BL Number 
O/170/04,"  http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/pro-p-os/p-challenge-decision-results-
bl?BL_Number=O/170/04, accessed 28.11.2013.  
878  Unfair prejudice is a precondition stipulated in Sections 48A (1) (c), 48B (1) (e), which refers to conditions 
imposed by the patent proprietor on the use, disposal of the patented product (or process) and the 
manufacture, disposal and use of material not protected with a patent. It also concerns misconduct 
hindering the establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities. 
879 The term commercial activity is construed broadly; the growth of business in size meets the criterion of 
commercial development. Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 444; UK IPO, "Manual of Patent 
Practice": 48A.04, 48A.07; also Kamborian's Patent [1961] R.P.C. 403. 
880 Lawson, "Public Interest Compulsory Licensing," 134-35,40-41; UK IPO, "Manual of Patent Practice": 
48A.08; Terrell and Editors, The Law of Patents, 445.  
195 
 
Pursuant to Section 48B (1)(a) compulsory licensing can remedy the insufficient commercial 
working of an invention, i.e. “working not to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable.”881 
The applicant bears the burden of proof: the scarcity of production and contribution of the 
invention to the total value of the production. The fullest extent to which an invention might be 
practiced is “the highest rate of the production which is practicable and necessary substantially to 
meet the demand.”882 
The concept of working a patent covers manufacturing a product, using a method or a process, or 
importing. Additionally, the working must be on a commercial basis. While determining whether a 
patent has been worked is relatively uncomplicated, determining the commercial basis raises 
certain difficulties and questions: how many machines, how many types must be produced, where 
should the product be utilized? For example, in McKechnie Bros Ltd’s Application, the Court 
acknowledged research work and work in laboratories as sufficient for working a patent. The 
examiners affirmed the capability of a patented invention to be worked, even though it was 
produced on a small scale in the USA, due to the evidence on potential customers in the UK.883 
4) Anti-competitive Practices 
The Patents Act regulates two kinds of anti-competitive conducts: 1) following from mergers and 
market investigations (Section 50A), and 2) affecting the public interest (Section 51). 
Section 50A allows for taking an action against mergers or market investigations to prevent or 
remedy competition that cannot be secured in other way under the Enterprise Act. The 
Competition Commission or the Secretary of State notifies the comptroller about conducts which 
result either from the refusal to license on reasonable terms or a restriction on the use of an 
invention (Section 50A(1) (c)). 
Section 51 concerns operations against the public interest. Upon a report of the Competition 
Commission, the Minister may apply to the comptroller to undertake according measures. The acts 
against the public interest should involve licensing terms restricting the use of a patented product, 
or a refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms (Section 51(1) (c), 51(3)). 
 
                                                          
881 UK IPO, "Manual of Patent Practice": 48B.04. 
882 ibid., 48B.04; also Kamborian's Patent [1961] R.P.C. 403. 
883 Lawson, "Public Interest Compulsory Licensing," 142-43. 
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5.3.2.2 Governmental Use – Sections 55-59 
Section 55(1) provides that the government or any person acting on its behalf is authorised to use 
patented inventions without the patentee’s consent “for the services of the Crown.”884 The 
government has a wide discretion in regard to the use of a patented product. It has the right to 
make, to use, to import, to keep a patented invention (products and/or processes), or to sell or to 
offer to sell it885. The government may also dispose of or offer to dispose of anything which was 
made, used, imported, or kept in the exercise of its powers. 
The norms apply at all times and for the purposes as named in Section 56(2): 
a) the supply of anything for foreign defence purposes, 
b) the production or supply of specified drugs and medicines, 
c) purposes relating to the production or use of atomic energy or research into matter 
connected therewith.886 
The Crown is entitled to extend its power in relation to an invention in states of emergency, for a 
period declared by the Order in Council (Section 59(3)). According to Section 59(1), states of 
emergency concern situations affecting the life and well-being of the community, the efficient 
prosecution of a war, and assistance for countries gravely distressed by the course of a war. Besides 
political circumstances, the Act allows the extension of power in times of economic necessity, to 
foster productivity and the exchange of goods, or to ensure access to resources. 
Pursuant to Section 57A, the Crown shall pay for the profit loss suffered by the patent owner. This 
is determined upon the profit, which would otherwise have been made under contractual 
conditions, and to the extent to which any manufacturing or capacity was under-used.887 However, 
as provided in Section 55(3), if the government or the UK Atomic Energy Authority use an invention 
before its priority date, then such uses are free of any royalty to the proprietor, i.e. the Crown 
enjoys prior use with remuneration. 
 
                                                          
884 The use of European patents regulated in Sections 77-78. 
885 Section 122 renders the Crown the right to dispose of or use articles forfeited under the customs and 
excise laws; the Crown is exempted from infringement for the sale or use of the sized goods. 
886 UK IPO, "Manual of Patent Practice": 55.05. 
887 ibid., 57A. 
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5.3.3 Practice 
As reported by UK AIPPI Group, very few applications have been made for compulsory licensing (on 
average less than one application per year (!)), with even fewer being awarded. One could rightly 
assume that patent holders do not cause situations which force the Crown to resort to compulsory 
licensing; and if so, the issues are clarified during conventional license negotiations. In regard to 
governmental uses, no records are maintained in the UK IPO. The Office assumes that the Crown 
gravitates toward conventional negotiations to determine the conditions and compensations for 
the use of a patented invention.888 
 
5.4 The United States 
5.4.1 The Norm 
“Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system.”889 
A patent compulsory license in the USA has a miniscule regulatory basis – the sole statutory 
provisions on compulsory licensing can be found in the Clean Air Act and the Atomic Energy Act. 
The US system disfavours applying a patCL, with the exceptions of conditions of anti-competitive 
conducts, such as: 
1) the misuse of IP-rights, e.g. anti-competitive mergers, anti-competitive use of patents, 
activities outside IP-rights890; 
2) improper enforcement: patent procurement by fraud, lawsuits solely to interfere with 
business of competitors.891 
                                                          
888 WIPO, "Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-Competitive 
Uses in Intellectual Properties Rights - CDIP/4/4 REV./STUDY/INF/5," (2011), 13; "Questionnaire on 
Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights. The United Kingdom," Section 9; AIPPI, "United Kingdom. 
Report Q187. Limitations on exclusive IP Rights by competition law," 4. 
889 Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, *215 (1980). 
890 E.g., 1) tying arrangement (requiring the purchase of unpatented goods in connection with the patented 
goods, conditioning a sale or license of patented goods on the agreement to sale or license other 
unpatented goods); 2) prohibiting purchasers or licensees of patented goods from making or selling goods 
that compete with the patented goods; and 3) conditioning the sale or licensing of the patent invention 
on the payment of royalties or other consideration after the expiration of the right. "United States of 
America. Report Q187. Limitations on exclusive IP Rights by competition law," 2. 
891 WIPO, "Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address Anti-Competitive 
Uses in Intellectual Properties Rights - CDIP/4/4 REV./STUDY/INF/5," 14; Joseph A. Yosick, "Compulsory 
Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions," University of Illinois Law Review (2001): 1276; Gianna  
Julian-Arnold, "International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality," IDEA 33, no. 349 
(1992-1993): 354. 
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A strict patent compulsory license has been proposed many times, but strong opposition from the 
industry and patent practitioners effectively impeded its enacting.892 The USA neither introduced 
any new limitation of patent exclusivity upon the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, nor 
implemented Article 5A of the Paris Convention on the insufficient working of patents.893 
The government enjoys a wide discretion in issuing CL for governmental uses: in cases of health 
emergencies894 and for federal-funded projects as provided in the Bayh-Dole Act (35 U.S.C 203).895 
 
5.4.1.1 The Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. Chapter 23) 
The statute regulates the terms of patent licensing in the field of production and utilization of 
special nuclear material or atomic energy for peaceful purposes.896  
At the request of the license seeker, the Atomic Energy Commission reviews the following 
conditions for granting a compulsory license: 1) the purpose must be clear and the party must hold 
specific qualifications, 2) prior negotiation with the patent holder to obtain the license must be 
unsuccessful. The Act provides that the patent owner should receive reasonable remuneration 
determined by the Commission, which considers specific factors, such as the importance of the 
invention and the cost of its development or acquisition.897 The decision is made in the form of an 
administrative act, and as such can be challenged according to the Administrative Procedure Act.898 
 
                                                          
892 Proposals: 1) the Hart Bill in 1973 allowing CL in the fields of public health, safety, or protection of the 
environment, and for underutilized patents if not worked within 3 years after issuance (or 4 years form 
the application), and for blocking patents; 2) the Affordable Prescription Drugs envisaged a CL for 
unreasonable pricing. The opponents argued that there was no evidence for trade suppression and that 
CL could discourage inventiveness and disclosure; and that “compulsory licensing is not creeping 
socialism: it is socialism run rampant.” See Yosick, "Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of 
Inventions," 1278; Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., *215. 
893 AIPPI, "United States of America. Report Q187," 3. 
894 Public Health Emergency Medicines Act (H.R.3235), Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions 
Act (H.R.1708), Affordable Prescription Drugs Act (H. R. 2927), Essential Pharmaceutical Act of 1994 (H. R. 
4151), from Consumer Project on Technology, "Chapter IV: Misc Compulsory Licensing Programs," 
accessed 30.11.2013. 
895 "KEI RN 2007:2 Recent Examples of Compulsory Licensing of Patents,"  
http://keionline.org/content/view/41/1, accessed 30.11.2013. 
896 42 U.S.C. §2181(a) stipulates that no patent shall be granted on invention or discovery on atomic energy 
or nuclear material intended to be applied in atomic weapon.  
897 42 U.S.C. §2183. 
898 AIPPI, "United States of America. Report Q187," 5. 
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5.4.1.2 The Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. Chapter 85)  
The Act introduces CL to safeguard access to inventions that control and limit air pollution. As 
environmental aspects pertain to diverse fields, CL serves the public interest in preserving nature 
and social welfare. 
Certain requirements must be met to apply for a CL: 1) the invention must comply with the 
emission requirement; 2) no reasonable alternatives can be obtained; 3) restricted access to the 
invention would adversely affect competition.899  
Upon the request to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Administrator 
may apply to the Attorney General of the United States, who in turn makes a certification to a 
district court that determines the reasonable terms and conditions of licensing. Such a procedure, 
however, has never been exercised thus far.900 
 
5.4.1.3 March-In Rights – the Bayh-Dole Act (35 U.S.C. 203) 
The provision gives federal agencies which fund research projects the right to require the 
contractor (inventor, assignee, exclusive licensee) to grant a license (non-exclusive, partially 
exclusive, or exclusive) in any field of use and on reasonable terms. If the respective person refuses 
to do so, the federal agency may grant the license itself by determining in advance that such action 
is necessary: 
1) because no effective steps have been taken within reasonable time to achieve the practical 
application of the invention in question in the given field of use; 
2) to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, 
assignee, or their licensees; 
3) to meet the requirements for public use specified by federal regulations when such 
requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; 
4) because the agreement required by Section 204901 has not been obtained or waived or 
because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United 
States is in breach of its agreement obtained pursuant to Section 204. 
                                                          
899 42 U.S.C. §7608. 
900 AIPPI, "United States of America. Report Q187," 5. 
901 Section 204 obliges patent holders to manufacture products embodying the subject invention 
substantially in the US. A federal agency which funded the respective research project may waive the 
requirement if the parties reasonably but unsuccessfully sought licensees to manufacture the invention in 
the US, or if domestic manufacturing is not feasible. 
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5.4.2 Practice 
5.4.2.1 Within Anti-trust Law 
The relationship between compulsory licensing on the grounds of patent law and antitrust law has 
no statutory manifestation, but has been recorded in numerous court decisions. Though the two 
systems might seem discrepant, in fact they are complementary to each other: 
The aims and objective of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, 
wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as 
both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.902 
The patent exclusive right and the resulting competence to choose or exclude licensors, or even the 
right not to work the invention, do not contravene the principle of fair competition as long as they 
remain within the legitimate patent monopoly903: 
The commercial advantage gained by new technology and its statutory protection by 
patent do not convert the possessor thereof into a prohibited monopolist.904 
In the discussion on the “healthy” borders of patent monopoly, two approaches evolved: the 
absolute and the balance theory. 
The absolute theory provides the patentee with the maximum scope of freedom to exercise their 
will over the invention, including locking the patent to exclude the competitors: 
As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use of the new patent, 
we answer that such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the 
right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or 
not use it, without question of motive.905 
The other approach, the balance theory, limits the scope of the patent monopoly to acts serving the 
main purpose of the patent system, i.e. “the promotion of the progress of science and useful 
arts.”906 In Hoe v. Knap, dating back to 1886, the Court ruled that a patentee is “bound to either use 
the patent himself or allow others to use it on reasonable or equitable terms.”907 This balanced 
understanding of the patent privilege derives from the concept of “a privilege conditioned by a 
                                                          
902  Atari Games Corp.  v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, *1576 (1990). 
903 CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp. Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation 203 F.3d 1322, *1325 
(2000). 
904 Abbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, *1354 (1991); Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 125 
F.3d 1195, *1216 (1997).  
905 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, *426 (1908); Fastener Co. v. Eureka 
Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, *295 (1896). 
906 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, *381-83 (1945); Vitamin Technologist, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation, 146 F.2d 941, *944 (1945). 
907 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, *381. 
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public purpose”908, whereas the absolute theory subordinates the public purpose to the private 
interest and extends the private privilege within the public domain.909 The proponents of the 
balanced view stress the anti-market repercussions of the maximal patent power: = 
The use of a new patent is suppressed so as to preclude experimentation which might 
result in further invention by competitors. A whole technology is blocked off. The 
result is a clog to our economic machine and a barrier to an economy of abundance.910 
An example of compulsory licensing within anti-trust remedies can be found in Foster v. American 
Machine, where the Court denied the injunction, as the plaintiff could not prove damages, and 
ordered a compulsory license with reasonable royalties for the use of the invention. The Court 
stressed the fact that the plaintiff did not work the invention and did not license it. Therefore, the 
plaintiff did not suffer any pecuniary losses in the course of the infringement of the patent, defined 
as the difference between the situation after the infringement and a hypothetical situation in which 
the infringement did not occur. In the given case, that difference amounted to zero.911 The Court 
held that an injunctive relief would be an inequitable remedy in the given circumstances – a 
business cessation would be an excessive mean when the patentee did not exploit the patent: 
Here the compulsory license is a benefit to the patentee who has been unable to 
prevail in his quest for injunctive relief. To grant him a compulsory royalty is to give 
him half a loaf. In the circumstance of his utter failure to exploit the patent on his 
own, that seems fair.912 
 
5.4.2.2 Within the Bayh-Dole Act 
In the long history of Amendment 203, a compulsory license has never been granted. The National 
Institute of Health (NIH) has received numerous petitions to exercise the March-In Rights, but never 
decided to do so.913 Considering that compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals is mainly associated 
with developing countries, the fact that the USA has its own internal records on CL in the medical 
sectors is at least surprising – several examples will be provided below. 
                                                          
908 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, *666 (1944). 
909 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, *383. 
910 ibid. 
911 Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co. , 492 F.2d 1317, *1322 (1974). 
912 ibid., *1324. 
913 James Love, "Four NGOs ask NIH to Grant Open Licenses to Ritonavir Patents under Bayh-Dole March-In 
Provisions," Knowledge Ecology International, http://keionline.org/node/1573, accessed 3.12.2013; 
"Notes on the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980," Knowledge Ecology International, http://keionline.org/bayh-dole, 
accessed 2.12.2013. 
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In 1997, CellPro, a startup of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center in Seattle, entered into a patent 
dispute with Johns Hopkins University over a patent on an antibody test to isolate stem cells in 
cancer treatment – a Johns Hopkins' patent that CellPro allegedly infringed. 
Commentators pointed that the case shed light on the hurdles arising in the academia, such 
as “research secrecy, broadly defined patents, and the lack of governmental supervision over 
commercialization of university inventions made of federal funds.” In the case, Johns Hopkins did 
not disclose the licensing agreements, which was required under the Bayh-Dole-Act. In the course 
of time, Hopkins and the contracted companies filed a suit for patent infringement against CellPro. 
CellPro assumed that it did not require Johns Hopkins' patent and worked on the development and 
clinical testing of its own bone marrow reconstruction technique, which is applicable in breast 
cancer treatment (an antibody-based isolation technique). Johns Hopkins claimed, however, that 
CellPro infringed its patent on cancer treatment technology – the patent holder believed the patent 
covered any use of antibodies for cell isolation. 
The case pronounced the issue of NIH responsibility in regard to the commercialization of 
federal founded projects, in which it can exercise the march-in right, but refrains from doing so. As 
a result, CellPro lost the patent battle, had to withdraw its device (despite its clinical advantages 
and no alternatives), and went insolvent – an example of a squandered technology.914 
In 2004, Essential Inventions (EI) requested a March-In right for Norvir of Abbott Laboratories (AIDS 
drug) and Pfizer’s Xalatan (a glaucoma drug), which NIH eventually refused for both medicines. The 
petitioners argued that the two companies charged unreasonable prices and thereby violated the 
law on federally funded inventions – Abbott priced the drug four times, and Pfizer – two to five 
times higher in the USA than in other high-income countries. In opposition to the request, Abbott 
Laboratories claimed that the federal grant constituted only a fraction of the total investment: 3.5 
million v. 300 million provided by Abbott itself (1:100)915, and covered only preclinical research. In 
rejecting the petition, the NIH argued that March-In rights were not an appropriate mean of price 
control. In effect, Abbott reduced the price on drugs due to government-funded programs, but 
retained a high price for private-sector purchases. The petition regarding Pfizer drug was rejected 
without any concessions.916 
                                                          
914 Dennis Meredith, "Patent Policy Flaws Complicate Commercialization of Federally Funded University 
Discoveries. New Case Study of Cellpro Calls for Changes in the Bayh-Dole Act,"  
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2002-12/du-ppf120602.php, accessed 30.11.2013. 
915 Jeffrey M. Leiden, "Abbott Laboratories Comments at NIH Public Meeting Regarding Norvir® and Bayh-
Dole March-in Provisions,"  http://www.natap.org/2004/HIV/060104_04b.htm, accessed 12.02.2014. 
916 "KEI RN 2007:2 Recent Examples of Compulsory Licensing of Patents." "KEI RN 2007:2 Recent Examples of 
Compulsory Licensing of Patents."; "15 Frequently Asked Questions about the 2012-2013 Ritonavir March-
In Petition," Knowledge Ecology International, http://keionline.org/node/1815, accessed 13.02.2014; 
"Ritonavir (Norvir),"  http://www.essentialinventions.org/drug/ritonavir.html, accessed 30.11.2013; 
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In 2007, Essential Inventions requested from Robert Portman, Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), to take steps to develop and accept alternative competitive 
sources of supply for federal procurement of two HIV-AIDS medicines: stavudine/d4T and 
Ritonavir.917 Along with other companies, EI intended to manufacture generic versions of the two 
drugs, and therefore called for changes in administering the government-funded research programs 
to make medical technologies more available for patients. In regard to Ritonavir, EI stressed the 
detrimental price policy of Abbott Laboratories. During the meeting with OMB officials, EI extended 
the proposal to include the AIDS drug Emtricitabine (Emtriva).918 Later in 2012, four NGOs – the 
American Medical Students Association (AMSA), Knowledge Ecology International (KEI), U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group (PIRG), and Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM) – requested 
that the NIH grant open licenses for patents owned by Abbott Laboratories for manufacturing 
Ritonavir.919 They claimed (again) that the drug pricing was unreasonably high, which adversely 
affected US citizens, and that Abbott refused to license Ritonavir for co-formulated antiretroviral 
drug combinations. In March 2013, the NIH held a conference call with the NGOs. In November 
2013, it refused to exercise the March-In right, explaining that the remedy is not a mean of price 
control, which should be left to the Congress to address in an appropriate legislative measures.920 
In light of the presented facts, the March-In right appears to be a legal phantom; rather 
unsurprisingly, as compulsory licensing is a rare phenomenon also in the US system. 
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5.5 Japan 
5.5.1 The Norm 
The term compulsory license does not emerge in the Japanese Patent Act; however, the law 
stipulates a similar measure under the institution of a non-exclusive license for:  
1) insufficient working of a patent in Article 83, 
2) a dependent invention in Article 92, 
3) public interest in Article 93. 
The remedy was introduced into the system with the Patent Act of 1921.921 It is a market-regulating 
tool intended to remedy a malpractice of the patent rights.922 Unsuccessful prior negotiations with 
the patent owner (or the exclusive licensee) constitute the main prerequisite for a CL request to be 
made to the competent authority: either the Commissioner of the Patent Office or the Minister of 
Economy, Trade and Industry. 
 
5.5.2 Grounds for Awarding a Compulsory License 
1) Insufficient Working 
Article 83 specifies that if the invention is not sufficiently and continuously worked for 3 years or 
longer in Japan, the intended user may request the patentee (or the exclusive licensee) to hold 
consultations upon granting a non-exclusive license after four years lapsed from the filling of the 
patent application. If the parties do not reach any agreement, the intended user may address the 
Commission of the Patent Office to award a CL. The import of goods meets the criterion of working 
the patent. Moreover, if the insufficient working can be justified by certain economic reasons, 
compulsory licensing does not come into question.923 
2) Dependent Patent 
Article 92 broadly address the procedural aspects of dependent patents. In material terms, it 
pertains to Article 72, which covers the scenario of an older patent being blocked by a younger 
patent: 
1) the basis patent was filed prior to the date of the filing patent application for the subsequent 
invention;  
                                                          
921 AIPPI, "Japan. Report Q187. Limitation on exclusive IP Rights by competition law," 4. 
922 "Japan. Report Q202," 5-7. 
923 ibid., 5. 
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2) the younger patent is in conflict with the older patent. 
In the above cases, the patentee or exclusive licensee of the dependent patent may request 
consultation on licensing the dominant patent. Article 92 indicates that the consultation should 
concern the extent to which the two patents correlate with each other and the extent to which the 
license seeker intends to work upon the patent. If the agreement is unfeasible, upon the request of 
the patentee of a dependent patent the Commissioner of the Patent Office may decide to order a 
CL. If the license appears to be unreasonably prejudicial to the other party, the Commissioner of 
the Patent Office shall refrain from granting a license.924 
The provision facilitates the access to pioneering technologies for innovators, which complies with 
the Japanese policy of technology sharing.925 
3) Public Interest 
Article 93 stipulates that license consultations may be requested if a patent at issue is particularly 
essential to the public interest. If the consultations are unsuccessful, the person intending to work 
the invention may request the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry to render a decision.  
Instruction of the System of Awarding Non-exclusive Licenses, issued by the Industrial Council, 
names the circumstances in which the working of the invention is of particular concern for the 
public interest: 
a) areas relating directly to the lives of citizens, such as public health, asset protection and 
construction of public facilities; 
b) situations in which the sound development of a relevant industry may deteriorate.926 
                                                          
924 ibid., 5-6. 
925  Nancy J.  Linck and John E. McGarry, "Patent Procurement and Enforcement in Japan - A Trade Barrier," 
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 27, no. 411 (1993-1994): 419-22; Teruo Doi, The Intellectual Property Law of 
Japan  (The Netherlands: Sijthoff&Noordhoff, 1980), 38. 
926 As published in a report of the Foreign Investment Council’s Expert Committee in 1968: 
  A non-exclusive license under Section 93 of the Patent Law may be allowed when the patent is regarded 
as being important for areas relating directly to the lives of citizens, such as the areas of public health, 
protection of assets and construction of public facilities. It may also be allowed when substantial adverse 
effects on the national economy are likely to occur due to the following events arising as a result of the 
monopolization of an important patented invention that is necessary for the production of certain 
products or is related to the implementation of certain industrial processes: (i) It is feared that a huge 
number of people will be made unemployed due to bankruptcy or other disruptions occurring for a 
corporation that is expected to use the patented invention; (ii) it is feared that, through bankruptcy or 
other disruptions occurring for corporations in a certain industry that are expected to use the patented 
invention, a huge amount of existing facilities in the industry, which would be utilized if the industry could 
use the patented invention, is likely to be destroyed; and (iii) when bankruptcy or other disruptions occur 
for corporations in a key industry, important export industry or hi–tech industry that is expected to use 
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The use of the term particular narrows down the ambit to situations in which no alternative to the 
patented invention is possible, regardless of the costs. The second criterion unequivocally suggests 
that CL applies in cases where the economy and the consumers are at stake, e.g. in the course of 
anti-competitive behaviour, and therefore, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry remains 
the decision-making body in the matter.927 
 
5.5.3 Practice 
No compulsory licenses have been granted in Japan in recent years.928 The last case of a CL request 
on dependent patents was recorded more than 40 years ago.929 No license was ever granted for 
insufficient working. However, it is estimated that at least 23 cases were settled privately, either 
unilaterally or via cross licensing, with most cases involving pharmaceutical companies. The mere 
existence of the provision sufficiently stimulates the working of inventions and the licensing 
behaviour.930 Of particular interest is the fact that the protection of IP in Japan was strengthened 
by its 1994 agreement with the USA, in which Japan committed itself to refrain from awarding a CL 
for blocking patents (Article 92), with the exception of anti-competitive practices.931 
 
5.6 Compulsory Licensing at Work – a Summary 
Patent compulsory licensing, though rarely employed, represents an important legal instrument in 
regulating access to patented solutions, which is of particular concern in the field of 
pharmaceuticals and international drug supply. 
Regardless of the differences in administrative procedures and material aspects of the patCL 
schemes between the analysed jurisdictions, which are the result of diverse legal traditions and 
established practice, the substantial framework (provided in the TRIPS Agreement) remains the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
the patented invention, the sound economic or technological development of the industry is likely to be 
substantially hindered. AIPPI, "Japan. Report Q202," 6. 
927 ibid., 6-7; Doi, The Intellectual Property Law of Japan, 41. 
928 AIPPI, "Japan. Report Q187. Limitation on exclusive IP Rights by competition law," 5. 
929 Julian-Arnold, "International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality," 351. 
930 Sadao Nagaoka, "Determinants of High-Royalty Contracts and the Impact of Stronger Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 19, no. 2 
(2005): 236; Doi, The Intellectual Property Law of Japan, 41. 
931 The USA and Japan decided upon three measures: Japan changed the pre-grant to post-grant opposition 
and unified the opposition system (1), pledged not to apply compulsory licenses in cases of blocking 
patents (2), reformed the early examination systems to enable the foreigners to enjoy the fast track status 
(3). Nagaoka, "Determinants of high-royalty contracts," 234-35; Klaus Hinkelmann, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz in Japan, vol. 2. (Köln, München: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2008), 196. 
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same, as do the objectives. PatCL ensures access to publicly significant patented solutions in cases 
when such access has been blocked by the patentee. As a forceful countervailing measure, it was 
not designed to support the individual interests of the patentee’s competitors, but to protect the 
public benefit coming from the patented solution, and vocalised in the strict criteria. 
Compulsory licensing serves to protect vital (inter)national interests, such as public welfare, 
technological development, and technology transfer. To combine all of the aforementioned issues 
into a single statement – compulsory licensing fosters competition and protects business and 
consumers. Even the criterion of the public interest, which is a dominant prerequisite of CL 
requests (like in Germany) and sharpens general conditions, pertains to market-related objectives, 
such as price reduction (to make a certain good affordable for citizens) and greater product 
diversity. 
A low number of compulsory licenses may paradoxically prove the functionality of the law in 
stimulating voluntary licensing (a pushing effect932). According to the study by Beall and Kuhn, only 
24 unique cases of CL were recorded between 1 January 1995 and 6 June 2011 – all concerned 
pharmaceutical products and were issued by national authorities.933 In Germany, for instance, 
patCL has been granted only once (and revoked by the higher instance).934 No CLs have been 
granted in the UK in the last ten years, with statistics showing a declining number of applications.935 
The same goes for Japan: several applications have been filled, but in the end, no compulsory 
licenses have been granted. After the 1994 Agreement with the US, it has become impossible to 
obtain a CL for a patented dependent invention. The USA does not permit any patent compulsory 
licensing whatsoever. 
Certainly, compulsory licensing is not a remedy for low medical care, poor living standards, and 
malnutrition. To a much larger degree, it performs the role of a short-term solution in a state of 
emergency. Certainly, it is an abuse to claim that a justified issuance of CL increases the mistrust in 
the patent system or that it indicates a weak patent system. The mere fact of applying a legal 
instrument according to its purposes, objectives and requirements cannot be the cause of the 
malfunction of the patent system. Critical opinions expressed by IP holders in such cases constitute 
self-defence to protect own interest and to punish lawful, though undesired, patent practice. 
                                                          
932 Esther  Van Zimmeren and Geertrui Van Overwalle, "A Paper Tiger? Compulsory License Regimes for Public 
Health in Europe," IIC (2011): 23. 
933 Beall and Kuhn, "Trends in Compulsory Licensing." 
934 Polyferon, BPatG 7.6.1991 E 32; Kraßer, Patentrecht, 834. 
935 Patentrecht, 834; WIPO, "Survey on Compulsory Licenses Granted by WIPO Member States to Address 
Anti-Competitive Uses in Intellectual Properties Rights - CDIP/4/4 REV./STUDY/INF/5," 13; UK IPO, 
"Swansea Imports Ltd. v. Craver Technology Ltd,  BL Number O/170/04." 
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5.7 Applying Compulsory Licensing in the Maker Scenario 
At this point, one thing should be clear: the probability of a compulsory license requested either by 
a maker or for a maker’s product is incredibly low: 
a) makers do not require patents to work their inventions (they rarely patent their ideas); 
b) a lot of their designing is done around patents;  
c) neither would they seek a CL nor would grant it to anyone (makers, after all, freely share 
their ideas). 
If tinkering on a product represents a substantial improvement, this fact might become a ground 
for licensing in the context of dependent inventions, assuming a maker will be the first to request 
patent protection. 
In view of the infinitesimal ratio of compulsory licensing taking place, as well as its high 
requirements, this solution remains a rather theoretical remedy for makers. Nonetheless, it inspires 
further research and merits careful consideration. 
 
5.7.1 Refusal to License 
This criterion assumes lasting attempts to obtain a license. However, in order to satisfy this 
criterion, two preconditions must be met: having the awareness of relevant patents (or rather, an 
awareness of the patentees) and resources necessary to carry out license negotiations. 
Studies show that entrepreneurship among makers has an “accidental character”936, i.e. it is not 
calculated in the activity itself, which is why makers in principle do not conduct patent due 
diligence before launching a project – they simply make. This, however, should not imply that they 
are unaware of patents or patent-related issues as such – quite the opposite. Crowdsourcing in the 
field of 3D printing is a perfect example of open collaboration in detecting prior art with the aim of 
preventing “creative” patent drafting and keeping the field open.937 Still, making does not start 
from the research in patent databases. 
In regard to resources, assuming that makers found a patentee(s), they must offer “reasonable 
licensing terms.” The phrase reasonable terms does not have any fixed definition and varies 
                                                          
936 Shah and Tripsas, "The accidental entrepreneur." 
937 The initiative of Electronic Frontier Foundation: Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Join EFF’s Efforts to Keep 
3D Printing Open." 
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according to the circumstances of a given CL request; it concerns, however, predominantly financial 
commitments, i.e. an adequate remuneration for the use of a patent. Regardless of the ultimate 
financial contributions, licensing negotiations always constitute a significant investment in terms of 
time and money. They can be even more costly when the market launch of a given product is 
postponed. For an individual investor, license bargaining represents a reasonable option only in 
view of secure investment recoup. Otherwise, the outlay is too high and cumbersome.  
In terms of making, it is unlikely that a maker would initiate licensing negotiations with a patent 
holder. The maker movement is immense, but single makers, even if clustered, do not achieve high 
purchasing power and the resources they have are intended for project developments and not 
licensing fees (particularly, in the case of non-commercial projects). It is more accurate to assume 
the opposite scenario: patentees (e.g. companies) are interested in specific maker solutions and 
initiate bargaining. In the worst-case scenario, licensing negotiations are part of a patent 
infringement settlement, when makers allegedly infringe patented solutions. 
In conclusion, it is unlikely for makers to (attempt to) meet this requirement. 
 
5.7.2. Anti-competitive Practices 
The analysis of anti-competitive behaviours is a complex task which falls outside the scope of this 
research project. For this reason, a general overview of the subject in the context of makers is 
provided below. 
Anti-competitive patent practices938 can disturb workings at any stage of the development process. 
As indicated in the questionnaire, makers encounter diverse obstacles such as market entry barriers 
and limited access to resources and markets, which may be the results of the strong position of 
certain market players. Strong market position, however, does not immediately denote an abusive 
or anti-competitive behaviour (in terms of competition law), even if a given conduct impedes 
making. As studies show, makers prevail in small-scale sectors with unstable demand conditions, 
ambiguity, and great variety.939 In that sense, almost every bigger company enjoys a strong and 
dominant position. However, this understanding does not correspond with the legal and economic 
comprehension of anti-competitive conducts. The maker movement is immense, but single makers, 
                                                          
938 E.g. tying agreements (one patented good with other non-patented), licensing agreements extending the 
fee payment beyond the patent term, or including an obligation to pay a percentage from sale of goods 
not related to a patent. 
939 Shah and Tripsas, "The accidental entrepreneur," 126; Shah, "Sources and patterns of innovation."; 
Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel, "Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers."; Joshua Gans and Scott 
Stern, "The Economics of User-Based Innovation," Working Paper (1998). 
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even if clustered; do not achieve significant market power to push through their rights and ideas in 
conflict with big companies. As a disclaimer, the diversity of making, both in terms of scope and 
content, restrains the apprehension of the anti-competitive criterion. Last but not least, the 
dynamic of making unequivocally indicates that makers successfully bypass many market and legal 
barriers. 
 
5.7.3 Public Interest 
Most patent systems do not directly define the notion of public interest. However, it is expedient to 
encompass public health, social welfare, and other sectors of national importance. In fact, most of 
the cases involving compulsory licensing concern the pharmaceutical sector. 
Two aspects make this ground inapplicable for the adopted model of making: 
1) makers rarely look for patent protection to monetize the investment940 –  it is discouraged 
in the community: As stated in the code of conduct for makers, making is open941; 
2) makers would not be affected by compulsory licensing, since their solutions, as suggested 
above, are kept accessible without any additional restrictions. 
At this point, it would be unjustified to say that the substance of the public interest does not apply 
to makers because makers only provide lifestyle solutions (or gadgets). They contribute socially 
valuable solutions, such as solutions in the field of medical equipment: the non-invasive anaemia 
diagnosis tool “ToucHb,” or the urine analysis tool “uCheck” via smartphone applications942, or  
theLittle Devices@MIT943 – just to name a few. 
 
5.7.4 Dependent Patents 
Literally understood, this circumstance would not apply to the model of making. As mentioned 
above, makers rarely patent their inventions (patenting is neither appealing nor reasonable in 
terms of time and investment recoup).944 In a wider spectrum, the situation of dependent patents 
                                                          
940 Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel, "Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers." 
941 Hatch, The Maker Movement Manifesto. Rules for Innvoation in the New World of Crafters, Hackers, and 
Tinkerers. 
942 Kate Torgovnick May, "Urinalysis: There’s Now An App For That,"  
http://blog.ted.com/2013/05/15/urinalysis-theres-now-an-app-for-that/, accessed 03.11.2013. See also 
http://www.biosense.in/products.html (accessed 03.11.2013) 
943 "LITTLE DEVICES @ MIT Affordable Health | Medical Technology | DIY Innovation,"  
http://littledevices.org/, accessed 04.04.2014. 
944 Shah, "Sources and patterns of innovation," 15-16. 
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reflects the common making approach: makers tinker on existing products, and succeed in either 
creating improvements or new adaptations. There is a certain level of dependency between the 
patented solution and the maker’s improvement, but it does not correspond with the situation of 
two related patents subjected to compulsory licensing. However, a license authorising conducts on 
an older patent which constitutes a dependent solution would correspond with some 
circumstances of making. The administrative aspects of CL are not convincing in terms of a suitable 
instrument facilitating makers’ activities. 
The context of dependent patents is inspirational for seeking a solution that would be milder than 
compulsory licensing and cover a wider range of activities than allowed under experimental use – 
hence the novel proposition of the green light license. 
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Chapter 6. GREENLIGHT – A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MAKERS  
The proposal of a green light license – a green light from the patent owner to makers, which allows 
conducts associated with making – addresses the issue of communitarian testing and improving 
upon patented solutions on a non-commercial basis by makers. 
The objective of this study was the examination of patent exceptions, i.e. legal instruments “de-
capsulating” patent exclusivity for unauthorised uses on patented solutions from the perspective of 
the scale of the safeguarded freedom to operate. In that regard, the project measures the flexibility 
in the patent system, and its adaptability to modern technological occurrences, such as the maker 
movement. Its underlying hypothesis assumes the insufficiency of patent limitations in ensuring the 
balance of interests of the participating parties, with the stress on the end users. 
In times of progressing patentisation and pressure toward a “strong IP system,” recognised as the 
sole source of technological development and public welfare, the interests of end users are 
neglected for the sake of the sacred patent exclusivity. 
The approved exceptions sanction well-established practices, such as agricultural uses and private 
and non-commercial uses, the ambit of which represents only a miniscule curtailment of patent 
rights. The proposals of new exceptions follow the same pattern and suggest only a minor 
derogation of patent exclusivity.945 Admittedly, exceptions underlie dynamic legal interpretation 
that modifies their scopes according to the changing reality, as illustrated by the experimental use 
exception, which had been extended over testing medicines for regulatory approvals. However, 
such changes constitute a delicate adjustment within the established rigid framework of patent 
exceptions – they do not introduce any novel form, which would enable the system to smoothly 
interact with ongoing technological transformations. The sole direction of the present expansion of 
the patent system is the inclusion of patentable subject-matters and strengthening the 
enforcement of rights.946 
The maker movement challenges the patent-related innovation pattern; it is comparable to the 
open source (copyleft) movement, which positions itself against the copyright regime. However, 
transposing a pure copyleft idea onto the patent field as a patent-left approach may eventually 
prove to be  unsuccessful due to the inherent structural and procedural differences between the 
                                                          
945 Naomi Hawkins, "An Exception to Infringement for Genetic Testing – Addressing Patient Access and 
Divergence Between Law and Practice," IIC (2012). 
946 See Llewelyn, "Schrodinger's Cat: An Observation on Modern Patent Law." 
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two systems: diverse types of protected works, diverse requirements and application fields, and, 
last but not least, complex and costly patent prosecution. 
Nonetheless, open source projects for patents are emerging (and will continue to emerge) to hinder 
the blocking effects of patents by ensuring access to patented solutions (with no or fewer 
limitations). Sectors in which patentisation has reached the level of basic research (discoveries), as 
in biotechnology, are affected by proprietary claims on “enabling technologies that burden 
research with transaction costs and uncertainty.”947 Thus, interested parties are launching 
initiatives aimed at keeping knowledge open and communal, inspired by the philosophy of open 
source software, which, on principle, prohibits proprietary claims resulting in locking down 
information. Although the latter does not pertain so much to patents, which grant protection and 
exclusivity in return for disclosure; the main patent-driven obstacle is the blocked use of the 
patented solution. Projects (and models) such as Biological Innovation for Open Society (BiOS)948, or 
the international HapMap Project949, address this matter. The first one concerns public access to 
patented research tools in the field of agricultural biotechnology. It prohibits patenting 
improvements of research tools, but permits seeking protection on the results obtained therefrom. 
HapMap is a government-funded project that ensures access to information on the haplotype map 
of human genetic variations. Like BiOS, it does not prohibit patenting itself, but obliges the 
participant to license access to proprietary information on terms which will allow the other 
participants to continue their works.950 Like in the case of classic open source, patent-opening 
projects apply licensing as the legal mean of sanctioning the use of information: a promise not to 
assert IP rights against the other parties participating in the project. 
Patent opening projects concern mainly the biotechnological field, in which an increasing number 
of patents covers knowledge in the early stage of development, implementable in a broad 
spectrum of further developments.951 Such projects ensure open access to patented information 
created or placed within a consortium for a specified field of technology, e.g. the RNAi Consortium, 
or the Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms Consortium. They are based on discrete membership, 
which obligates participants to certain conducts, like in BiOS, to share improvements on core 
technologies, not to enforce rights against other BiOS licensees, and to share all information about 
                                                          
947 Sara Boettinger and Dan L. Burk, "Open Source Patenting," JIBL 1(2004). 
948 "Cambia Enabling Innovation. FAQs - BiOS Agreements,"  http://www/cambia.org/daisy/cambia/69.html, 
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biosafety with the public.952 They involve the cooperation of various entities (companies, 
universities, and research institutions) with the common objective of making the patented 
information accessible, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, attracting the funding by allowing 
a certain margin of patenting on the obtained results. The latter indicates that non-proprietary 
concepts may decrease R&D incentives and interest in a given project, if they block channels of 
investment recoup, such as patenting. 
One could suggest the establishment of a patent opening project with the aim of creating a 
catalogue of patents available for makers. Such an initiative would definitely be helpful, though it 
would require many Elon Musks refraining from enforcing patent rights in cooperation with 
makers. If widespread, such an initiative could change the culture within and around the patent 
system. The main challenge of the maker movement, being its strength at the same time, is its size. 
In terms of the number of participants, an open patent project for makers would require a new 
infrastructure to maintain and supervise a consortium or a database with thousands of patent 
rights from various fields and interested users. 
The concept of a patentleft regime in which, once an idea is made patentleft, it “infects” further 
ideas-solutions resulting therefrom with the patentleft effect, is worth considering and 
implementing in future endeavours. To some extent, the HapMap Project embodies the patentleft 
idea, because it imposes an obligation on users to refrain from patenting solutions based on 
information from HapMap, and, if they do manage to obtain patents, they are obliged to share the 
information on terms which will allow others to continue their work. HapMap is grounded in the 
principles of non-exclusive licensing and reciprocity. From another perspective, initiatives like 
HapMap or BiOS resemble classic patent pooling with cross-licensing, which is a behaviour common 
in many industries.953 A similar initiative for makers would be formed in the same way: a pool of 
patents placed under specific conditions. 
To reiterate, a patentleft idea is an engrossing concept which deserves further attention and 
elaboration. As the object of the study was the scope of patent exceptions, the study proposes a 
novel solution within the framework of patent limitations to address free tinkering and the public 
dissemination of information. Its objective is plain and simple: to free makers from infringing patent 
rights, from being involved in patent puzzles and from decoding abstruse patent claims. An 
instrument for makers should fulfil certain prerequisites – it should be: 
1) self-evident like private and non-commercial use, assumed almost intuitively; 
                                                          
952 "Cambia Enabling Innovation. FAQs - BiOS Agreements." "Cambia Enabling Innovation. FAQs - BiOS 
Agreements." 
953 Boettinger and Burk, "Open Source Patenting," 229-30. 
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2) non-discriminatory in terms of the technology field; 
3) enabling communal working; 
4) covering non-commercial uses. 
The concept of the green light license (the greenlight) responds to these expectations. However, a 
number of questions arise at this point: 
1) WHO: who should be given the license: the whole community or a single maker?  
2) WHAT: Which uses should it cover?  
3) HOW: What kind of license should it be? Should it be negotiated at all or be a blanket 
solution? 
4) WHY: This is a broad concept in terms of permissible uses and the target group. 
In regard to the first question, every maker should enjoy the freedom to make, and should be 
granted a green light license. To reiterate, a maker is a technology enthusiast who tinkers, 
develops, and improves solutions for one's own needs and/or to share with others for the mere act 
of sharing and enriching the maker community. The greenlight would exempt only makers who 
perform on a non-commercial basis; it would be a promise not to assert patent rights against public 
and non-commercial conducts. 
Regarding the question of what, the greenlight would go further than the experimental use 
exception, since making is more than reverse engineering for the better understanding of the 
patented technical teaching – making denotes learning and improving one's own skills. Tinkering on 
a patented device (or a patented component) would be the main indication for the greenlight, akin 
to experimental use. However, the scope of tinkering is almost limitless; it is also more than 
improving or repairing – playfulness is a part of making. 
As a conventional compulsory license covers the right to use, manufacture, and sell a patented 
invention, its milder derivative, the greenlight, would address all and only non-commercial uses, i.e. 
the development, adaptation, prototyping, and private-scale manufacturing (e.g. 3D printing) for 
the purposes of making. The greenlight would cover posting online information on a given 
improvement in the form of instructions, and would secure the makers themselves from the 
accusation of indirect infringement or inducement of infringement. 
The red light would turn on when making would cross the border of commercial applications, e.g. 
the sale of a new product. This also concerns the use of the results of making as tools for 
commercial purposes or in pursuing professional activities. 
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However, as long as makers do not usurp the patentee’s right to financial profits, a green light 
license should be upheld and should remain unpaid – otherwise, standard licensing (and royalties) 
should come into play. The main intention of the greenlight is to keep non-commercial making free 
from patent restrictions. 
Regarding the question of how, the term “license” does not pertain to a conventional contractual 
obligation negotiated with a patent holder, or to an administrative decision like a compulsory 
license. To a larger degree, the proposal resembles “an implied license” for making activities that 
would come into force the moment an idea is disclosed to the general public: in the case of open 
sharing and collective working (e.g. testing, prototyping), where the private and non-commercial 
use exception terminates, and the experimental use exception cannot fully support makers. In 
other circumstances, private and non-commercial use applies. The greenlight is an implied 
allowance from the patent holder – a tolerance of making behaviour (on a royalty-free basis!) and a 
promise not to sue under the conditions of making. 
The greenlight is a blanket solution, because open sharing cannot be supervised. In effect, as 
indicated in the first question, the greenlight should apply to all makers. Public use and the free 
dissemination of ideas represent the main obstacles in free making in light of the existing patent 
exceptions. The green light license should make collective (public and non-commercial) working 
lawful and remain non-discriminatory in regard to the technology field. 
The proposal of the greenlight envisages also establishing a database, in which makers could 
publish projects eligible for the green light license. This would centralise the makers' ideas, which 
are now spread out among various communities and user forums. 
When justifying the greenlight, one can reply that law sufficiently safeguards the freedom to work 
on patents if such work serves the better understanding of their technical teaching. However, 
making goes much further: it goes beyond pure experimenting; it mixes the patented idea with 
individual creations (one's own making). 
“Makers are champions of change.”954 The maker movement is a movement with a mission and a 
vision: a mission to educate and excite people about science, and a vision to make the world better 
and people happier through self-expression in making. It is worth recalling that the White House 
appreciated the contribution of makers to the welfare of Americans and proclaimed 18 June a 
                                                          
954  Howard, "The Maker Movement's Potential for Education, Jobs and Innovation is Growing." 
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National Day of Making.955 This is one of the many reasons why the maker movement should be 
finally given the deserved attention in the legal science. To reiterate, making is more than life-style 
gadgets – it educates (learning by doing), creates new jobs, and spreads the flare of innovation 
throughout society – which is exactly what patents intend to do. Moreover, it has a tremendous 
democratising impact: people participate, get involved, share, and feel responsible for themselves 
and their communities.956 That alone should be a sufficient enough justification for an appropriate 
legal tool to keep the space open for makers. There is not much theorising in the Maker movement 
– it takes place, it brings more benefit than one would expect, and thus it should be protected. 
The proposal of the greenlight aspires to establish a new statutory exception. However, at this 
initial phase, it intends to introduce a new model of a patent doctrine exempting the makers' non-
commercial activities to be adopted via judicial precedence. This modus operandi would facilitate 
the reception of the greenlight in the system. 
However, in light of the three-step test and its current construction, the green light license would 
hardly pass the first criterion of limited exception, i.e. a small diminution of patent rights, since it 
would exempt various uses upon patented products with the sole limitation to their non-
commercial character. The scope of non-commercial making activities is wide, e.g. taking a device 
apart, adding new components, switching some elements, mixing them with others, manufacturing 
certain parts (for the purpose of making), or even building a patented device – all can be recognised 
as making and using a patented solution. The greenlight is designed to derogate patent exclusivity 
from public and non-commercial uses; the greenlight would not curb the patentee’s exclusive right 
to make, use, offer to sell, and sell the invention on a commercial basis. 
In that regard, it would be nonetheless unrealistic to assume that meticulous legal minds and 
proponents of a strong patent system would acknowledge such a generous exception in favour of 
makers as a limited exception. 
Following the practice of the WTO Panel, once the first criterion has been excluded, the two other 
criteria – normal exploitation and legitimate interest – do not warrant further consideration. For 
the purpose of this analysis, it must be said that the greenlight may not be recognised as complying 
with the given construction of the other two criteria due to the possible curtailment of the 
economic interests of the patent holder, e.g. via home 3D printing of spare parts and instructions 
on enhancing patented solutions, as well as making similar solutions. When weighed against the 
                                                          
955  “You’re sort of the anti-Washington message, in that you guys just hang out and do great stuff,” said U.S. 
CTO Aneesh Chopra when introducing [Dale] Dougherty. Ibid.  
956  ibid. 
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rights of third parties, i.e. society itself, the greenlight proves more valuable due to the contribution 
of making to the overall welfare. As demonstrated in the analysis of the patent tree-step tests for 
patents delivered by the WTO Panel, the interests of third parties get the least degree of attention, 
though the patent system serves vital public interests and is not intended to solely protect 
individual and private interests of patent holders. 
When justifying the necessity for the greenlight, it must be accentuated that the proposal responds 
to the expectations arising from the deteriorated patent quality (to point it out again). How, 
otherwise, could one explain that individuals who do not possess advanced facilities and 
infrastructure to pursue their hobbies face the peril of being accused of patent infringement. 
Indeed, leading makers deliver great and often patent-worthy solutions, but not the whole 
community, not every single maker – the situation in the densely patented 3D printing field reflects 
such concerns perfectly. 
From this perspective, the greenlight could contribute as a pressure tool in ensuring the high 
quality of patents. The mere possibility of invoking the greenlight could discourage patent-seeking 
entities from requesting patent protection for weak, non-inventive solutions, just to limit or deter 
third parties from studying them thoroughly. Patent applicants, especially in the fields of 
electronics, robotics, and 3D printing, should bear in mind that the downstream maker movement 
tweaks with solutions in all possible ways. From that perspective, making can be regarded as an 
unofficial form of post-grant examination: the faster a given patent is re-made, the lower its value. 
As mentioned before, a supportive element of the greenlight would be a freely accessible database 
(the greenbase) with results delivered by makers who apply the greenlight. This would be also to 
the advantage of patent authorities, which would gain another valuable resource in their search for 
prior art. 
Paradoxically, a low degree of innovation is beneficial to the greenlight: the more people are 
capable of understanding (and remaking) patented subject-matter, the more people would require 
its protection. High patent quality gravitates towards a high degree of innovativeness – which is 
difficult to hack. The experimental use exception would be a supportive tool in understanding the 
technical teaching embedded in a patented solution. 
On the other hand, the recognition of the greenlight might result in the further convolution of the 
system with protection instruments in the name strengthening the patent system to impede the 
use of the greenlight. In such a situation, the acceptance of the greenlight would be artificial and 
fraudulent. The dominant pro-patent mindset articulates that no progress could be possible 
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without strong IP (patent) rights. In fact, the progress would not be possible without the 
dissemination of knowledge; the patent system assists with patent disclosure. The greenlight 
promotes the same idea; all the more that the access is guaranteed only via information sharing. A 
disclosure of information, i.e. public making, already constitutes a precondition of the greenlight. 
Posting outcomes of makers' investigations in the greenbase would further ensure its application. 
The greenlight proposal provokes us to reconsider the structure, values, and behaviours sanctioned 
in the present patent system. It does not exhort to abolish the system. Rather, it creates another 
window in the patent fortress. However, without a thorough re-evaluation and reform of the 
system, every pro-maker tool or any other novel “opening” concept will be just a phantom. 
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Chapter 7. FINDINGS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The underlying hypothesis challenged the functionality and effectiveness of existing patent 
limitations within the making scenario. The prior research assumed that certain limitations, such as 
private and non-commercial use, experimental use, the prior use right, and the repair doctrine, 
might protect making from patent liability, albeit in a narrow extent. The comparative analysis, 
partially assisted by the empirical study, proved the narrow application of exceptions and their 
inadequacy in supporting the activities of makers (public and non-commercial making). 
Patent limitations as such do not enjoy much attention in the legal discourse.957 Reports enlisting 
patent exceptions, such as those prepared by WIPO958, do not investigate their effectiveness and 
functionality, and conclude analysis with the conventional explanation “for the balance of 
interests.” Only experimental use and the Bolar exception have become the subjects of deep 
analyses and discussions owing to their economic significance, and in light of the objectives of the 
patent system. 
Exceptions are necessary in the system: it is acknowledged that without such measures, patent 
exclusivity would be too powerful and detrimental to the public interest in terms of further R&D 
operations and access to inventions. The exceptions limit the expansion of patents and ensure the 
free use of patented solutions in fields that patents were not designed to interfere with, such as the 
private sphere, international relations, and the sovereignty of third countries, as in the exception 
on permissible uses of patented subject-matters on vehicles and vessels. 
The dominant proprietary mindset, howerver, disregards patent exceptions. In the three-step test 
for patents, they are placed in the last criterion, which indicates the low position of third parties, 
including users, in the hierarchy of interests. This is also manifested by the ongoing criticism of 
imposing compulsory licensing schemes that apparently ruin the trust and stability of the patent 
system of the applying country, even if it serves crucial public purposes. 
This situation is driven by the unshakable conviction of the rightfulness of patent protection, 
despite the lack of unequivocal empirical evidence to support it, apart from sectoral analyses. 
Based on the latter, it can be inferred that the diversification of the protection measures can 
                                                          
957  See Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, "Limiting Patents," in Compulsory Licensing. Practical Experiences 
and Ways Forward, ed. Reto M. Hilty and Kung-Chung Liu (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2014). 
958 WIPO, "Questionnaire on Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights,"  
http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/exceptions/, accessed 17.07.2013. 
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provide a more efficient and just rewarding system. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that 
studies exploring the purposes behind patenting expose pure business and strategic objectives. 
The current state of affairs in the patent field reinforces the opinion on the necessity to balance the 
disproportion that affects end users. As presented in the survey analysis, makers indeed face 
difficulties such as limited access to resources and legal barriers (i.e. the legal protection of ideas), 
and might be targeted by patent holders when they disclose their ideas publicly. Protection against 
such scenarios is the objective of the greenlight. It stretches the ambit of patent limitation over 
making activities, which as such do not deviate to a large degree from traditional exceptions, such 
as private and experimental use. The green light license embraces the variety of making operations 
and eliminates the restrictions placed on the quantity and quality of uses in the public sphere and 
solely within non-commercial applications. It secures the immunity of uses once the concepts are 
posted in the greenbase, which enhances cooperation between patent offices and makers, 
becoming a source of information in patent prosecution.  
Not only do makers oppose the established paradigms of innovations, but also expose the flaws of 
the current patent system, with the main one being low patent quality. This issue, upheld by many 
practitioners, initiates a false chain-reaction resulting in the abundance of weak (trivial) patents 
that fuel the secondary market and portfolios of patent assertion entities. Low patent quality, 
pronounced in the obviousness of patented solutions, is often the cause of non-willful patent 
infringement due to the mistaken conviction that a certain solution is unpatentable. 
It is assumed that higher patent quality within the maker scenario would bear two implications: 
1) a greater scope of free state of the art due to higher thresholds of the non-obviousness and 
novelty of patented subjects; 
2) the lack of need for a special pro-maker legal tool, as makers would operate within the free 
state of the art, and would refer to the existing patent exceptions, e.g. experimental use. 
In regard to the latter, it was also considered whether the experimental use exception, as the most 
appropriate for making, should be construed in a broader way. The aforesaid manoeuvre could 
possibly lead to an excessive extension and a misinterpretation of the scope of the experimental 
use that could cover “unintended” uses. Furthermore, it would require a redefinition of what an 
experimental use is, as well as the types of operations it would cover. In that respect, it was found 
more suitable to propose a tool designed solely for makers, which would address the different 
aspects of making. 
The importance of this study is manifested first and foremost in the introduction of the maker 
movement to the legal science and, secondly, in the preparation of a guide for makers, which 
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explains the scope of permissible use of patented solutions – as there are many misconceptions in 
this field. 
In terms of branding, user innovation pertains to the same phenomenon, but remains an academic 
term (used mainly in the management field). The people it describes do not recognise themselves 
as user innovators but as makers. This remark does not solely concern the wording (as is common 
in legal discussions). Unlike the term user innovation, the concept of the maker movement 
describes not only individual innovators who work together, enjoy the work, and deliver interesting 
solutions, but much more. The maker movement introduces social changes, enhances democratic 
values, and, without exaggeration, saves young people from helplessness in destabilised regions – 
see makerspaces in Iraq959. Above that, making and makers exist in the political life – it is sufficient 
to recall that 18 June is the National Day of Making in the USA. 
This research is not alone in pointing out the pitfalls of the system and by calling for modifications 
to its paradigms and working. The patent community should work on enhancing patent 
requirements and the ethical standards of patent practice. As various critical opinions pertain to 
the implementation of patent law (e.g. patent enforcement and the determination of license fees), 
we should reconsider the justification of the patent system that recently has been strongly 
exploited for business purposes. 
 
  
                                                          
959 "Global Enterpreneurship and Maker Space Initative,"  www.gemsi.org, accessed 01.07.2014; Glen 
Dalakian II, "Iraq to be Reborn as Art & Science Hub through Baghdad Hackerspace,"  
http://www.wamda.com/2012/09/iraq-reborn-art-science-hub-through-baghdad-hackerspace, accessed 
01.07.2014. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
Kapitel 1. Einleitung und Forschungsfragen 
Diese Dissertation untersucht die Fragestellung, in wie weit Maker von speziellen 
Ausnahmeregelungen im Patentwesen (Patentbeschränkungen) profitieren können und deshalb im 
Rahmen Ihrer Aktivitäten von einem „freedom to operate“ ausgehen können.   
Es wird hinterfragt, inwieweit die Monopolstellung eines Patentinhabers beschränkt werden darf, 
und ob damit die Interessen der Verbraucher berührt werden. 
Einige Rechtsinstrumente beschneiden die Patent-Exklusivität ab initio aus bestimmen Handlungen 
heraus, was im weitesten Sinne dem Ausbalancieren von Interessen zwischen den Patentinhabern 
und Benutzern in einem spezifischen Handlungsumfeld diesen soll. 
Die Fragestellungen dieser Dissertation sind nicht von abstrakter Natur und bezwecken nicht eine 
rein theoretische Behandlung des Themas. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse sind stark praxisbezogen. Es 
ist zu untersuchen unter welchen Voraussetzungen die Wirkung von Patenten eingeschränkt sind 
und welche Auswirkungen solche Ausnahmeregelungen auf die Maker-Szene haben, um damit die 
kreativen Arbeiten der altruistisch motivierten Technikenthusiasten (Maker) unserer Zeit zu 
fördern.  
In diesem Zusammenhang führt diese Dissertation das Konzept des Maker Movements in den 
patentrechtlichen Diskurs ein, und verwendet dieses Konzept als Basis für die vorgenomme 
Analyse. 
Das Maker Movement bezeichnet ein Phänomen bzw. eine Massenbewegung von individuellen 
Entwickler – Maker - die in Technologiefeldern, wie Robotik, Elektronik und Elektrotechnik, 
hobbymäßig aktiv sind. Ihr technischer  Hintergrund ist oft stark mit ihrem beruflichen Leben 
verknüpft und erlaubt es den Makern auch komplexe technische Probleme zu lösen und neue 
technische Ideen (Erfindungen) einzuführen. Diese Szene hat einen gewissen Verhaltenskodex 
etabliert. Zu dessen wichtigsten Eigenschaften (Standards) gehört die altruistische Verbreitung des 
Wissens und Know-Hows. Die Maker teilen ihre Erkenntnisse und ihr Wissen mit anderen; die 
Bewegung basiert auf einem intensiven Informationsaustausch. 
Der Austausch an sich ist auf den ersten Blick nicht problematisch. Wenn man sich jedoch den 
spezifischen Inhalt mancher Entwicklungen ansieht, können Zweifel entstehen. Die verbreiteten  
Informationen betreffen meist die Art und Weise wie man eine Verbesserung einer bereits 
bestehenden Technologie erreichen kann. Dies kann insoweit kritisch werden, weil dies als Aufruf 
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zur Patentverletzung verstanden werden kann, auch wenn dies im privaten Umfeld, z.B. im 
Hobbyraum des Makers, auf nicht-kommerzieller Basis geschieht.  
Die technische Affinität sowie die hohen technischen Fähigkeiten vieler Maker und die Qualität 
ihrer Projekte rücken die Maker ins juristische Umfeld des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes. Zum einen 
sind deren Lösungen oft auch patentfähig, zum anderen kann deren Handeln in den Schutzbereich 
bestehender Rechte Dritter eingreifen. 
Die Maker beschäftigen sich mit neuen Lösungen und Verbesserungen von bereits existierenden 
Produkten, die sie im täglichen Leben benutzen. Eine besondere patentrechtliche Gefahr entsteht 
wenn die Maker Ideen verbreiten welche entweder auf einer patentierten technischen Lehre 
beruhen oder ein patentiertes Bestandteil betreffen und dies verbessern. 
Diese Dissertation betrachtet die Aktivitäten der Maker welche zum ersten ausschließlich einen 
nicht-kommerziellen Hintergrund haben und darüber hinaus in öffentlichen Maker-Foren 
vorgestellt/diskutiert werden. 
Seit Jahren wird, oft auch scharf diskutiert, ob das Patentsystem seine Ziele zur Technologie- und 
Innovationförderung, wie ursprünglich proklamiert, immer noch erfüllt. Wenn man die 
gegenwärtige Patentlandschaft betrachtet, kann man den Eindruck gewinnen, dass das System vom 
damalig beschnitten Weg abgekommen ist. Patente werden heute nämlich oft nur noch als 
Business-Tool angesehen oder als Waffe gegen Mitbewerber eingesetzt. 
Anders das Maker Movement welches eine alternative Trajektorie der technischen Entwicklung 
anstrebt, die auf den Prinzipien von „Open Sharing“ und Kooperation basiert. 
Die ersten empirischen Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema, durch Prof. Eric von Hippel, deuteten 
darauf hin, dass in diesem Bereich ein großes wirtschaftliches und technisches Potenzial steckt, 
welches später auch große Firmen erkannt haben. Projekte wie LEGO Mindstorm oder der Einkauf 
von dem von Makern (RepRap Community) generierten 3D-Drucker "Makerbot" durch Stratasys 
beweisen, dass es sehr lohnend sein kann, in die Ergebnisse eines Maker-Projekts zu investieren. 
Gegenwärtig etablieren bereits große Firmen, wie Lenovo oder Huawei „Makerspaces“ 
(Werkstätten für Maker), um das Potenzial derer Ergebnisse früher erkennen zu können. Dennoch 
wird die Mehrheit makerischer Lösungen ohne Unterstützung von externen Unternehmen 
entwickelt. 
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In Anbetracht dessen konzentriert sich diese Arbeit auf die Frage, inwieweit die Maker-Szene 
erteilte Patent zu respektieren hat oder unter welchen Voraussetzungen sich diese im 
privilegierten, patentschutzfreien Raum bewegt. 
Die unterliegende Hypothese setzt voraus, dass die Grundeigenschaften des Makings, d.h. die 
Gruppenarbeit und das Open Sharing, was hier freie und unbeschränkte Verbreitung von 
technischen Ideen bedeutet, tatsächlich gelebt wird und damit der Stand der Technik patentfrei 
weiterentwickelt wird. Die bestehenden Ausnahmeregelungen zum Patentschutz (Patentschranken, 
Patentbeschränkungen) können dieses Handeln aber aktuell nicht vollständig freistellen. Die 
Hypothese verlangte die grundlegende Analyse und das Würdigen der Ist-Situation, um dann im 
Anschluss die sich öffnenden Spielräume und Freiheitsgrade, insbesondere auch im internationalen 
Umfeld, beschreiben zu können.  
Der Zweck der Patentbeschränkungen bleibt klar: Sie manifestieren einerseits wichtige Grenzen  wo 
anderenfalls andere Rechtsgebiete oder Rechte Dritter unangemessen beeinträchtigt würden. 
Anderseits schützen sie ein relevantes öffentliches Interesse, wie dieses z.B. im Fall der 
experimentellen Benutzung einer Erfindung besteht.  
Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist somit nicht nur die rein rechtliche Analyse des Maker-Umfelds, 
sondern auch, falls notwendig, eine neue angepasste Form für eine Ausnahmeregelung, welche 
dem Geist des Maker Movement entgegenkommt, vorzuschlagen. 
Als methodischer Ansatz wurde die Vergleichungsanalyse von Patentbeschränkungen gewählt und 
für vier Patentsysteme durchgeführt. Der Vergleich betrifft die Patentsysteme von Deutschland, 
Japan, Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, die auf Grund ihrer 
patentrechtlichen aber auch wirtschaftlichen Relevanz, ausgewählt wurden. 
Die vorgenommene Analyse bezieht sich größten Teils auf die materiellen Aspekte der 
untersuchten Rechtsinstrumente, wobei bewusst weniger Aufmerksamkeit auf die prozedurale 
Materie gelegt wurde. Als grundlegendes Muster für die Analyse dient der Katalog von 
Patentbeschränkungen nach dem Artikel 27 der Einheitspatentgericht-Vereinbarung. Die Analyse 
umfasst daneben auch das Vorbenutzungsrecht und den Zwangslizenz-Mechanismus, welche 
ebenfalls zu Einschränkungen von Patentrechten führen. Das deutsche Patentsystem dient als 
Referenz-System für rechtliche Doktrinen. 
Ein Teil dieser Studie basiert auf einer empirischen Untersuchung in Form einer elektronischen 
Umfrage, die die Erfahrungen der Maker mit dem Patentrecht ermitteln soll. Die Umfrage zielte 
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explizit auf patentbezogene Hindernisse für Maker ab. Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie stellen die Basis 
sowie auch die empirische Begründung für das Projekt dar. 
 
Kapitel 2. Einleitung und Beschreibung des Phänomens "Maker Movement"  
Der Begriff das „Maker Movement“ ist relativ neu und aus der Zeitschrift „Make“,  einer Maker-
orientierten, populärwissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift entnommen, die im Jahr 2005 von Dale 
Dougherty gegründet wurde Der Beginn der Maker-Massenbewegung reicht jedoch bis in die 70-er 
Jahre  des vorigen Jahrhunderts zurück. 
Professor Eric von Hippel vom MIT hat die Entstehung der „neuen Innovationen-Quelle“ als 
Demokratisierung bezeichnet. Damit hat er die immer häufiger anzutreffende 
Technologieschaffung durch innovative Endverbraucher gemeint und als User Innovation 
bezeichnet. Im Rahmen seiner Untersuchungen beschreibt er die Aktivitäten der sich entfaltenden 
Maker-Bewegung als open-sharing (free-revealing) und kooperativ. 
Seine Beobachtungen entstanden gerade zu der Zeit, als die Gesellschaft neu erarbeitetes Know-
How als weiteren zentralen Punkt der Wertschöpfung anerkannt hat. Damals vollzogen die 
Gesellschaft und die Wirtschaft eine 180 Grad Drehung und „human capital“ bzw. „knowledge“ 
wurde ab dann als wesentliche Voraussetzung für eine Wertschöpfung erkannt. Dies führte auch zu 
Veränderungen im Verhältnis zwischen Hersteller und Verbraucher – Konzepte wie „co-creation“, 
„co-production“ haben sich erfolgreich am Markt etabliert, wobei Verbraucher als „Wertschöpfer“ 
und als „Ideen-Generator“ eingebunden werden.  
Darüber hinaus führten enorme Fortschritte bei den IuK-Technologien dazu, dass der 
Informationsfluss immer weiter beschleunigt wurde. Der dadurch ermöglichte, intensive 
Informationsaustausch förderte die Entwicklung unserer Wissensgesellschaft und die Einbindung 
der Endverbraucher. Sogar die Punk-Kultur brachte erfinderische und kreative Menschen hervor 
und führte zu einer „do it yourself“-Kultur. Alvin Toffler, ein amerikanischer Schriftsteller und 
Futurist, hat dafür einen Hybride-Begriff, „Prosumer“, d.h. „a producer“ und „a consumer“ in 
einem, entwickelt. 
Aus patentrechtlicher Sicht sind zwei Hauptaspekte für Maker besonders relevant: der 
Informationsaustausch (Open Sharing) und Zusammenarbeit. Darauf basiert die Kultur der Maker. 
Organisatorisch gesehen arbeiten die Maker in unterschiedlichen kooperativen Formen: 
strukturierte Gruppen mit klaren und strikten Teilnahme-Bedingungen, aber auch lose 
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Zusammenschlüsse von erfinderischen Hobbyisten, die sowohl online als auch offline tätig sind. Die 
Informationen fließen zwischen den Gruppen und einzelnen Maker frei hin und her und bleiben 
offen für weitere Anregungen und Peer-Reviewing. 
Hobbymäßige Beschäftigung kann sich aber auch in eine Einnahmen generierende Tätigkeit 
umwandeln. Maker sind, laut Studien und beobachteter Praxis, „accidental enterpreneurs“ 
(„zufällige/ungeplannte Unternehmensgründer“). Grundsätzlich werden die Projekte nicht wegen 
einer Gewinnerwartung gestartet. Diese entsteht erst im Laufe eines Vorhabens, wenn sich die 
Aussichten auf eine mögliche kommerzielle Verwertung immer mehr abzeichnen. Die in den letzten 
Jahren verstärkt auftretenden Crowdfunding-Plattformen erleichtern dabei wesentlich den Zugang 
zu finanziellen Mitteln, welche für die Grundfinanzierung eines Maker Startups essentiell sind. 
Erfolgreichen Maker-Projekte werden dann aber auch stärker mit patentrechtlichen Fragen 
konfrontiert. Ein Maker Projekt ist dann erfolgreich, wenn dieses zu einer populären, also viel 
diskutierten Lösung geführt hat oder mittels einer Crowdfunding-Kampagne finanziert werden 
konnte. Hierbei können erhebliche Summen eingesammelt werden, wie z.B. im Fall von FormLab, 
wo 1 Mio. US Dollar  für einen Desktop 3D Drucker („From1“) eingeworben wurde. 
Dieser Fall hat in den Medien viel Aufmerksamkeit gefunden, nachdem nicht nur FormLab, sondern 
auch die Crowdfunding-Plattform „Kickstarter“ von der Firma 3D Systems, wegen Patentverletzung, 
verklagt wurden. Die Auseinandersetzung wurde dann  aber im Rahmen einer außergerichtlichen 
Einigung beendet. 
Momentan beobachtet die Maker-Szene, mit angehaltenem Atem, die Entwicklung eines 
patentrechtlichen Streits zwischen Stratasys, einem großen 3D Drucker-Hersteller, und Afinia, 
einem mittelständischen Unternehmen, welches ebenfalls Desktop 3D Drucker anbietet. Die Maker 
sind dabei zweifach betroffen: 1) Stratasys hat eine aus der Maker-Community abstammende Firma 
(Projekt RepRap), MakerBot, gekauft und 2) Afinia wurde wegen der Benutzung einer weit 
verbreiteten Technologie verklagt, welche in der Community als freier Stand der Technik angesehen 
wird und deshalb von vielen Maker benutzt wird. 
 
Kapitel 3.  Maker im Umfeld des Patentsystems 
Das 3. Kapitel setzt sich mit den Grundsätzen des Patentschutzes auseinander und thematisiert die 
Probleme der Maker im Rahmen des aktuellen Patentsystems.  
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Bewegen sie Maker auf einem mit Patenten geschütztem Gebiet, ergeben sich schnell viele Fragen 
zur Rechtsmäßigkeit ihres Handelns.  
Die Tatsache, dass einige von Makern geführte Projekte die Aufmerksamkeit von Patentinhabern 
auf sich gezogen haben, reicht sicher nicht aus, um letztlich eine belastbare Grundlage für die 
Behauptung der fehlerhaften Funktionalität von Patentsystemen darzustellen. Schließlich ist es 
auch Zweck des Patentschutzes, im Fall einer Patentverletzung, dem Patentinhaber eine 
verlässliche Basis für die Durchsetzung seiner Rechte, zu bieten. 
Die Ausweitung des Patentschutzes auf neue Gebiete wie Software und Biotechnologie wirft jedoch 
Schatten auf die  Ziele des Patentsystems. So hat sich gezeigt, dass dies Einfluss auf die Qualität, 
d.h. den erfinderischen Abstand einer Neuentwicklung vom Stand der Technik, als auch die 
Patentierbarkeit von Lösungen insgesamt, nach sich gezogen hat. 
Das Patentsystem wird von einigen als Patent-Industrie bezeichnet, die per analogiam Patente 
herstellt um diese dann, durch Lizenzierung oder Verkauf zu verwerten. Eine Antwort auf die Frage, 
ob man damit den technischen Fortschritt oder nur eine quantitative Steigerung von Patenten, z.B. 
für die Abwehr von Wettbewerbern, erreicht, ist nicht in allen Fällen leicht.  Häufig gewinnt man 
aber doch den Eindruck, dass nur auf die Quantität und nicht auf die Qualität geachtet wird.  
Für Maker ist das dreifach wichtig: 
1) Es wird immer mehr patentiert und veröffentlicht. Es ist für eine Person fast unmöglich den 
gesamten Stand der Technik in einem Bereich zu recherchieren; 
2) Bedingt durch immer enger werdende Schutzbereiche nähern sich die Patente dem Stand der 
Technik immer weiter an, und grenzen damit den patentfreien Spielraum  für die Maker immer 
weiter ein; 
3) Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Patentinhaber ist für eine Privatperson (Maker) aus 
finanziellen Gründen, trotz einiger „Erleichterungen“ wie inter partes-Review vor dem USPTO, 
fast unmöglich. De facto bleibt oft nur ein „working around“ übrig. 
Spannungen zwischen den Makern und dem Patentsystem sind unvermeidbar: Während die Maker-
Szene immer mehr Zulauf bekommt und immer komplexere Lösungen anbietet, bewirkt die 
steigende Patentdichte, zusätzlich verschärft durch ein immer breiteres Spektrum von 
Spezialformen technischer Schutzrechte, dass die Freiheitsgrade für makerisches Handeln, immer 
stärker eingeschränkt werden. 
Die Kritik an den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen und den bestehenden Patentsystem bleibt 
unvollständig und möglicherweise dadurch fehlerhaft, wenn im Rahmen dieser Arbeit bewiesen 
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würde, dass die Patentbeschränkungen aktiv das Ungleichgewicht zwischen Patentinhabern und 
Makern reduziert, und damit Betätigungsfeld  in ausreichendem Maß freigehalten wird. 
 
Kapitel 4. Vergleichende Analyse von Patentbeschränkungen 
Die Analyse folgt dem Katalog der Patentbeschränkungen gemäß Artikel 27 des Übereinkommens 
über ein Einheitliches Patentgericht. Darüber hinaus werden in dieser Arbeit die öffnenden 
Wirkungen des Vorbenutzungsrechts, des Patenterschöpfungsgrundsatzes, und der daraus 
resultierenden Doktrinen von „Reparatur und Neuherstellung“, sowie die Doktrinen von Nicht-
äquivalenten Lösungen, als Verteidigungsmechanismen (Defence tools) gegen Verletzungsvorwürfe 
diskutiert. 
Die Schlussfolgerungen zeigen, dass die heute existierenden "Öffnungsklauseln" im gewerblichen 
Rechtsschutz bezüglich den Ziele und Aktivitäten der Maker-Szene inkompatibel oder unzureichend 
sind.  Die Ausnahmeregelungen haben sehr enge Anwendungsfelder, die lediglich einen kleinen Teil  
des Spektrums der Making Aktivitäten (Open Sharing, Veröffentlichung von patent-relevanten 
Informationen) decken bzw. zulassen. 
So gilt es z.B. Freistellung, welche für Maker völlig irrelevant sind, wie z.B. die Benutzung von 
patentierten Gegenständen an Bord von Schiffen und für die Bedürfnisse des Schiffes, sowie für 
den Betrieb von Luft- und Landfahrzeugen. Gleiches gilt für Einzelzubereitung von Arzneimitteln, 
oder den Landwirtschaftsprivileg.  
Als irrelevant wurden die Einschränkungen bezeichnet, die zwar Anwendungsgebiete betreffen, 
welche für Maker zwar zugänglich sind, diese aber nicht bearbeiten,  wie z.B. im Fall von 
Interoperabilität-Vorschriften oder beim Bolar-Prinzip.  
Die Mechanismen der Nicht-äquivalenz sind in der täglichen Making-Routine nicht hilfreich, weil sie 
erst im Patentverletzungsverfahren zur Anwendung kommen. Jedoch erst das Wissen über solche 
Rechtsinstrumente, erlaubt es den Makern sich mit Patenten intensiv zu beschäftigen und dem 
Aspekt der Äquivalenz angemessene Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. 
Vier Arten von Freistellungen begünstigen die Maker, wenn auch nur in einem begrenzten Rahmen. 
Dies vor allem deshalb, weil sie nur teilweise die Bedingungen, unter denen Maker arbeiten, 
berücksichtigen. 
Die private und nicht-kommerzielle Benutzung setzt zwei eindeutigen Konditionen voraus, und 
zwar, dass die Benutzung nur für persönlichen Gebrauch erfolgt und daraus keine finanziellen 
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Vorteile resultieren. Streng genommen bedeutet das, dass die Maker anderen Maker die 
entwickelte Projekte nicht präsentieren dürfen.  Da die Veröffentlichung einer von einem Maker 
generierten Idee auf einer Maker Plattform keine reine persönliche und private Benutzung 
darstellt, und damit eine Voraussetzung für eine Beschränkungen nicht vorliegt, auch wenn die 
Benutzung weiter nicht-kommerziell bleibt.  
Da aber das Austauschen von Informationen über technische Aspekte, sowie die 
Veröffentlichungen möglicher weiterer Anwendungen einer Technologie essentielle Basis der 
Maker-Kultur ist, kann diese "Freistellung" ins Leere laufen.  
Die Benutzung von patentierten Erfindungen für experimentelle Zwecke bietet einen größeren, 
wenn nicht den größten, Spielraum für die Maker. Versuche zur Eignungsprüfungen einer Erfindung 
oder zu deren Weiterentwicklung, dürfen Dritte, also auch Maker, ohne Erlaubnis des 
Rechtsinhabers durchführen.  
Dabei ist wesentlich, dass diese Art der Freistellung (experimentelles Prinzip) nicht unter allen 
Rechtsordnungen identisch ist. So ist die amerikanische Doktrin sehr konservativ und streng: Sie 
erlaubt nur Handlungen, die der Befriedigung der wissenschaftlichen Neugier und/oder der 
Untersuchung der Erfindung dienen. Selbst Versuche mit minimal kommerziellem Charakter sind 
von der freistellenden Wirkung der experimentellen Benutzung ausgeschlossen. Die deutschen 
sowie die britischen Doktrinen erscheinen liberaler und „großzügiger“, da sie eine finanzielle 
Motivation hinter den Versuchen dulden können, solange die Versuche der Gewinnung von 
Erkenntnissen, bezüglich der Weiterentwicklung der Erfindung, dienen.  
Die experimentelle Benutzung umfasst Messungen, das Reverse-Egineering und das Testen des 
patentierten Gegenstands. Die Herstellung an sich bleibt aber von der Freistellung ausgeschlossen. 
In Bezug auf Maker klingt die experimentelle Benutzung plausibel und Maker-freundlich. Jedoch 
benötigt das Making an sich ein viel breiteres Spektrum an Aktivitäten, als die erlaubte 
experimentelle Benutzung. Making setzt das Mischen von Elementen, Ändern oder Ergänzen mit 
neuen Teilen voraus. Durch das Open Sharing können Änderungen in Folge der Veröffentlichung 
künftig weltweit durchgeführt werden.  
Das Vorbenutzungsrecht wird selten herangezogen – das Risiko einer gerichtlichen 
Auseinandersetzung sowie die hohen Hürden bezüglich der Beweisführung, machen dieses 
Instrument eher unbeliebt. 
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Das Privileg der Vorbenutzung dient dem Schutz von gewerblichem und wirtschaftlichem 
Besitzstand, und verhindert die unbillige Vernichtung der vor der "gegnerischen" Patentanmeldung 
geschaffenen Werte und Gegenstände. Die vor dem Anmeldetag dieser Patentanmeldung erfolgten 
Arbeiten sollten sich dabei in einem fortgeschrittenen Vorbereitungsstadium befinden und auf die 
kommerzielle Verwertung abzielen. 
In Bezug auf das Making, verhindern die folgenden Anforderungen des Vorbenutzungsrechts die 
wirksame Durchsetzung des Privilegs: 
1) geheime Vorbereitungen zur Kommerzialisierung – das Making ist oft ein gemeinsames, 
öffentlich präsentiertes Vorhaben (entsprechend dem offiziellen Maker Manifest); 
2) das Privileg wird national geregelt und erstreckt sich nur auf ein bestimmtes Unternehmen und 
Territorium, während Maker-Gruppen weltweit tätig sind. In Hinsicht darauf schränkt das 
Vorbenutzungsrecht die Patentexklusivität für die Maker Szene nicht ausreichend ein, um deren 
Aktivitäten zu unterstützen; 
3) der kommerzielle Ansatz steht im krassen Widerspruch zur Philosophie der Maker-Szene. 
Nach dem Reparaturprinzip werden solche Handlungen freigestellt, die das Ersetzen von 
abgenutzten bzw. gebrochenen Bestandteilen bezwecken, um die übliche Funktionalität des 
patentierten Objekts wieder herzustellen. Die Umsetzung dieser Definition gehört mit zu den 
größten Herausforderungen des Patentrechts: Es ist enorm wichtig die Grenze zwischen erlaubter 
Reparatur und rechtswidriger Wiederherstellung zu erkennen und zu respektieren. Die aktuelle 
Rechtsprechung lässt zwar gewisse Prinzipien erkennen. Dennoch verlangt deren Anwendung das 
detaillierte Analysieren des Handlungskontexts im Lichte der betroffenen Patente. 
Gerade die wachsende Verfügbarkeit von Desktop 3D Druckern für Privatpersonen zwingt zu 
gründlicher Betrachtung vom sachlichen Umfang des Reparatur-Prinzips, insbesondere wenn 
gewisse Bestandteile bereits zu Hause hergestellt werden können. 
Die Notwendigkeit des Prinzips im Patentsystem ist unbestritten; jedoch öffnet es in seiner jetzigen 
Form nur eine kleine Hintertür im Bollwerk des Patentschutzes. Um dieses Instrument rechtmäßig 
umsetzen zu können, bedarf es einer qualifizierten Analyse zum Schutzbereich, also was rechtlich 
geschützt ist, welche Teile zur technischen Lehre gehören und den Kern der patentierten Erfindung 
darstellen. Dies sind  Fragen, die für Personen die mit dem Patentwesen nicht vertraut sind, nicht 
zu beantworten sind. 
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Kapitel 5. Die Zwangslizenz 
Die Zwangslizenz (ZL) stellt ein weiteres Instrument zur Öffnung der Patentexklusivität dar und kann 
im Einzelfall von enormer Signifikanz sein. Diese Dissertation diskutiert die Mechanismen der ZL im 
Lichte des Making-Umfelds.  
Das Instrument der Patentzwangslizenz (im Unterscheid zur kartellrechtlichen Zwangslizenz) gehört 
zu den dramatisten Rechtsinstrumenten, die das Patentsystem kennt. Es bezweckt die 
Einschränkung der Rechte eines Patentinhabers im Wege einer administrativen bzw. gerichtlichen 
Entscheidung (d.h. ohne Zustimmung des Patentinhabers). Dieser Eingriff erfolgt meist dann, wenn 
ein Missbrauch vorliegt oder wenn die vitalen Interessen der Öffentlichkeit beeinträchtigt werden. 
Eine ZL gesteht die Benutzung auch gegen den Willen eines Patentinhabers zu.  
Das Instrument hat sich im Patentumfeld seit langem etabliert. Es wurde in der PVÜ, im Artikel 
5.A.2 als eine Ausnahmeregelung zur Nicht-ausübung eines gewährten Patents, international 
eingerichtet. Die spätere Fortentwicklung der internationalen (und nationalen) 
Patentrechtsgrundlagen hat weitere Bedingungen und Umstände für die Zwangslizenz 
harmonisiert, z.B. erfolgloses Bemühen des Lizenzsuchers oder wettbewerbswidrige Handlungen 
des Rechtsinhabers. 
Das TRIPS Übereinkommen legt die Hauptvoraussetzungen der Zwangslizenz fest. Durch die globale 
Harmonisierung der Zwangslizenz haben deren Gestaltung und Umsetzung weltweit ähnliche 
Formen angenommen. Unabhängig von den administrativen Unterschieden zwischen den 
Rechtsordnungen, die materiellen Hauptaspekte bleiben gleich, wie diese im dem TRIPS-
Übereinkommen festgelegt wurden. Lediglich die USA erkennen die Patentzwangslizenz nicht an; es 
werden aber naheliegende Rechtsinstrumente für bestimmte Anwendungsbereiche konzipiert, wie 
z.B. die Zwangslizenz nach dem Luftverschmutzungsgesetz (Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. Chapter 85). 
In der Praxis scheint die ZL nur auf internationaler Ebene von Bedeutung zu sein. Die Erteilung von 
nationalen Zwangslizenzen findet nämlich kaum statt: das umständliche Verfahren, die hohen 
Anforderungen bezüglich der Beweislast zur Gewährung eine ZL und der imense Aufwand den der 
Prozess selbst in Anspruch nimmt, führen dazu, dass die ZL ein „ungeliebtes“ Rechtsinstrument ist. 
Auffallend ist dabei, dass die Zwangslizenzen meist die Herstellung bzw. den Vertrieb von 
Arzneimitteln in Entwicklungsländer betreffen. 
Überdies wird jede Erteilung einer ZL sehr kontrovers und kritisch gesehen, auch wenn diese 
rechtmäßig und begründet ist, wie z.B. die ZL auf Bayer’s Nexavar für Natco Pharma im Jahr 2012. 
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Das Ergebnis der Analyse zeigt, dass die Zwangslizenz für die Maker von keinerlei praktischer 
Bedeutung ist. 
Erstens, Maker gehören nicht zu den freiwilligen Lizenzsuchern, die an die Tür eines Patentinhabers 
klopfen würden. Auch sind die finanziellen Ressourcen der Maker sehr eingeschränkt, was eine 
Lizenznahme meist ausschließt. Es wird in dieser Dissertation zwar von einer Massenbewegung 
gesprochen, letztendlich aber arbeitet jede(r) Maker im eigenen Namen, auch wenn dies in 
Kooperation mit anderen Maker erfolgt. Maker benötigen für die Zwecke des Projekts auch häufig 
gemeinsame Ressourcen, aber grundsätzlich keine gemeinsame Lizenz, welche Lizenzgebühren mit 
sich bringen würde. Ein Projekt wird eher aufgegeben, als aufwändige Verhandlungen mit 
Patentinhabern (bzw. mit Lizenzinhabern) zu führen. 
Diejenigen, die sich um eine ZL bemühen, haben geschäftliche und finanzielle Interessen im 
Rahmen einer gewerblichen Tätigkeit. Anderenfalls wäre das Bemühen um eine ZL unvernünftig 
und riskant. Zwar gibt es Maker, die erfolgreich eigene Ideen kommerzialisieren. Diese sind aber 
nicht Gegenstand dieser Dissertation, welche sich ausschließlich auf öffentliche (public) und nicht-
kommerzielle Aktivitäten beschränkt. 
Grundsätzlich ist jede Standardbedingung für eine Zwangslizenz in Bezug auf das Making abwegig. 
Die Hauptbedingungen für eine ZL, d.h. erfolgloses Bemühen eine Lizenz zu erhalten, 
kartellrechtliche Hintergründe oder öffentliches Interesse, sind im Umfeld der Maker Szene nicht 
einschlägig. Auch patentieren Maker selten ihre eigenen Ideen (entweder aus Kostengründen oder 
aus reiner Antipatent-Ideologie). Schon allein die Maker Grandphilosophie eliminiert den Aspekt 
des gefährdeten öffentlichen Interesses für die Einräumung einer Zwangslizenz, weil die 
"makerische" Ideen der Gesellschaft frei zu Verfügung gestellt werden. 
Man darf auch nicht aus dem Blick verlieren, dass ZL selbst im wirtschaftlichen Umfeld nur sehr 
selten beantragt werden. Für Maker spielt dieses Instrument dann gar keine Rolle mehr. 
 
Kaptiel 6. Greenlight für Maker 
Der Vorschlag zur Etablierung eines Greenlights (GL) für Maker zielt auf die Freistellung von 
patentgeschützten Lösungen für die von öffentliche (public) und nicht-kommerzielle Benutzung ab. 
Es umfasst sowohl das Benutzen von geschützten Gegenständen (Prototyping, Making, Mixing), als 
auch das Open Sharing von Informationen und Anweisungen. 
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Es wurde gezeigt, dass die jeweiligen Ausnahmeregelungen an sehr stringente Bedingungen 
geknüpft sind und damit das Making nur teilweise unterstützen. Die gesetzmäßige Umsetzung 
verlangt umfassende Kenntnisse im Patentwesen, um sich im Making im gesetzlichen Rahmen 
bewegen zu können. Das kommt jedoch dem Geist der Maker Szene nicht entgegen und bietet 
darüberhinaus keine für Maker praktikable Lösung. 
Als neuer rechtlicher Rahmen wird vorgeschlagen, dass genug freier Raum geschafft wird, ohne die 
kommerziellen Interessen der Patentinhaber zu beeinträchtigen. 
Das GL-Konzept würde diese Forderungen erfüllen und hat die folgenden Eigenschaften: 
1) Es ist intuitiv begreifbar, wie private und nicht-kommerzielle Benutzung (trotz vieler auch hier 
herrschender Missverständnisse); 
2) Es ist nicht diskriminierend in Bezug auf ein Technologiefeld; 
3) Es erlaubt Gemeinschaftsprojekte, welche zu den wichtigsten Aspekten beim Making gehören; 
4) Es adressiert ausschließlich nicht-kommerzielle Benutzungen. 
Nur Privatpersonen, d.h. Maker, die neue Lösungen entwickeln und dabei bereits patentierte  
Lösungen verbessern unterliegen dem Schutz des GL. 
Das GL gilt wie eine Duldung des Patentinhabers Making-Aktivitäten durchzuführen. Es ist weder 
eine Lizenz in klassischem Sinne, noch eine administrative Entscheidung, die bestimmte Patente 
betrifft. Das GL funktioniert eher als „implied license“ und tritt im Moment der Offenbarung einer 
Idee, z.B. online als ein Forum-Post und gilt solange die Entwicklung und Benutzung keinen 
kommerziellen Charakter hat. 
Das GL ergänzt den Wirkungsbereich der erlaubten privaten und nicht-kommerziellen, sowie auch 
der experimentellen Benutzung, welche zur Zeit fürs Making nicht ausreichend ist. 
Der Vorschlag besteht aus zwei Teilen: dem rechtlichen Konzept und einer Datenbank für Maker 
Ideen. 
Die GL-Datenbank (Greenbase) fasst die "makerischen" Ideen, die auf verschieden Maker 
Plattformen verstreut sind, zusammen. Die Veröffentlichung in der Datenbank wäre eine 
Voraussetzung, vor allem in der GL-Einführungsphase, um die Maker Lösungen unter dem Dach von 
GL freizustellen. Die Datenbank würde makerische Lösungen dokumentieren – unter Umständen 
auch eine Referenz für Patentprüfungsrecherchen darstellen – und damit auch einen durch Maker 
generierten Stand der Technik schaffen, um die Patentierung von nicht-erfinderischen und/oder 
nicht-neuen Lösungen zu verhindern. 
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Projektziel wäre es also auch diese Datenbank, als eine wichtige Quelle für Recherchen  zum Stand 
der Technik, zu etablieren, welche dann auch eine wichtige Rolle im Rahmen der Patentprüfung 
durch die Patentämter spielen könnte. 
Der Autorin ist es bewusst, dass der GL-Vorschlag sehr ambitioniert ist, und als unzulässig gesehen 
werden kann, da damit „erhebliche“ Einschränkung der Patentexklusivität verbunden wäre. Dies 
vor allem bei der gegenwärtigen Tendenz, den Kreis patentierbarer Technologie eher zu erweitern 
und die Rechte aus dem Patent zu verstärken. Es wird auch viel berichtet (beobachtet), dass sich die 
Patente sich nicht nur "horizontal" ausbreiten und so mehr Technologiefelder abdecken, sondern 
auch „vertikal“ und damit der erfinderische Abstand neuer Patente zum Stand der Technik immer 
kleiner wird, also der Grad des Erfindungsbeitrags absinkt. 
In Hinblick darauf ist es zu beachten, dass das Patentsystem auch einen gewissen Freiraum für die 
Benutzung von patentierten Lösungen gewährleisten muss und sollte dies auch aktiv und nicht nur 
auf dem Papier tun, um seine Ziele in Hinblick auf die Förderung der Fortentwicklung des Stands 
der Technik erreichen zu können. Das Maker Movement ist ein gesellschaftlich und wirtschaftlich 
signifikantes Phänomen, das patentrechtliche Aufmerksamkeit  verdient. Um dieses zu fördern, 
muss das Patentsystem in seiner jetzigen Gestalt, auch gegen den Willen des Patentinhabers, für 
Maker geöffnet werden. 
Betonung verdient die Tatsache, dass die besprochene Notwendigkeit zur Öffnung der 
Patentexklusivität auch durch die niedrigere Patentqualität verursacht wird.  
„Makers are champions of change“. Maker sind mehr als ein Verein von individuellen Erfindern, die 
sich mit Technologien hobby-mäßig beschäftigen. Das Making fördert die Leidenschaft an Wissen 
und Wissenschaften, kreiert langfristig neue Arbeitsplätze und unterstützt die Menschen dabei 
eigene Entwicklungswege zu beschreiten und die gefundenen Lösungen zu realisieren. Es entstehen 
Makerspaces in Kriegs- und Krisengebiete, wie in Gaza oder dem Nahen Osten.  Die Bewegung hat 
starke pro-demokratische Auswirkungen: die Menschen werden ermutigt sich zu engagieren und 
fühlen sich verantwortlich für ihre Projekte und die Arbeitsgruppen. Der 18. Juni wurde in den USA 
als Nationaltag fürs Making proklamiert.  
 
Kapitel 7. Schlussfolgerungen 
Diese Dissertation hatte zweierlei Aufgaben:  
1) Die Maker Bewegung in den patentrechtlichen Diskurs einzuführen und  
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2) Die Anwendbarkeit der bereits existierenden Patentbeschränkungen in Bezug auf die Maker 
Bewegung zu bewerten. 
Besonders die Regelungen zur Beschneidung des Patentschutzes werden in der aktuellen 
Diskussion vernachlässigt und lediglich mit einer oberflächlichen Erklärung zum „Ausgleich der 
Interessen“ abgetan. 
Selbst der Drei-Stufen-Test (Artikel 30, TRIPS) berücksichtigt die Interessen Dritter erst im letzten 
Schritt, was auf die Stellung in der Bedeutungshierarchie hinweist. Der Ruf nach Erteilung einer 
Zwangslizenz führt meist zu enormer Empörung.  
Stets begegnet man der fantastischen, fast religiös anmutenden Behauptung, dass das bestehende 
Patentsystem die technische Entwicklung fördert und bereits leichte Einschränkung des 
Patentschutzes die ganze Industrie unzulässig bremsen würde. 
Das was Maker leisten zeigt offensichtlich, dass eine technische Entwicklung auch ohne Patente 
und ohne finanzielle Belohnung und Marktexklusivität möglich ist. Die Bewegung beanstandet die 
klassischen Paradigmen der Innovationen und zeigt einen Weg, wie man Interessen anderer 
Menschen berücksichtigen kann, und sich dabei ethisch einwandfrei ihnen gegenüber verhält. 
Das Making lenkt auch immer das Augenmerk auf die die Patentqualität, die momentan zum Haupt-
Patentthema avisiert, und dabei viele weitere Makel des Patentsystems an die Oberfläche spült. 
Die trivialen und schwachen Patente, die gleichen Schutz wie wesentliche Erfindungen gewähren, 
bremsen oft Entwicklungen Dritter, und fördern den sekundären Patentmarkt, wo Patente wie 
Güter gehandelt werden. 
Es ist zu überlegen, ob durch eine  höhere Patentqualität dieses Problem komplett eliminiert 
werden würde, weil es automatisch mehr nicht-erfinderischen Raum zur Verfügung stellen würde, 
in welchem sich Maker (und andere Benutzer) frei bewegen könnten. 
Kritische Meinungen zum heutigen Patentsystem betreffen vor allem die Umsetzung, bzw. den 
Missbrauch in der Umsetzung, von gegebenen Instrumenten, die von vielen geduldet bzw. 
akzeptiert werden. Es wird vorgeschlagen das Patentsystem mit einer "Patentleft“-Option 
auszustatten, wie dies vergleichbar beim Urheberrecht geschehen ist. Ein "Patentleft"-Konzept 
bietet das Greenlight für die Maker Szene an. 
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Appendix 
A. Survey on Makers and Patent Law 
1. Introduction 
The technological sophistication of makers, together with the prosperous growth of their projects, 
results in their exposure to patents. The results of this exposure can be twofold: makers may decide 
to patent their idea or, worse, receive a notification of alleged patent infringement. The latter may 
occur because making comprises of tinkering with and improving on existing patent-enclosing 
products, sharing information and/or instructing other makers how to achieve a presented 
solution. 
The following questions underlie this survey: Do makers patent their solutions? Do they reach the 
point where a patent holder challenges their work, alleging patent infringement? These are the 
questions which are derived from the hypothesis of this project. 
In regard to the second question, the media record only big cases, such as Stratasys v Afinia, leaving 
small-scale ones unnoticed. In effect, the need arises of investigating this matter directly by makers 
themselves via a survey posted in the makers’ online communities. In terms of patenting, it was of 
interest to understand whether there is a desire to pursue patent protection, as patent office 
databases do not contain such information. 
 
2. Method 
a) General 
The survey was posted on March 23, 2014, and was accessible until June 30, 2014. The invitations 
were posted in the following online communities: the RepRap Forum and the RepRap Forum 
Google+, Make Forum Google+, Make Hangar Google+, Makers, hackers, artists & engineers 
Google+, Arduino: Forum Google+, Raspberry Pi Google+, Makers – Electronics, Robotics, 3D 
Printing & More Google+. Reminders were sent out every 3 weeks. 
The general population of the survey can be estimated at the level of more than 300.000 members 
(by adding up the numbers of members registered in the named communities). However, it cannot 
be excluded that a person can belong to more than one community (like the author herself). 
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In light of the above, the answer ratio of 94 participants (who completed the survey) looks rather 
modest; nonetheless, it allows for indicating certain tendencies and provides the required evidence 
in support of the hypothesis. 
 
b) Selection of Communities 
The selection of communities represented a real challenge. Google+, which is the main source of 
makers’ communities, provides an infinite number of groups, with new groups emerging constantly. 
Therefore, the focus rests on classic examples of makers’ groups, like RepRap and MAKE magazine, 
Arduino, Raspberry Pi, and Adafruit Industries. One community, “Makers-Electronics, Robotics, 3D 
printing & More”, was selected since it directly pertains to makers. 
The target groups for the survey were selected according to the following criteria: 
a) the community should have a voluntary/discretionary and open character, 
b) it should not be supported by any company (e.g. Mindstorms by Lego), unless created around a 
company established by a maker (e.g. Adafruit) 
c) it should be technology-related.  
 
c) The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire comprised of four parts, each beginning with an explanatory introduction. 
In the first part, respondents were asked about the way they innovate: whether in a community or 
individually, and if so, whether they share their ideas with others. The second part concerned their 
experience in commercializing their solutions: whether the process is conducted in cooperation 
with a manufacturer or individually; and which features determined the attractiveness of the 
innovation for the market. 
The third part constituted the core of the questionnaire. It first asked about the obstacles that the 
respondents are faced with in the course of innovating; it also measured their experience in 
patenting and asked about their reasons for filling a patent application or refraining to do so. This 
part queried in detail whether the respondents have been notified of alleged patent infringement, 
what was the cause of the claim, its outcome, and the country the situation took place in. 
The fourth part referred to the technological background of the respondents' activities as makers: 
the industry sector, the type of innovation, country, and years of experience. 
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The questionnaire was anonymous. It consisted of binary questions and was designed to measure 
the frequencies of asked occurrences. 
 
d) Preparation 
The launch of the survey in March 2014 was the second attempt at holding a survey that was 
prepared in 2012. The first launch of the survey took place in November 2012 and lasted until May 
2013, when it was discontinued due to a low answer rate (55 completed/110 opened). For that 
reason, the first attempt was considered as a test run and the collected answers were not taken 
into account in the current study. 
Three groups were identified as target groups – the RepRap Community, the readers of MAKE 
magazine and the alumni of JugendForscht960. 
The questionnaire was distributed via invitations posted on community forums, Facebook profiles, 
and Google+ groups (after the kind recommendation of the MAKE magazine). Initially, the 
reminders were sent out after the first two weeks; and later – at approximately one-month 
intervals. 
The preliminary analysis was posted on the websites of the inquired communities. The obtained 
results and the overall progress of the project stimulated and motivated the re-launch of the 
survey, which was later appended with questions measuring the makers' experience in patenting. 
Prior to the first launch, the questionnaire was pre-tested and distributed among: 
1) the colleagues in the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, 
2) invitations posted on RepRap and the MAKE magazine forum. 
Respondents were asked to provide feedback on the comprehensibility of the questionnaire. 
Consequently, several changes were included to improve the clarity of questions.  
The preparation and the conduct of this survey illustrates the maker approach of learning by doing. 
 
                                                          
960 "Stiftung Jugend Forscht e. V.,"  http://www.jugend-forscht.de, accessed 16.10.2014. 
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3. Results Analysis 
The questionnaire was opened 162 times and completed in 94 cases; however, in 10 cases, some 
answers in the last fourth part (technological background) were omitted. This situation happened 
despite the existence of a function which disallowed leaving the question unanswered. In such 
cases, the questionnaire was dropped, while the answers were nonetheless included in the 
analysis. Below is the quantitative description of the results: 
 
Part 1 – How Do You Make? 
This part pertained to the way the respondents were engaged in making activities. 
Table 1. Classification of making activities, n=94 (100%) 
How do you innovate? 
in a community 63 (67%) 
Individually 31 (33%) 
 
In the community group, active contributors, i.e. community innovators, dominated over helpers 
who assisted in the communities' workings (42 to 21 answers). Among individual makers, only eight 
respondents declared to work individually and to maintain their solutions for personal use only. The 
majority (25 respondents) shared their idea with friends or other enthusiasts with whom they 
continue to develop the idea or to whom they deliver the results (a finished product). 
 
Part 2 – Have You Ever Commercialized? 
The survey revealed that 26 respondents (27.7%; n=94, 100%) had experience in the 
commercialization of their developments; more new designs (19 answers) then improvements (15 
answers) became marketable products.  
The prevalence of the respondents carried out the process individually, with no support from 
manufacturers (Chart 1). 
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Chart 1. Descriptive characteristics of how the solution was commercialized, n=26, multiple 
choice 
 
In terms of features that spoke in favour of the marketization, the survey recorded strong 
differences between the two types of solutions in two variables: 1) a pioneer solution, 2) additional 
new functions – exactly as it was assumed. However, in other variables, the distinction between the 
two types was not so pronounced (Chart 2). 
Chart 2. Classification of the attributes of marketed solutions, n=26, multiple choice 
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Part 3 – Experience With Patent Law 
In terms of patenting, only twelve respondents (12.8%; n=94, 100%) claimed to have applied for a 
patent, with the following outcomes: the patent was granted (3 answers), the application is still 
pending (5 answers), and the application was rejected (4 answers). The reasons underlying their 
decisions are ranked as follows (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Reasons for patenting the solution, n=12, multiple choice 
Why have you decided to apply for a patent? 
I wanted to monetize my investment and 
license my invention 
6 
I decided to start a company and wanted to 
protect my invention 
2 
The manufacturer I work with insisted on 
patent protection 
2 
Other: 
As proof that I had contributed 
Protect from competition 
2 
 
There is a strong correlation between commercialization pursuits and patenting: eight respondents 
who considered applying for patent protection also marketed their solutions.961 
The prevalence of participants, 82 respondents (87.8%; n=94, 100%), did not apply for a patent, 
indicating the following reasons (Table 3). 
Table 3. Reasons for not patenting, n=82, multiple choice 
Why have you refrained from patenting? 
High patenting costs 39 
It was not necessary 31 
The invention would not meet the 
patentability criteria 
20 
Other: 26 
 
                                                          
961  p =.0056, McNemar’s test, p =.002 Fischer’s exact test. 
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The option "other" allowed the respondents to provide a different reason for non-patenting, with 
the majority using this possibility to manifest their opinions on the patent system. 
The given answers can be clustered in the following way: 
1) disregard for the patent system and the support of (involvement in) open source projects 
(20 answers), including the following examples: 
 Because part of why we are doing it is for it to be FREE and open for everyone 
 I am an open source advocate 
 I believe the patent and copyright rules have expanded to a ludicrous degree and do 
more to stifle innovation than they ever have done to promote it. I find the whole 
system reprehensible and actively avoid participating in it. 
 I/we do not like the idea of not sharing 
 My ideas should be open for all 
 Patenting is the antithesis of my world view 
2) diverse, ranging from state regulations and support to patenting the idea by a third party (6 
answers): 
 complicated patenting process 
 I live in Iraq. The amount of support that you get here is zer 
 my projects are at too early stage for consider patenting, but I'll think to do it later 
 No funds to defend the patent. Considerable efforts required to apply for a paten. 
 To generate prior art 
 When I researched my idea, someone had already patented something similar 
In terms of legal support, the low ratio of patents might be possibly explained by the low degree of 
legal assistance obtained by respondents (Table 4). 
Table 4. Legal assistance, n=94 (100%) 
Do you receive any legal assistance? 
Yes 20 (21.3%) 
No 74 (78.7%) 
 
The next variable pertained to obstacles the respondents meet in their making activities. Fifty two 
respondents (55.3%; n=94, 100%) admitted to experiencing various challenges, whereas 42 (44.7%; 
n=94, 100%) declared that they do not face any difficulties in making. 
Those who confirmed facing difficulties were further asked to name the obstacles that impede their 
workings. The answers are ranked as follows (Table 5). 
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Table 5. Classification of obstacles, n=52, multiple choice 
Could you name those obstacles?  
Limited access to resources and markets 35 
Legal barriers, like patents, copyright restrictions 28 
Organisational barriers 18 
Dominant standards and high switching costs 15 
Increasing technological complexity 13 
Other: 15 
 
Under the option "other," the respondents provided various interesting answers, which 
summarized as follows: 
 lack of time to develop ideas and funds to implement them 
 isolation, i.e. no friends with similar interests, hence participation in an online community 
 unfair treatment of open source: companies market and sell open-source innovations from 
other people without providing credit, and ultimately out-compete the original developers 
 overall social inertia - aggressive marketing that deeply conditions consumers 
 inability to access businesses to be heard 
 red tape and state barriers; lack of information (lack of white papers or wiring diagrams) 
 legal intimidation by companies that makers feel might be detrimental to their bottom line 
(rightly or not) 
 trade secrecy 
 the way the market is shaped and how it works 
 the company owns all ideas 
The questions which formed the core of the survey referred to the makers' experience with 
allegations of patent infringement. The assumption was that due to the advanced character of 
making, some makers were perhaps targeted by patent holders assuming patent infringement 
based on public use or commercialization. Only six respondents (6.5%; n=94, 100%) confirmed 
being involved in such situations; however, four claimed that it happened more than once (mean = 
7.75, median=4, n=4). Table 6 presents detailed characteristics of the cases. 
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Table 6. Descriptive characteristics of patent infringement claims, n=6, multiple choice 
Variable Number of answers 
What type of innovation was involved?  
improvement 3 
new design 5 
What triggered the reaction of the patent holder?  
breach of the license agreement 0 
sharing the innovation with others 3 
market entry, commercialization 2 
patent infringement 2 
other 
 in one case, requesting information 
 patent trolling everyone in the industry 
2 
What was the outcome?  
settlement 1 
license agreement 1 
court proceeding 1 
launch of a cooperation 0 
other 
 re-design to avoid conflict 
 no pursued legal action (i.e. no legal grounds) 
 work stopped 
3 
Who was the rightsholder?  
A big company 4 
A medium-sized company 0 
A small company 1 
An individual inventor 1 
  
The patent holders signalized about the infringement either informally (3 answers) or via a formal 
letter (written notification) (4 answers). All of the recorded cases took place in the USA, with one 
answer also referring to Japan. 
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Part 4 – Technological Background 
The respondents were active in various fields, predominantly hardware engineering (Chart 3). 
Chart 3. Technology sector, n=88 (100%) 
 
Under the category "other," respondents named mainly 3D printing and a combination of software 
and hardware, including robotics. Further entries included Arduino, defense, but also “Education, 
Practical approach & methodology of team play in the US vs Europe in the sport of soccer.” The 
provided answers pointed to the intersectional character of workings, which could not be clearly 
assigned to a single sector. 
The respondents represented various countries, with a prevalence of American makers (Chart 4.). 
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Chart 4. Country of making, n=84 (100%) 
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Below are some of the hard-to-narrow-down examples (with their original spelling): 
 3D Printer, Machine tool, CNC Robotics 
 graffiti honeypot – spatial RF sensor – handheld document processing 
 Motion controller for handicaped and able bodied 
 Simple microcontroller based toys and gadgets 
 Power on arduino système thrue housse electric network 
 high power devices driver 
 Simple devices or robots for households 
 instrument to measure coffee cherry fermentation in Africa, automation for domestic chicken 
keeping 
 Accelerometer-based free-form persistence of vision gadget 
 Aircraft Design 
 Needle driver, IV port, and a wound dressing 
 navigation system, stroller, 3D printer, scientific instrument to measure 
 Artificial muscle 
 drills vs open competition structured practices as age approaches adolescence and vs. no 
practice all games and pick up games every games has outside referee sorce (US) vs. all games 
are self refereed (EU) 
 Micro controller monitored chicken coop and greenhouse. 
 Sentry gun 'rail guns autonomous flyng veachels 
 Micro CHP system, Net zero greenhouse design, Ionic precipitator for biomass systems 
 Personal flight instrument. Household control. Electronic educational toys. 
 Hexapod 
 Microprocessor based speaker protection, based on waveform analysis. 
 some entstop-triggers for 3dPrinting a device that keeps headphone cords from tangling 
 Biofeedback devices 
 
4. Discussion 
The survey found and proved that makers can be targeted by patent holders. All respondents who 
declared to have received an infringement warning were active and innovating members of maker 
communities. This confirmed the assumption that public sharing within a group might expose a 
maker to the peril of infringement allegations. 
Furthermore, the survey indicated that patenting, though not much common, takes place when the 
worked solution gains a marketable form and becomes commercialized. 
It also revealed a negative attitude toward the patent system according to the credo of making: you 
make, you share. Though at the same time, it showed that what deterred respondents from filing a 
patent application to a large degree were high patenting costs. There is nothing wrong in patenting 
inventions; patents offer a good opportunity to recoup the investment and to earn a living. Some 
makers who patent their solutions, like William Steele, openly declare that they license their 
solutions in order to license them to commercial companies, while keeping the data (source code 
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and designs) open for hacking and making.962 Such conduct blends together two approaches: an 
idealistic approach of making and sharing and a pragmatic approach of monetisation. 
At this point, it must be stressed that the survey does not claim to reveal the prevailing opinions 
among makers. As the maker community is enormous and the answer ratio of this survey modest, 
the survey discloses indications of certain occurrences. It suggests that the investigated matters are 
not indifferent to makers. 
The significance of the questions on the technological background of makers diminished with the 
growing overall comprehension of the maker movement and the progress of the research. The 
underlying questions and the hypothesis of the project were based on the notion of user 
innovation. At the time of the preparation of the questionnaire, the studied literature did not 
indicate that the projects of end users were characterized by high technological input963 with the 
exception of communities set up by companies, but these were not the target group of this project. 
For that reason, technological questions were added to the survey to prove the assumed high 
technical affinity of makers (originally user innovators). As mentioned above, currently, due to 
increased media presence and various public events, the technological characteristics of the maker 
movement do not require any further research or a deeper presentation. Likewise, the section of 
the survey on commercialization set out to prove that makers deliver commercially successful 
solutions. 
In conclusion, the survey was intended to gather information on the makers' experience with 
patents and to collect opinions on the protection system. The relaunch of the study was aimed at 
generating a higher answer ratio, which nonetheless remains modest when compared with the 
general population of makers (which is constantly growing). In other words, the results are not 
representative for the whole community. Nevertheless, the assumptions that makers have reached 
the level of patentable solutions and that they have attracted the interest of patent holders cannot 
be rejected, which provides the empirical groundwork for this project. 
A great added value of the survey was the opportunity to enter maker and hacker communities, to 
learn their opinions on patents, their projects, and their aspirations; with the project culminating in 
a presentation during the Chaos Communication Congress in 2014. 
                                                          
962 "Ultra-Bot 3D Printer by William Steele. Questions about Open Source and our Patent Application." "Ultra-
Bot 3D Printer by William Steele. Questions about Open Source and our Patent Application." 
963 The open source communities, like Linux or Apache, without undermining the skills of programmers and 
hackers, were not the desired examples of user innovations, since the object of their works pertained to 
copyright protection. The sought communities and users were to be involved into high-tech tangibles: 
(self-) hand-made and -changed products. 
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B. Abbreviations 
 
3D printing Three-dimensional printing 
AIA America Invents Act 
CJEU Court of Justice for the European Union 
CL Compulsory license/compulsory licensing 
DIY Do-it-yourself 
DoE Doctrine of Equivalents 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EPC European Patent Convention 
EPO European Patent Office 
EU European Union 
IC Integrated circuits 
JPA Japan Patent Act 
JPO Japan Patent Office 
NPE Non-practicing entity 
PAE Patent assertion entity 
patCL Patent compulsory license/patent compulsory licensing 
R&D Research and development 
RDoE Reverse doctrine of equivalents 
TEC Treaty establishing the European Community 
TFEU Treaty of functioning of the European Union 
TRIPS Agreement on the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UK IPO United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office 
UPC Agreement Agreement on a Unified Patent Court 
UPC Unified Patent Court 
U.S.C. United States Code 
USPTO United States Patent and Trademark Office 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation 
FDM Fused deposition modelling 
i.e. Id es (that is) 
e.g. Exempli gratia (for example) 
ibid. Ibidem (in the same place) 
EEA European Economic Area 
PCT Patent Cooperation Treaty 
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